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CHAPTER 1  
 
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Background  
 
The patterns of civil-military relations in independent Africa are influenced by the discourse of the 
western armed forces, and Namibia is no exception. The emerging patterns of post-independence 
civil-military relations are marked, at the level of institutions and mechanisms, by a strong similarity 
between the formal mechanisms and institutions of civil control found in the metropole and those 
introduced in the newly independent countries. For example, Namibia’s Constitution, which serves 
as a formal control mechanism over the military, was heavily influenced by Western European 
countries such as Britain, Germany and the United Sates of America who helped negotiate the 
country’s independence process. The constitutions of most independent African countries, Namibia 
included, have a provision that makes the president commander-in-chief of the armed forces like in 
the United States of America (Edmonds, 1988:77). The incorporation of the provision in the 
constitution was to prevent the military from exercising undue power and influence. Similarly, 
military institutions such as Namibia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) mirror that of Britain in design. 
The researcher argues that such military establishments reflect the Western model of civil-military 
relations inherited by newly-independent African countries.  Chapters 5 and 6 give more details of 
Namibia’s civil-military relations in transition and context. Since the end of the Cold War many 
countries have been preoccupied with demilitarisation, security and sustainable development. 
Consequently, security sector governance has emerged as a key element in the process of 
democratisation. 
 
Democratic governance is an essential element of the stable and secure setting necessary to 
support human development and human security in a country. Governance has thus received 
increasing consideration in Africa since the early 1990s. Nonetheless, Ball & Fayemi (2006) argue 
that while good governance was accepted as fundamental to supporting democracy and to 
promoting good development results, very little attention was given to the question of how the 
security sector was governed until the late 1990s. However, it has been found that sound 
governance of the security sector is crucial for the success of democratic consolidation, poverty 
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reduction, and sustainable economic and social development. It is also important for the quality of 
security, which is about creating a safe and secure environment for the state and its entire 
population. 
 
In Namibia, various national policies have been justified by the maintenance of ‘peace and security’ 
as a precondition to ‘nation-building’. The Government has recognised that the military has 
tremendous power which it can use against the state. Therefore, the politicians, who are elected 
representatives of the people, found it important to control the utilisation of this coercive power for 
the benefit of society rather than for uncontrolled and self-serving ways. The term civil-military 
relations is usually used in a generic way to cover relations between the armed forces and society 
or the political authority. Independent Namibia opted for democratic civil-military relations with the 
aim of ensuring civil control over the military.  
 
Much has been written on civil-military relations; however, very little research has been produced 
on democratic civil-military relations in Namibia since independence. The term civil-military 
relations has a varied usage depending on the context within which it is applied. It is somewhat 
self-evident that the term can only be used in societies where a sufficient level of institutional 
differentiation exists between the armed forces and the civilian authorities (Williams, 1998:1). 
Nevertheless, there are a number of different senses in which the term civil-military relations can 
be used. This research attempts to fill the gap by looking at the political institutions that are 
necessary for democratic civil-military relations and how they have contributed to peace and 
stability in Namibia. 
 
Nature and Scope of Empirical Material 
 
The scope of this research is to examine the generally held western assumptions of Civil-Military 
relations and how they were institutionalised in Namibia since independence between 1990 and 
2005. The study will focus on Namibia’s civil-military relations in the context of the Namibian 
Constitution which outlines the principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships that are 
necessary to secure democratic civil-military relations. In addition, the Ministry of Defence, 
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budgetary mechanisms and military professionalism will be examined as they are critical to 
successful civil control over the armed forces.  
 
Significance of the Research 
 
This research study seeks to improve understanding of the interaction between different factors 
relating to civil-military relations and their significant bearing for democratic control of the military in 
Namibia. Although the subject of civil-military relations has been researched in great detail, not 
many in-depth national case studies have been written. It is therefore hoped that the findings of this 
research will help improve the actual practice of civil-military relations in Namibia.  
 
The military has the capacity to use substantial force and potential to overthrow the civil authority 
and destroy democracy. The purpose behind establishing the military is to defend the country 
against external attacks. The role of the military is to uphold, in a non-partisan manner, the rule of 
law and the territorial integrity of the state, or else democratic governance is endangered. 
However, post-independent African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Lesotho etc experienced 
military coup d'états (Nathan, 1996:1). The question is how to address and manage the power of 
the military so that they do not interfere in the political governance of the country. Feaver 1999:215 
noted that “A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil-military 
relations”. 
 
Study focus 
 
The preceding paragraphs highlighted the significance of civil control over the military and the 
state’s ability to enforce democratic governance. This study explores the broad theme of civil-
military relations to establish a framework for Namibia’s civil-military relations that ensures 
successful democratic civil control of the military. Specifically the study 
 
• examines the patterns of civil-military relations in independent Africa to comprehend the 
emerging patterns of post-independence civil-military relations in Namibia,  
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• explores requirements needed for democratic control of the armed forces to determine 
Namibia’s civil military relations,  
• assesses the interface among different democratic institutions and mechanisms necessary 
for civil control of the military in Namibia, and 
• examines the influence of the international context and involvement of external actors in 
shaping Namibia’s civil-military relations. However, since civil-military relations take place 
in unique settings, the study will draw some conclusions and practical policy 
recommendations to strengthen civil-military relations to sustain peace and stability in 
Namibia.  
 
Research Problem 
 
Governments in colonial Africa were supported by a well established military and security 
establishment. Post-independent states in Africa are largely shaped by the colonial states that 
existed before. At independence most African states essentially rearranged the political structures 
that they inherited from their former colonial masters. The state has been defined by some scholars 
as “the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance” (Chazan et al, 
1999:39). The main mechanisms of state comprise the executive and parliament as decision 
making bodies, the civil service as decision-implementing agency, security forces as decision-
enforcing organisations and courts as decision-mediating institutions. Chazan (1999:39-40) further 
posits that for state organs to operate effectively the military should be able to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the country.  
  
The post-colonial period saw the growth and strengthening of the military in Africa. The military was 
retained as a symbol of sovereignty and national independence. Equally, in other countries such as 
the former Zaire, the military was sustained and expanded to provide necessary support for the 
weak government of Mobutu Sese Seko. The collapse of Somali’s central government in the 1990s 
was attributed to the government’s inability to fulfil critical functions associated with a modern state, 
especially to provide security, safety and law and order (Andersen, 2006:3). The state in Africa is 
often viewed, among other things, as repressive, fragile and absolutist, because the power 
inherited at independence was mainly concerned with domination rather than legitimacy. This has 
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caused instability associated with illegitimate and bad governance in some African countries. The 
military was also seen as an instrument of oppression that supported autocratic rulers rather than 
serving the interests of the nation as a whole. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new period of 
security and development nexus, and bad governance was seen as the root cause of state failure. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an 
international organisation helping governments tackle the economic, social and governance 
challenges, Security Sector Reforms are aimed at ensuring that the security sector in a given 
country is capable of meeting the security needs of both state and people in a manner consistent 
with democratic norms, good governance and the rule of law (OECD, 2005:16). The task facing 
African countries, Namibia included, is reforming the security sector in a manner consistent with 
democratic norms and values necessary for the development.  
 
Civil supremacy of the armed forces in a democracy embraces the idea of the sovereignty of the 
people. In Namibia the military is subordinate and accountable to civilian officials who are elected 
by the people. This is meant to ensure that the state is in a position to base its values, institutions, 
and practices on popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders. In a democracy, military 
leaders obey the government as they accept the basic national and political goals of a democracy 
and because it is their duty (Janowitz, 1960:79). However, the armed forces in Africa have often 
contributed to political instability and armed conflicts (Luckham, 1988:1). The military is an 
important state institution as it holds coercive power. The primary duty of the armed forces is 
usually to protect the sovereignty of the country against external aggression. Nonetheless, the 
military also has the potential to overthrow the civil authority and destroy democracy to achieve its 
own objectives or its perception of institutional security or national objectives. As Feaver 
(1999:217) suggests, military coups are the usual concern of civil-military relations. He adds that 
coups radically represent the main crisis of the military, because they take advantage of their 
coercive power to replace civilian rulers. It should, however, be noted that the study of civil-military 
relations not only focuses on coups but on other issues such as the relations between the military, 
as a political, social and economic institution, and the society as well as the military relations with 
the political authorities. Scholars on civil-military relations have suggested that “the problem of the 
modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician” (Huntington, 
1957:20). The researcher agrees with this argument because often the relationship between the 
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military and politicians is characterised by a lack of understanding of each other. One will find that 
the ruling politicians seem not to have knowledge and understanding of the military, and therefore 
are not interested in what is happening in the military institutions. On the other hand, the military 
tends to be involved in political issues to advance its interests, thus straining the relationship with 
politicians. 
 
The period 1960-63 saw the achievement of independence by most African countries. Afterwards 
the continent witnessed numerous military coups or attempted coups. Nevertheless, with the end of 
the Cold War and pressure from Western countries for the continent to democratise, many African 
states have emerged from authoritarian rule. Consequently, most countries have found it important 
that the power that is held by the armed forces be utilised in a responsible way for the benefit of the 
society. To achieve this, they have opted for the subordination of the military to the civilian 
authority, although coups and coup attempts have persisted (Nathan, 1996:1). 
 
Beyond the absence of legitimacy as a result of political and socio-economic strains that 
characterise most African societies, scholars such as Decalo (1991:67) remind us there has been 
little agreement on what propels the military to overthrow a civilian government. Nonetheless, there 
are several different reasons that have contributed to military coups in most of post-colonial Africa. 
Undemocratic political processes, weak civil society, economic deprivation, gross failure of civilian 
governance, weak societal institutions, extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts are some of the 
contexts in a state that may cause military intervention in politics. Similarly, the military justify 
coups in order to rescue the state from bankruptcy and corrupt civilian regimes that fail to pay the 
salaries of soldiers. As Edmonds (1988) fittingly puts it, the military will interfere in the political 
process especially when civilian authority can no longer deliver the social goods and does not 
possess the capacity to exert control within the country. Additionally, rapid cuts in the military 
budgets that largely violate what has been traditionally regarded as the institutional prerogatives of 
the armed forces, and restriction of the military’s organisational autonomy, have been cited as 
some of the reasons for coups (Thomson, 2000:129).  
 
For Bratton et al (1997:212) coups take place when there are social changes in the country that 
threaten the interests of the military and their allies, as happened in Algeria in 1991, where the 
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military prevented the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front from coming to power after their 
electoral victory, or when the military seeks to change the society entirely, for example, the 
overthrow of the authoritarian government of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 by a 
military-based socialist movement. From Thomson’s (2000:20) point of view African states lack 
legal-rational authority, that is, state institutions constituted to serve the interest of citizens. By 
implication, most African states have been weakened by some form of authoritarian regime that 
has characterised the continent. In some countries that are undergoing a transition to democracy, 
the state is not only weak, but sometimes nonexistent outside the capital city. Such states have 
weak civil control over the military. As a result it is easy for the military to exert undue pressure on 
the government. Researchers such as Cottey et al point out that weak states such as Nigeria are 
characterised by ineffective governmental and political structures, deep social/political divisions 
and disunity in society, thus creating significant conditions and reasons for military intervention in 
civil affairs (1999:12).  
 
In most independent African states, power is centralised in the hands of the executive branch of 
government. Equally, most countries on the continent are by and large governed by personal rather 
than institutional rule, combined with clientelism to retain legitimacy within the political system 
(Bratton, 1997:107). Disappointingly, some new African leaders have sought to remain in power by 
perpetuating their regimes, have restrained the work of the opposition political parties because they 
see opposition as a threat to their own positions, and have been unwilling to leave their 
comfortable jobs through democratic elections. Some have failed to establish and consolidate 
democracy because of their failure to replace colonial instruments that were manifestly designed 
for domination, oppression and exploitation with the ones for popular participation and others. The 
researcher argues that the consolidation of power with strong authoritarianism has characterised 
most African states, thus undermining democratic civil-military relations. 
 
Some independent African states have failed to make a transition from authoritarianism to 
democratic governance. Among the reasons put forward for the failure of such transformation is the 
weakness of control mechanisms such as laws that ensure checks and balances that have allowed 
leaders not to be held accountable for their actions, economic dependence on former colonial 
masters, lack of skills and resources etc. Tribalism and ethnicity have also been given as reasons 
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for the failure of nation-building in many African states. Eritrea, which was a province of Ethiopia, 
broke away and formed a new independent state. But this is also true in other continents, such as 
in East European countries where the world has witnessed the reappearance of nationalism in the 
1980s that led to the break up of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the formation of 
new states. It is also common in most African states, Namibia included, to find political movements 
based mainly on ethnicity. One can give the examples of the Inkhatha Freedom Party in South 
Africa, and the United Democratic Front in Namibia as largely ethnic-based political parties.  
Therefore, among other things, colonial heritages, weak state institutions, lack of democracy and 
unregulated political ambitions have largely contributed to the failure of the African state, resulting 
in brutal civil wars and other conflicts in many countries.     
 
In contrast to the above scenario on the continent, Namibia, along with Botswana, South Africa and 
many others, is considered to be a democratic state. Namibia enjoys a free press, holds regular 
elections and there is little or no violence during or after elections as compared to other countries 
such as Nigeria (Keulder and Tania, 2005:8). Accordingly, there has not been a coup d’etat, 
attempted coup d’etat, or any form of unacceptable influence over the political process by the 
military in Namibia since independence. On a continent where the involvement of the armed forces 
in politics is common, Namibia’s success story is remarkable and thus needs to be examined.  
 
To understand the dynamics of Namibia’s civil-military relations experience one has to look at 
existing paradigms that describe the informal dimensions of civil-military relations rather than only 
examining the obvious formal, institutional arrangements. In addition, it would be interesting to find 
out what worked well in civil-military relations in Namibia and why. Thus by engaging with these 
issues this study is conducted in order to shed light on how the concept of civil-military relations 
has been institutionalised and dealt with since independence. The study explores other factors 
which may shape civil-military relations, suggesting that these are the following: the ways in which 
historical patterns, in particular the German and South African colonial period, as well as the 
liberation era, laid the foundation for a strong civil supremacy in Namibia; civil-military relations in 
the African context; the Constitution and institutions such as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
arrangements relating to civil control of the armed forces. 
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Chapter 1 provided a broad and general background to the research problem with regard to the 
military contributions to political instability in African countries. The chapter also highlighted the 
importance of democratic civil control of the armed forces in order to guarantee sustainable peace 
and stability. Chapter 2 will address the research questions and methodology for collecting data to 
support the findings of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study explores the nature of civil-military relations in Namibia. In order to do this, the 
research examines the political institutions in the country that are necessary for democratic civil-
military relations and how they have effectively contributed to the prevailing peace and stability in 
Namibia.  
 
It is generally acknowledged that democratic governance plays a critical role to ensure a stable and 
secure environment for the state and its citizens. Similarly, it has been observed that democratic 
governance of the security sector is crucial for the success of democratic consolidation and social 
development (Ball, et al 2006:1). Nevertheless, a fundamental transformation of the security sector, 
aligning it with core democratic governance values, principles and practices, is needed to ensure 
effective democratic governance of the sector. In pursuit of the above, this research study was 
guided by the following sub-questions: 
 
1. What formal mechanisms of constitutional and civil control are in place, how do they 
operate and are they successful?  
2. What criteria have been used to govern civil-military relations in the context of democratic 
politics in Namibia?  
3. What is the role of the Executive and Parliament in civil-military relations? 
4. Are civil stakeholders empowered to engage in defence matters?  
5. How are the Ministry of Defence and military organised?  
6. What is the role of the Minister of Defence and the Permanent Secretary in civil-military 
relations? 
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Methodology 
 
Introduction  
 
The study adopted a qualitative method of research. This method led to a description of the 
concepts that underpin civil-military relations in the context of independent Namibia. This approach 
was appropriate given the study’s research questions and the guiding theoretical framework. The 
descriptive approach assisted in testing the assumption of civil-military relations in the present 
situation in order to explain civil-military relations. Landman (1988) says descriptive research is 
“primarily concerned with describing the nature or conditions and degree in detail of the present 
situation” (http://www.petech.ac.za/robert/resmeth.htm).  
 
This approach assisted in examining the general aspects of civil-military relations. Thereafter the 
study narrows to the identification of the main features of Namibian civil-military relations. This 
approach, in addition to a literature survey, also involved participant observation in the Ministry of 
Defence, where the researcher worked. The researcher spent some time conducting interviews 
and observing the application and implementation of civil control of the military in the country. In 
this regard, the researcher used the experience gained as a former official in the Ministry of 
Defence and as a Parliamentary official. Moreover, the approach sought to find “a deep 
understanding of the meaning found in the literature and then relate it to the whole” (Neuman, 
1997: 68). Accordingly, the methodology assisted in measuring the practice in Namibia against the 
experiences discussed in the literature. 
 
Methods of Data Collection 
 
Interviews  
 
In pursuit of the research objective, as well as to facilitate recording of empirical information on 
civil-military relations, in-depth interviews and discussions were conducted with major resource 
persons and stakeholders including: 
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• Senior Government Officials – the nature of the relationship between the Executive Branch 
and the military can help determine the prospects for the role of the military so it does not 
impinge upon the transition towards democracy  
• Politicians/Parliamentarians – Parliament provides a critical check on decisions, authority 
and roles of the military establishment and structures 
• Serving and former Namibian Defence Force (NDF) officers who were/have been involved 
directly in policy making and implementation 
• SWAPO party officials – to establish mechanisms used to subordinate PLAN to civil 
authority/party. This assisted the researcher to understand why the NDF, which is mostly 
comprised of former PLAN soldiers, easily accepted civil control during the defence force’s 
inception stage 
• Official opposition parties – to determine the role of political parties in ensuring checks and 
balances in the governance of the defence force 
• Academics and experts who offered an analytical viewpoint of civil-military relations 
practice in Namibia 
• Private sector, civil society actors, organisations and individuals – to establish the extent to 
which civil society is permitted or wants to engage in defence or security-related issues. 
This can be a barometer of the country’s maturity for civil-military relations.  
 
By interviewing the above respondents, the research gathered diverse input to come up with 
conclusions to the research questions. Thirty (30) individuals were interviewed. These individuals 
were carefully selected for their ability to provide answers to the exploration of the theoretical, 
institutional and implementation context of civil-military relations as well as its impact. Some of 
these respondents also gave some readings and documents that were appropriate for studying the 
research problem. The Interview Guidelines are attached as appendix 4. 
 
Sample Selection 
 
The research used purposive sampling as a means of selecting individual respondents who are 
responsible for key functions. By using this kind of sampling to collect the data the researcher 
selected individuals and institutions who could give the most relevant information (see interview list 
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attached as appendix 5). In addition, this method allowed the researcher to rely on respondents’ 
experiences and insights on the subject being studied (Welman and Kruger, 1999:63). The 
researcher was also aware of the problem with this kind of sampling as it is biased towards people 
whom the researcher thinks possess important information. But the benefits of the method are that 
it targets people with specific knowledge. Also this is an accepted practical method of sampling in 
qualitative research. 
 
Primary data was collected by means of interviews with key informants, internet searches and 
seminar/workshop participation, government reports and documents, research papers and 
participant observation. Primary data was sourced through semi-structured interviews with key 
questions. These types of interviews allowed, where necessary, the probing of respondents’ 
answers for clarification. At the same time, the researcher was aware not to ask leading questions 
as they might influence the participants’ responses to the interview questions. 
 
Primary documents 
 
Primary documents such as parliamentary reports on debates on defence and security, policy 
documents such as policy statements, discussion papers, Ministry of Defence Annual Reports and 
other related material were used.  A search of appropriate web sites, including Institute for Security 
Studies, United States Information Services, and United Nations comprised an essential part of the 
data gathering process. UN documents and flyers were particularly helpful as it was impossible to 
interview UNTAG personnel who had left Namibia long before the time of undertaking this study. 
 
Secondary sources 
 
The researcher also used secondary sources in the form of books, reports, periodicals, articles, 
and newspapers with information relevant to the topic of this research. Appropriate conferences, 
seminars and workshops with academics were attended at the Center for Defence and Security 
Management (CDSM), Wits University and at the Joint Authors’ Symposium of the Danish Institute 
for International Studies (DIIS) and the Southern African Defence and Security Management 
Network (SADSEM) in Windhoek. The researcher also attended a series of seminars at the Danish 
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Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen, Denmark to further develop the understanding of 
approaches to security and research. Preliminary research findings of this study were presented 
and discussed at some of these research forums. 
 
Archival materials 
 
The study also used archival materials such as historical records on SWAPO’s liberation struggle 
and other related documents to access historical data on civil-military relations. These historical 
sources were used to derive a representative reflection of how civil-military relations evolved and 
institutionalised. In using these sources, the researcher was aware that the accuracy of the study 
might be undermined because historical sources are only reflective of recorded events and might 
leave out relevant undocumented data; government reports, for instance, might be biased as they 
may reflect the position of the governing party and not be representative of non governmental 
organisations and agencies; and information from official press releases may not necessarily 
include the views of other political parties. Moreover, the researcher was aware of the problem of 
accessing such documents because of the secrecy surrounding them. Nonetheless, the researcher 
was allowed access to documents relevant to the study. 
 
The researcher hopes that combining the secondary sources will help reduce their individual 
limitations as well as increase their reliability, thus increasing the overall reliability of this study. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The study utilised thematic analysis. This method of analysis focuses on identifiable themes and 
patterns of behaviour. Aronson (1994) has identified four steps in the thematic analysis of data. 
The first step is the collection of data from interviews or literature and the listing of patterns of 
experiences. This can come from direct quotes or paraphrasing common ideas. The next step of 
thematic analysis is to identify all data that relate to the already classified patterns. Thereafter the 
identified patterns are expounded upon and all data that fit under a specific pattern are identified 
and placed with the corresponding pattern. The next step is to combine and catalogue related 
patterns into sub-themes or recurring activities, followed by building a valid argument for choosing 
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the themes. The researcher does this by referring back to the literature to gain information that 
allows him or her to make inferences from the interviews and literature. Once the literature is 
interwoven with the findings from the interviews, the research is likely to produce a researched 
study that stands with merit. 
 
The researcher utilised this method in an attempt to compare the broad empirical pattern of civil-
military relations to find a correlation with that being practiced in Namibia. A review and analysis of 
the relevant existing literature and available data on civil-military relations was carried out. The 
purpose was to address a variety of questions on the concept of civil-military relations and assess 
the use of civil-military relations in the country. In analysing data, the researcher examined civil-
military relations in the context of Namibia’s history, social, political, and economic background as 
well as international factors that might have shaped the country’s democratic civil control over the 
military.  In this regard, the historical approach was used in addition to the interviews. The study 
involves the historical accounts of civil-military relations in Namibia in order to evaluate the evident 
and important implications. The approach also made it possible to avoid the risk of getting caught 
with analysing the subject of civil-military relations which is generic.  
 
Both primary and secondary source materials, including archival documents, policy documents, UN 
Reports and media articles, were scrutinised by this researcher. Where appropriate the stated 
aims, oversight mechanisms and reports on defence and security constituted vital yardsticks for 
evaluating the impact of civil-military relations in the country. 
 
The research was based on the available and conceptual framework of civil-military relations. 
Therefore, the nature of civil-military relations in Namibia was explored and analysed on the basis 
of existing theoretical and operational frameworks of civil-military relations. 
 
Reliability, validity and ethical issues 
 
The qualitative approach allowed the researcher to test the validity of certain assumptions that are 
inherent in the theoretical formulation of civil-military relations. The study used triangulation which 
involves various and divergent sources of data such as interviews, internet searchers, 
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seminar/workshop participation, government reports and documents, archival searches, research 
papers, newspapers, books, magazine and research of others in the field of civil-military relations 
so as to enhance the validity and reliability of the study findings. To this end, the researcher cross-
checked what the literature says about the theory of civil-military relations in a broad sense with the 
civil-military relations being practiced in Namibia to see if the study findings agree with what is 
written in the literature.  
 
Researchers such as Lincoln and Guba (1985) cited in Babbie and Mouton (1998:277) propose 
that the issue of reliability should not focus on getting the same results from the data collected, but 
rather on whether the results are consistent with the data collected. This will verify that data 
collected is both accurate and reliable.  
 
Finally, in view of the sensitive nature of defence and security research, and in keeping with the 
ethical standards governing this form of research, every effort was made to adhere to the university 
rules and regulations. Permission was granted for interviews and for accessing documents. All 
participants were told about the purpose of this research, and where they agreed to be interviewed, 
their responses were taped with their permission. The researcher asked all participants whether 
they wanted to be anonymous and anonymity was ensured. The data acquired in this research will 
only be used for this study.  
 
The limitations of the research 
 
In an attempt to examine civil-military relations in Namibia, the researcher recognises the 
limitations of dealing with the sensitive and sometimes secret nature of defence and security 
issues. The researcher anticipated problems of access to information relevant to the study. Lee 
sums it up as follows: “This may affect the availability and quality of data with usually adverse 
consequences for levels of reliability and validity” (1995: 2). However, the researcher is well known 
to most defence policy makers in Namibia, which allowed for access to certain data. Another 
constraint for the researcher is that not much has been published on civil-military relations in 
Namibia. The study did not deal with the private security sector or the Special Field Force (SFF), a 
paramilitary unit of the Namibian Police under a different ministry, but concentrated on the military. 
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Therefore, this research limited itself to the Namibian Defence Force, and oversight and 
management structures related to defence. 
 
Limitations of this study also came about as a result of time constraints and lack of resources such 
as books on civil-military relations in Namibia. The other limitation was bias that could have arisen 
in the research. According to Leedy, bias is any influence or condition that disturbs data from what 
may have been obtained under conditions of pure chance (1989:213). Moreover, bias is inherent in 
all research, and descriptive studies are particularly susceptible to distortion through the 
introduction of bias (Leedy, 1989:213). There are several sources of bias that may be present in 
this research. The position of the researcher as a government official could have contributed to the 
responses given by respondents. For example, a respondent may have been unforthcoming in 
answering the questions posed given the researcher’s position, or may have said what they 
thought the interviewer wanted to hear. In an attempt to minimise the potential reluctance of 
respondents, respondents were offered the choice of being interviewed anonymously. In addition, 
the researcher’s employment in the Parliament of Namibia-National Council may have led the 
researcher to interpret the data in a particular way. Nevertheless, every effort was made to address 
these shortcomings. Interviews, for instance, were held in neutral places and not in the office, after 
hours when possible. The researcher also explained to respondents that although employed in 
government, he was undertaking the interview in his private capacity and time. The respondents 
were allowed to tell the story, and the researcher’s personal judgment was kept out as much as 
possible. This researcher avoided making judgments about what respondents did not say or could 
have said. Respondents’ responses were cross-checked with data from literature on civil-military 
relations to guarantee reliability and validity. This researcher literally separated data from 
respondents and data from the literature in an attempt to avoid subjective bias in the study. It is 
hoped the effort assisted this researcher to interpret data from a more objective perspective.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The significance of the study is to improve understanding of the interaction between different 
factors relating to civil-military relations and their importance to democratic control of the military in 
Namibia. 
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The preceding chapter described the qualitative research methodology used to explore the nature 
of civil-military relations in Namibia.  The qualitative approach was employed to investigate the 
validity and reliability of the study. Chapter 3 investigates literature in the field of civil-military 
relations to determine the nature of civil-military relations being practiced in Namibia. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature on civil-military relations by looking at the 
broad perspectives of different scholars on civil-military relations. It is hoped that by examining the 
literature the study will establish the nature of civil-military relations being practiced in Namibia. 
 
The literature on civil-military relations is preoccupied with the mechanics of controlling the armed 
forces, such as legislative oversight and military professionalism, but limited research has been 
conducted on how civil-military relations emerged and evolved. An analysis of Namibian civil-
military relations reveals a weakness in that there are no local civil-military relations studies before 
1980. This complicated the extent to which a scholar could rely on the conceptual and historical 
traditions developed in western military sociology and civil-military relations studies. By undertaking 
this case study, an attempt is made to achieve a better understanding of the phenomenon of civil 
supremacy in Namibia.  
 
This review looks at state institutions for the control of the military, because they are of primary 
importance for civil-military relations. Since civil-military relations encompass a wide area of 
research, the review looks primarily at the research that is deemed relevant for this study. A review 
of both relevant referenced and ‘grey’ literature on civil-military relations is used. Both published 
and unpublished local and international literature has been consulted. This research study, 
therefore, seeks to make a contribution to the gap in the literature by undertaking an analysis of 
civil-military relations in Namibia since independence. 
 
This study will draw from four sets of literature, namely (1) civil-military relations concepts and 
theories; (2) civil-military relations in democratic transitions; (3) civil-military relations in the African 
context; (4) Namibian civil-military relations.  
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Definitions  
 
The description of the nature and scope of civil-military relations is determined by various factors 
and specific geographical disposition of a country. For this reason, this researcher will first look at 
the definition of the concept of civil-military relations and apply it to the contemporary Namibian 
context. 
 
Various scholars, often influenced by their personal ideological disposition, have defined in 
different ways what civil-military relations encompass. Louis Smith (1951) points to principles that 
have governed American civil military relations. These include: (1) Civilian leadership of the 
executive branch of government that is accountable to the people through regular elections; (2) 
civilian leadership of the professional military services and departments. The professional military 
heads are subordinate to civilian departmental heads and are appointed by the president and 
confirmed by the Congress; (3) constitutional provisions to establish basic national security 
policies. Elected representatives pass laws that define the defence, organisation and policies of the 
nation. The chief executive implements these directives, the Constitution provides course of action, 
and the Congress enacts legislation that defines the scope of military activity; (4) legal defence of 
civilian control. The Supreme Court is authorised to hear cases that involve military violations of the 
rights of the citizenry. 
 
The importance of civilian control of the military was further expressed by US President Truman in 
his memoirs during the well-known Truman-MacArthur Debate, when he suggested that 
 
Policies are to be made by the elected political officials, not by generals or admirals…I have always 
believed that civilian control of the military is one of the strongest foundations of our system of free 
government…we have always guarded the constitutional provision that prevents the military from 
taking over the government from the authorities, elected by the people, in whom the power 
resides…(Truman, 1956: 444). 
  
Clausewitz argues that war is the continuation of politics by other means. In other words, the logic 
of war must come from the political masters of the military. Clausewitzean reasoning allocates a 
role for civilians and implies in turn, a role for the military (1966:89).  
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Janowitz says civil-military relations should examine the nature of military government and its class 
basis (1977:11). Other scholars such as Finer suggest that the study of civil-military relations 
should look at the reasons for military coups and intervention in politics (1988:10-11).  
 
In the liberal democratic paradigm civil-military relations consist of three constituent parts:  
• A clear separation between civilian and military powers and responsibilities 
• The accountability of the armed forces to civilian authority / government 
• The practice of transparency in the conduct of defence and security matters (Welch, 
1987:914; Edmonds, 1988:70-92; Danopoulus, 1992:3). 
 
Williams notes that the term civil-military relations are used in the descriptive sense of the word to 
describe the relations that pertain between the armed forces and the civilian authorities within a 
particular society. He further states that used in this sense, it refers in large part to the formal 
mechanisms of constitutional and political control that exercise a restraining influence over the 
armed forces through the Defence Act, budgetary issues and legislative functions (1998:1). 
 
Scholars such as Cottey, Edumunds and Forster suggest that the term ‘civil-military relations’ 
covers all characteristics of relations between armed forces and the society. They add that the 
political function and position of the military – their relationship with the institutions and patterns of 
political power in the society – underpin civil-military relations. Cottey et al. further argue that civil-
military relations also involves issues such as the broader attitude of the military towards civilian 
society; civilian society’s perceptions of and attitudes to the military; and the military’s ethos and 
understanding as to what its role should be (1999:4). 
 
Arguing along similar lines, Feaver suggests that the heart of traditional civil-military relations is a 
social contract between civilians and the military maintained in a ‘proper’ division of labour. He 
contends that the division of labour is expected because the concept of civil-military relations 
assumes a difference between what is called ‘civilian’ and the ‘military’ (1999:228).  
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Civil-military relations is also said to refer to “the hierarchy of structure, authority and functions, and 
the interaction between the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the citizenry on the one 
hand, and the armed forces on the other” (Du Pisani, 2000:5). 
 
Some critics of civil-military relations theorists argue that the USA experience of civil-military 
relations has unduly influenced western military scholars. Consequently, this tradition has 
universalised both the theory of civil-military relations and its practice. Much of the classical 
approach can be traced to the earlier writings of Samuel Huntington (1957) who emphasises the 
subordination of the armed forces to western-style checks and balances in the form of regulations, 
military procedures, military command and control patterns, legislative oversight etc. 
 
The Problem 
 
The traditional role of the armed forces is to fight wars on behalf of the state and to safeguard state 
security. Edmonds (1988:90) adds that the point of the military is for the defence of the state with 
the mandate to create hegemony, protect sovereignty and maintain stability through coerciveness 
when necessary to do so. Nonetheless, the role of the military has now been re-defined. 
Consequently, the armed forces have assumed new and non-traditional roles (human security as 
well as state security) geared towards nation and state building. 
 
It has been argued by researchers such as Kummel G. et al. (2000:7) that throughout history the 
military has acted in a non-democratic way by overthrowing democratic elected governments. 
Similarly, there have been incidences where the military has played a crucial role in defending a 
democratic regime against its attackers or even supported transition to democracy. It is therefore 
important to understand the characteristics of the military for a democratic country to come up with 
institutions for the political control and democratic control of the military.  
 
It is widely recognised that armed forces have tremendous power at their disposal. This power is 
generally intended to be used to prevent external aggression, but it can also be misused to 
undermine the political process and present an internal threat to the government and citizens of the 
state.  
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Control  
 
Huntington argues that usually the key concern of civil-military relations was how to assure ‘civilian 
control’ of military establishments. He argues that civil-military relations are shaped by three 
explanatory variables, namely, the level of external threat, the constitutional structure, and the 
ideological make-up of society. He further stresses professionalism of the armed forces as the 
foundation for non-intervention in the political sphere. Huntington characterises professionalism as 
a special type of vocation involving expertise, responsibility and corporateness. According to him 
professionalism holds the key to civilian control over the armed forces (1957:83).  
 
Janowitz and Finer have written extensively on the role of both societal and non-institutional factors 
necessary for ensuring that the armed forces adhere to the principle of civil supremacy. Janowitz 
suggests that the changes in the organisational framework of the military would reduce their 
political interference (1960:10-11). Finer also emphasises that an efficient and influential political 
sphere could manage the civil-military relations in such a manner that the armed forces 
intervention would be less likely (1962:6).  
 
Welch (1976) and Danopoulos (1992) cited in Du Pisani (2003) argue that: 
 
…the armed forces cannot be precluded from the political arena given their organizational identity, 
autonomy and functional specialization. In a democracy, the military exercises political influence 
through regularized and accepted avenues. In a context of democratic control, the security sector 
is content to exercise its bureaucratic bargaining and accept advice, but the sector stands ready to 
work within overall policy direction from government (2003:6). 
 
Welch has suggested three civil control mechanisms that have been successfully used by different 
states in the world. These include: (1) Ascriptive factors such as class and ethnicity that may affect 
the relationship between civilian and military leaders; (2) Utilisation of party controls, possibly 
through the creation of parallel hierarchies of commands; and (3) Constitutional constraints in the 
political impact of the military (1976:5). 
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Furthermore, Welch (1987:9-14) and Danapolous (1992:3) cited by Beebe et al. (2000:99) argue 
that given the military’s organisational identity, autonomy and functional specialisation, it cannot be 
totally excluded from the political arena. The same authors further contend that practically, civil 
supremacy exists when the armed forces are at ease to make use of their bureaucratic bargaining 
power but accept overall policy direction from government officials. 
 
Nathan adds that in democratic societies, “The governing principle is civil supremacy over the 
armed forces”. In other words, the armed forces are subordinated and accountable to the elected 
and duly appointed civilian authority. Democratic control of the armed forces requires that the 
citizens of the country support the activities of the military (1996:1). 
 
Similarly, it is argued that democratic control of the armed forces is generally perceived as 
subordination of the military to democratically elected political leaders. Therefore, all decision 
making on national defence is transferred to those who are in charge of the defence policy. 
Steinkamm further argues that it is difficult to explain the term “civil control of the armed forces” in 
democratic societies because each country has different ideas and historical experience (1988:23-
24).  
 
Chuter takes a slightly different view from the early writings of S.E. Finer and S. Huntington and 
their preoccupation within civil-military relations on controlling the power of the military. He defines 
civil control as the obedience which the military owes to the civis, the state. Additionally, Chuter 
argues that the military is one of a number of instruments of the state and has the duty of loyalty to 
the state which employs it on behalf of the citizens (2000:27). It is, however, imperative to make a 
distinction between civil control of the military and civilian control. Chuter further reminds us that 
civil control means that the military is part of the state (civis) machinery and works as an executive 
arm of the state. In a democracy, the government requires executive oversight to implement its 
programmes to serve the people that elected it into power (2000:27). Civilian control, on the other 
hand, has to do with control of the military by individual citizens. It is therefore possible for civilians 
to control the military in an undemocratic way.   
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Scholars such as Giraldo have identified reforms necessary to strengthen the role of civilians in 
military matters. Firstly, civilian control is likely to be more effective if civilian power is intense and 
there is a single, clear-cut chain of command, to avoid the military causing confrontation among 
civilians within the executive branch. Secondly, he argues that bodies with strong military 
representation should be downgraded to advisory roles with reduced policy authority. Thirdly, 
responsibilities given to civilians within the Ministry of Defence should be defined, or else many 
tasks may fall to the military (2001:9). 
 
Du Pisani clarifies: 
 
This in turn means that the government which the people elect is the first source of control, 
followed by parliament, followed possibly by the courts. The issue goes beyond that of narrow 
control, and means a complex inter-relationship between the state, political society and civil 
society, informed by the above principle (2003: 5-6).  
 
Luckham critiques these classical approaches and argues that the concept of civilian control 
makes it difficult to understand key questions about the nature of regimes. He says civilian 
autocracies just like military dictatorships have also depended on the military and other security 
agencies for repression and surveillance for their political survival (2003:21). He also disagrees 
that military professionalism is a panacea to military intervention as advanced by Huntington 
(1957). Arguing along similar lines, Stepan points out that in Latin America, for instance, it was the 
more professional soldiers who overthrew the government. According to him, soldiers were 
“inspired by the ‘new professionalism’ of internal security and counter-insurgency promoted under 
the US military aid programmes” (1973:260). 
 
Foster is of the view that civilian control has to do with the provision of oversight and the issuance 
of direction to the military by duly elected and appointed civilian officials. He has also identified the 
other control instrument for the military as force structure, doctrine, and technology. Foster 
suggests that to effectively control the military, civil authorities should be able to determine whether 
the military is predominately heavy or light, combat-oriented or support-oriented demographically 
varied or identical in composition; whether doctrine emphasises offensive or defensive operations, 
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early or late retirement for senior officers, unilateral or multilateral response, frequent or infrequent 
rotations; whether technology is mostly lethal or nonlethal, extremely advanced or less advanced 
(2005: 2).  
 
The other identified control measure for civilian authority over the military is the mission and 
culture. The mission of the military is rarely questioned in most cases. It is broadly understood that 
the rationale for the military is to fight a war. However, scholars such as Foster (2005:3) argue that 
such postulation is defective. He suggests that the purpose of the military is not only to fight wars, 
but to prevent war, give security and safeguard peace. He further proposes that the military that is 
structured, skilled and equipped first and foremost for peacekeeping, nation building, humanitarian 
support and disaster response is more willing to be controlled than a conventional war fighting 
military. 
 
Perlmutter rejects the idealistic ‘deterministic’ division between military and civil functions of state 
that are characteristic of past views of the relationships between armed forces and society. 
Furthermore, he emphasises that in the modern state there is a wide area of overlap between the 
two. He argues that military professionalism, the development of exclusive expertise and 
‘corporateness’, are linked with their bureaucratic function as a participant in overall defence and 
security management (1977:92). In other words, he is of the opinion that professionalism alone is 
not sufficient to explain civil control because in the modern state, where power in the society is 
diffused and crucial roles are carried out by multifaceted, differentiated and mutually dependent 
organisations and institutions, the armed forces are inextricably involved in the policy making 
process.   
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, a major underlying assumption of the literature has been the 
subordination of the armed forces to the political authority of the day. One can further argue that 
Huntington’s view of the civil-military relations represents the mainstream dominant theory and 
prescription within the civil-military relations paradigm.  
 
This brings the discussion to the examination of the two devices often used to pre-empt the 
ambitions of the armed forces. Civil-military relations can be understood better by looking at the 
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two different civilian control measures of military power identified by Samuel Huntington (1957:189-
192) and used to ensure obedience and compliance of the armed forces to civil authority namely 
“objective and subjective civilian forms of control”. 
 
Objective Civil Control 
 
By objective civil control Huntington (1957:189) recognises the need to maximise military 
professionalism, making it a politically unbiased instrument of the state, and assuring the military a 
unique existence as a professional institution. He argues that under the objective civil control, the 
officer corps is disciplined by its own professionalism, and the most important element is giving 
service to the community. He concludes that the more professional an army, that is the more it 
sees itself serving society, the less of a threat it would pose. This objective or liberal model is 
closely associated with western parliamentary democracies where control is realised through the 
maximisation of military professionalism. In other words the principle operates on the basis that the 
soldiers internalise their own subordination. In turn, the politicians are expected to exercise due 
regard for the internal professional autonomy of the armed forces. Huntington’s idea is that 
objective civil control is suitable given that the best underwriter for military subordination to political 
domination is beyond doubt a professional military. It is further argued by Pantev that only military 
professionalism would lead to acceptance of the role of the military as an impartial instrument of 
national security, restricted from taking part in party politics and unlikely to interfere in politics 
(2005:108-9).  
 
Objective forms of control are formal, legalistic and statutory mechanisms agreed between the 
armed forces and the state as forms of checks and balances. They include formal control 
mechanisms such as parliamentary oversight over the armed forces, civil control over the defence 
budget process, constitutional restraints on the role of the military and other control mechanisms 
where the activities of the military are monitored. The model stresses a clear separation of 
responsibility between the civil and the armed forces, as well as ‘autonomous’ military 
professionalism. These mechanisms, according to Finer cited in Williams, depend on the level and 
legitimacy of political culture in a given country (2003: 270).  
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The objective form of control over the armed forces is the model that has been applied in most 
African countries with little success. Williams argues that this model has several limitations. Among 
others, it is instructive. For example effective control of the British Armed Forces was maintained 
into the 20th Century through strong historical ties that existed between the political elites and the 
top commanders of the Armed Forces. Similarly, the institutional-separation form of control where 
the military should be apolitical is problematic. The fact that the military is required to defend the 
constitution of the country and to serve the government of the day somehow involves them in the 
political process. Moreover, Williams is of the opinion that the formal-legalistic measures are 
designed to prevent an abuse of power rather than contain the armed forces within a legitimate and 
mutually agreed sphere of activity (2003:271). 
 
Subjective Civil Control 
 
The other measure is the ‘subjective civil control’ of the armed forces. By subjective civil control 
Huntington (1957:351) asserts the maximising of civil power by both civilising and politicising the 
military, by making it politically dependent, and denying the military a separate professionalism 
different from other organisations in society. According to this model, civil supremacy is enforced 
by the denial of an independent military sphere. Here the military becomes an integral, though 
subordinate, part of the political authority and is inculcated with civil political values and interests.  
 
Nevertheless, according to Baynham, subjective control is mostly identified with absolutist or 
totalitarian regimes such as that of Nazi Germany, where policy is in the end determined by force 
and coercion. This form of control is visible in arrangements such as party penetration and control 
of the top leadership of the military, ethnic composition of the officer corps to ensure loyalty, 
monitoring the activities of the military using non-military intelligence agencies, and the existence of 
security agencies such as intelligence, police or para-military to check on the influence of the 
armed forces (1992:10).  
 
Nathan (1994) describes informal practices as those where the public is able to apply a measure of 
indirect control and oversight through open debate, media scrutiny and academic research around 
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issues such as threat perceptions, alliances, doctrine, defence expenditure, weapons policy and 
the armament industry.  
 
It is claimed that informal political control over the military largely depends on the level of 
transparency and accountability permitted by executive government as well as the right of the 
citizenry to be informed in defence and security matters. It is further argued that a pre-requisite for 
successful informal political control over the armed forces is a flexible and well-established civil 
society (Williams, 2000:7).  
 
Likewise, Chuter argues that far more effective are informal methods of control. He further states 
that these methods of control vary from country to country, but are reported to be strong and 
essential in consensus-based societies such as in Africa and Asia. According to Chuter these 
methods are the heart of civil control in the best sense of the term and include:  
 
• Inter-penetration of the military and civilian elite 
• Involvement of civil society in policymaking 
• Frequent contacts between the military and civil society groups 
• Military and civilians working together (2000:31).  
 
The concept of subjective and objective models of civil control of the military was elaborated by 
Feaver (1999:228). He contends that neither civil nor military leadership has ever followed the 
prescription of the classic theory of a division of labour. As an alternative he proposes the 
assertive-delegation model. He demonstrates that although delegative control is related to 
Huntington’s objective civil control, civilians do not always completely support its ideal division of 
labour, but prefer to exercise direct supervision over the military operations. He further maintains 
that assertive control does not weaken professionalism, but preserves the institutional basis for 
division of labour in the context of a divergence pattern of civil-military relations.  
 
Stepan came up with the moderator theory. He argues that professionalism took place in Latin 
America, yet Latin American countries are prone to military intervention in politics. In attempting to 
find out what was wrong, he came up with the moderator theory where the political elites give the 
 29
military limited legitimacy to carry out the mission of intervention under certain circumstances 
(1974:190). It is argued that institutions, the military included, are highly politicised but they are 
weak, and therefore easy to manipulate by political parties as a bargaining power. The moderator 
role given to the military is limited and they are not allowed to direct political change. The main role 
of the military is to maintain the system. Nevertheless, this model proved problematic in Brazil 
between 1930 and 1964 when the President used military officers as tools for his own interest. The 
result was that the military went beyond the moderating function to hold on to power. Similar 
instances have taken place in African countries that have suffered coups. The usage of this model 
is also likely to result in a situation where the ‘demand’ call to intervene is because the president is 
acting illegally and that under the circumstances the ‘obedience within the limits of the law’ clause 
nullifies the armed forces’ duty to obey the head of state. This is dangerous to the democratic 
process. All political changes in any given country should adhere to the rule of law. 
 
Corporatist theory advanced by McKinley, acknowledges two roles of the military. First, is the 
pressure group role, where the armed forces engage in political activity in a lobbying capacity to 
influence policy. Second, is the conjunctive role, where the armed forces actively participate in 
policy decisions in conjunction with the civil polity (1971:90).  
 
Nathan (1994), on the other hand, argues that the corporatism model was used during the 
apartheid period where senior military officers were involved in key decision making. Obviously, 
this dented the legitimacy of the then defence force which was a tool of oppression. In addition, 
Nathan observes that there should be a clear separation or divide between the government and the 
military. 
 
On the usage of objective and subjective control of the military, Foster proposes that objective 
control has to do with the military being professional. For that reason, the military should possess 
specialised skills, expertise and preparation, licensing, and standard of conduct, while subjective 
control is about more intangible factors that reside in the mind of the military and therefore can 
produce profound and more convincing levels of civilian control (2005:3). 
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Characteristics 
 
Civil-military relations scholars such as Huntington (1957), Edmonds (1988), Chuter (2003) and 
others agree on the three characteristics of the military that determine its professionalism or 
existence as an institution. The first characteristic is the expertise of the military in the management 
of violence for the protection of society and to consolidate democracy. It is argued that the 
expertise in the management of violence in the military makes it different from other operational 
sectors of state governance. If the battle is mismanaged, members of the military face the threat of 
being killed by their enemies. For that reason their endurance in battle is eventually reliant upon 
the organisation that went into the preparation, morale, discipline and training of the fighting group. 
 
The second characteristic of the military is the responsibility for the defence of the state, although 
this older view is giving way slowly to some kind of transition to recognise human security as 
equally essential to contemporary military functions, protection of sovereignty and maintenance of 
stability. Edmonds (1988:70-92) argues that in executing its tasks, the military must observe a 
professional culture that supports the ethics, rules and symbols of state. The third characteristic is 
the military’s corporate nature, that is, its institutional self awareness and association. This feature 
deals with the transformation of internal institutional matters that determine corporate identity and 
morale issues of the soldier. To this end, Edmonds (1988) and Chuter (2003) assert that the 
military must behave in a way that is acceptable to the society it serves and to government. They 
further argue that the military must demonstrate its neutrality, impartiality, and commitment when 
serving the state and the public. Additionally, the military is required to remain professional and 
apolitical as they serve the common interest of a diverse society, and must be loyal to the 
government of the day. They must maintain a high morale as a trait that encourages them 
individually and as a unit to go beyond organisational potential, and brings them together under 
severe conditions. Factors such as the quality of training, a normative commitment to the 
responsibility to be fulfiled, a strong sense of identity with the unit to which the individual is 
attached, a delight in the particular job that they have to do, and a certain degree of patriotism and 
love of one’s country must tie together for success. These are indeed useful requirements 
expected from a professional military as they seem to generate legitimacy for the existence of the 
armed forces in society.  
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Scholars such as Finer vigorously dispute Huntington’s assertion that military intervention in politics 
is contrary to professionalism, arguing from numerous historical examples that greater 
professionalism enhances the likelihood of a coup d’état, distinguishing among countries on the 
level of their political cultures (Finer, 19962:6). 
 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
Some researchers such as Williams (2003) have come up with civil-military relations models that 
can be found in the SADC countries. According to him the nature of civil-military relations could be 
classified into two categories, namely:  (1) countries with strong legislative tradition that tend to put 
more emphasis on legislative apparatus - parliamentary committees, ombudsman system, and 
approval of the budget – to perform oversight functions; and (2) those countries that have a strong 
executive culture that may rely more extensively on the regulatory role of civil servants, finance 
ministries and presidential control to ensure the subordination of the military. In his opinion, there 
are political party penetrations which play an important role in ensuring loyalty and subordination of 
the military in countries such as Namibia and Zimbabwe. He argues that “Members of the military 
elite are either card-carrying members of the ruling party or, are represented on the central 
committees of the ruling parties” (Williams, 1998:24). 
 
In the case of Namibia, military command posts are occupied by ex-senior People’s Liberation 
Army of Namibia (PLAN) officers who are loyal to the SWAPO government. However, the laws of 
the country do not allow members of the defence force to engage in political activities. This 
researcher agrees that Namibia practices a mixture of the two types of civil-military relations 
identified by Williams (2003) above. For instance, the ruling SWAPO Party may influence activities 
of the military through the Minister of Defence, Permanent Secretary, the Chief of Defence Force 
and other senior military officers who are all ex-PLAN members. Alternatively, the ruling party could 
also do so through the SWAPO-dominated Parliamentary Committee that oversees the activities of 
the military. However, one should note that opposition political parties are also represented in the 
Namibian Parliament and play a significant role, although ineffectual, to ensure that there is limited 
influence of one party on the activities of the Defence Force.   
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Civil-military relations in democratic transitions 
 
Frazer, cited in Feaver argues, that in countries where there was a peaceful transition from a 
colonial period to independence there is less likely to be a lasting civilian control than in countries 
that underwent a violent transition. She argues that civilians who take power peacefully may have 
not built up the necessary institutional counterweights to stop future coups by the military. In 
contrast, those coming from an armed liberation struggle may have unintentionally created a strong 
armed oversight mechanism over the military; therefore they are in a better position to keep the 
armed forces in check (Feaver, 1999:223).  
 
Some authors such as Aguero have traced the strength of civilian supremacy in democratic 
transitions to the following factors: (1) whether the transition was gradual or sudden; (2) whether 
the authoritarian regime had been militarised or civilianised (3) the relative degree of internal unity 
of the civilians and military actors; (4) the degree of mass public support for emerging civilian 
structures; (5) the extent to which civilians were able to develop expertise on defence matters 
(1995:224).  
 
Drawing on examples from Africa, Butts and Metz point out that African defence forces can serve 
as the catalyst for political change rather than the opponent of change. In this regard they argue 
that the key to the success of the transition in South Africa was the support given by the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) during the transition from apartheid to majority rule. According to 
them, the SADF supported the transition and thus promoted internal stability in the country. They 
argue that the SADF was used to support the police in maintaining internal security as well as 
performing civil duties in black townships. It is further argued that, as opposed to military 
praetorianism common in Africa, the SADF was invited to participate in the national policymaking 
process rather than imposing itself on civilian leaders, and that SADF did not develop a corporatist 
ethic that sees the military as an organisation with its own interests different from the rest of the 
society (Butts and Metz, 1996:22-24). With the demise of the apartheid system and the 
establishment of majority rule, a new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was created. 
It is argued that in a broader sense, the SANDF inherited a positive relationship with society and 
was respected for remaining above domestic politics.  
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Goodman argues that while the primary responsibility of the military is to provide national security, 
the downsizing of the military in the Post-Cold War Era has led to the assignment of new tasks for 
the defence forces. He outlines the new responsibilities of the military as supporting police in 
maintaining internal order, providing emergency food supply, participating in peacekeeping 
operations, constructing roads and bridges etc. Goodman argues that such non-traditional military 
missions are transitional and can be helpful for the consolidation of democracy if they do not impair 
the military’s ability to carry out its core function of deterring aggression through combat readiness. 
He further argued that there should be a timetable for the transitional missions of the military back 
into civilian hands as well as the executive and legislature to provide checks on these transitions 
(1997:2). 
 
Hutchful is of the view that the process of democratic consolidation in many African countries is 
exposed to occurrences of rebellions such as in Niger in 1993 and the attempted coup in Burundi 
in 1993. In view of that, he has identified five important challenges faced by democratising regimes 
and societies in Africa in relation to the military: 
 
1. The question of how to restore and sustain civil supremacy over the military following a 
long period of military rule, and what would be the appropriate institutional framework for 
this purpose. What role would be played by various political bodies such as the executive 
and the legislature? 
2. The question of the military’s future relationship with the political process. In what form and 
to what degree, if any, is the military to participate or be represented in the political 
process? What corporate political rights, if any, are to be retained by the military? 
3. The issue of military privileges and prerogatives. This covers issues ranging from political 
and constitutional powers and roles of the military, to questions of professional autonomy, 
salaries, wages and allowances. 
4. The problem of redefining the role and the mission of the military, including functions, 
doctrine, force levels, appropriate institutional structures and relationships and equipment 
types. 
5. The issue of military budgets (1998:600). 
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Fayemi has identified the following as requirements for security sector reforms in the transition 
from authoritarianism: (1) Depoliticisation and subordination of the armed forces to civilian 
authority, the establishment of a Ministry of Defence and the empowerment of parliament. (2) 
Balancing the demands of the armed forces with those of development. (3) Involving the 
international community in the security sector reform programmes. (4) Demilitarisation and 
reorientation of the police towards fighting crime. (5) Making sure that the security organisations 
work under the constitution, and within the rule of law and are held responsible for human rights 
violations. Furthermore, Fayemi argues that security reform can only take place as part of broader 
political reform that includes a new understanding of security based on human security, rather than 
the security of the rule of a regime or individual (1998:310). Similarly, some scholars believe that 
security sector reform has to be part of a wider political process and its success or failure will 
mainly depend on the quality of the political leadership (Hutchful, 1998:1). 
 
Steinkamm (1988:4) has summarised into three categories the political and judicial principles as 
well as the good practices necessary to establish democratic control over the military. Firstly, the 
constitution must ensure that the civil authorities have the final power in the following areas:  
 
 Decision making over war and peace – As elected people they must decide over the 
survival of society in a significant manner;  
 Management and control of the military and other security organisations. The executive 
authority decides where, when and how the military should be used. 
 Force design and size must be left to civilian authorities and not to the military. 
 
Secondly, democratic control must have its limitations. Civilian authorities can be subject to 
justifiable disapproval if they make decisions without guidance from experienced military 
professionals. This may happen in the case where the civilian authorities have little professional 
military knowledge. The advice of experienced military officers is therefore momentous for the 
effectiveness of the defence and security policy. The primary role of the military is to defend the 
society. There the armed forces must be effective, disciplined and obedient, and ready to die for 
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the defence of their country. Thirdly, the effectiveness should be guaranteed by the state political 
structures under the constitutional-legal foundation: 
 
 The structure of the state power must ensure that authority over the military is separated 
between executive and legislative authorities. None of them should exercise total control 
over the military. On the other hand, the military must obey these two state branches and 
both the executive and the legislature should work together in defence and security related 
issues. This can be realised through suitable laws. 
 The military are part of the executive authorities. The government initiates the budget and 
defence policy through the civilian dominated Ministry of Defence. Civilian support staff in 
the ministry have military knowledge to ensure confidence from the military leadership. 
 Educated and well-informed civilian staff are necessary. The allegiance connection of 
military officers is very strong so that civilian officials cannot entirely rely on them as the 
only advisers. The government should establish institutions, where military officers and 
civil servants study together. Most countries have a number of notable military 
practitioners, but nearly no academically educated civilian experts. Separation of soldiers 
from a study of the national security and one-sided prominence that was put on the study 
of warfare made the anxiety between civilian and military officials of Ministries of Defence 
and Foreign Affairs more severe. Nevertheless civilian officials must advise government. 
 Not only the executive but also legislative power requires at its disposal a skilled staff of 
experts for making decisions on military related issues. The Members of Parliament need 
experts not only for parliamentary control but also for compiling the budget for which the 
legislative power is responsible (Steinkamm, 1988:4). 
 
Additionally, the following significant political and social arrangements were identified as necessary 
for the support of the civil control of the military. These include the military itself, which can and 
must implement democratic control over itself. It would be the easiest if the military itself adhered to 
the existing legal norms, rights and duties, discipline and order. Civil control is also applied in the 
values of leadership. Civil control begins where the military cooperate with the media, trade unions 
and other non-governmental organisations. The other is the element of constitutionality and the 
rule of law. The state constitution should not be the only one that sets and ensures the legal order, 
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but should work together with the three branches of state such as the legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary. The constitution and legal order must be supported by the population, and this can be 
achieved through education, the media, and a number of organisations. Moreover, the constitution 
and legal state discourage soldiers from interfering in politics.  
 
It is argued that the period and power of democracy are important in determining the country’s 
pattern of civil-military relations. Feaver argues that the nature of the transition to democracy may 
also be an underlying factor shaping civil-military relations (199:222-3). It is further suggested that 
civil military relations in transition develop over time, and reflect the prevailing social, cultural, 
political and economic conditions of the day. (Civil-Military Relations, http://www.gfn-
ssr.org/good_practice.cfm?id=77&p=24). 
 
Luckham notes that policy choices made about the management and control of the armed forces 
during transition, as well as democratic strategies towards the military, are critical for the 
consolidation of democracy, the prevention of conflict and the building of a sustainable peace. He 
further argues that globally it is now not acceptable for the military to claim the mantle of political 
authority (2003:23). 
 
It has been argued by scholars such as Cawthra and Luckham that security reform has a chance of 
success if the state remains intact during the transition and if its security establishments have 
remained unscathed. They argue that the extent of civilian control of the military is difficult because 
the military is not a democratic establishment to be administered in a democratic manner. 
Furthermore, they suggest that to succeed in democratic governance of the military there should 
be democratic institutions in place on the one hand, and on the other the political leadership, civil 
servants and the military should accept the democratic politics in the country. In addition, they 
argue that civilian control of the armed forces is not necessarily the same as democratic control, 
because it is possible to have civilian control of the military in a non-democratic country (2003:307). 
 
Cawthra and Luckham have identified four historical patterns of transitions from authoritarian 
governance and from conflicts that have resulted in violent disturbances: 
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1. The example of a situation where transitions from military governance in failing states go 
wrong and the state is delegitimised. As a result the armed forces lose their monopoly of 
violence. Therefore instead of transition to democracy, there is transition to violent conflict. 
2. The situation where the institutions of democracy or semi-democratic states exclude 
significant minorities and marginalise them socially and economically, thus encouraging 
them to take up arms against the state. 
3. A situation where during the armed struggle against authoritarian regime there emerges a 
parallel structure of power and legitimacy that is able to either overthrow the government 
or force a negotiated settlement. 
4. Where there has been violent conflict over the identity of the state during the transition, for 
instance in post-communist countries that had transitions from socialist to non-socialist 
ideologies and from totalitarianism to liberal democracy (Cawthra and Luckham, 2003:20). 
 
The point here is that political violence occurs as a consequence of deep crises in state legitimacy 
and military institutions thus eroding the state’s monopoly on public order. It is therefore imperative 
that the state, the armed forces and other security establishments must be rebuilt on a more 
legitimate basis. 
 
Democratic behaviour is an essential feature in stable civil-military relations. It has been argued by 
Pantev et al. that an effective democratic control of the military will largely take place in 
consolidated democracy with effective constitutional as well as judicial arrangements. Consolidated 
democracy is ‘a political system under which democracy, as a complex system of institutions, rules, 
and stereotyped behavior patterns’, has been acknowledged, in preference to any undemocratic 
option, by the political parties and citizens (2005: 7). Furthermore, Pantev identifies three 
limitations within which consolidated democracy operates, that is to say, behaviour, attitude and 
constitution. Accordingly, it is argued that with regard to behaviour, democracy in a country is 
consolidated if no major national, social, economic, political, or institutional dynamics draw 
extensive resources for accomplishing their intentions by producing an undemocratic government. 
This view is also shared by other researchers such as Linz and Stepan (1997) who suggest that 
democracy is consolidated if no major political group desires to or tries to bring an end to 
democratic rule or bring about violence to overthrow the democratic government or secede from an 
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existing democratic state. According to the limitation of attitude, a democratic government is a 
consolidated one when a significant component of the society, even in the face of large-scale 
economic troubles and frustration with the government, maintains that the democratic measures 
and institutions are the most appropriate means of administration. In terms of the constitution, a 
democratic administration is consolidated when the governmental and non-governmental dynamics 
have somehow acknowledged the fact that differences are to be solved within the agenda of the 
country’s laws, procedures, and institutions. 
 
In a similar vein, the essential circumstances that have to be there to consolidate democracy have 
been identified as an independent and viable civil society, a political society and culture which 
respects government procedures, a constitutional consensus that the democratic state embodies 
the rule of law, and a public administration system capable of being used, and accountable to, 
democratic society (Pantev, 2005: 8).  
 
Civil-military relations in the African context 
 
Although there are various models of civil-military relations, in Africa the colonial legacies often 
dictate the current civil-military relations found in a given country. Civil-military relations in most 
African countries were influenced by historical, political and societal settings prevailing before 
independence or by regional or global mandatory reforms at the end of the Cold War. Civil control 
of the military mainly follows subjective rather than objective control models of civil-military 
relations. Existing national armed forces, in many instances, are direct lineal descendants of 
colonial armed forces. Many of these were recruited from certain ethnic groups or on the basis of 
kinship. As a result the rank-and-file historically did not represent the population at large. Until very 
late in decolonisation, commissioned officers were almost exclusively drawn from the colonial 
power. Africanisation of the officer corps occurred hurriedly, with limited time to inculcate 
“professional” values of military political neutrality.  
 
Traditional African political and economic structures during the colonial period were manipulated, 
distorted and co-opted to the interests of the metropole or even dismantled. Europe in fact worked 
to deny Africa its own history (Hutchful, and Bathily, 1998:1). Therefore post-colonial African states 
 39
could not draw on their history. As such the concept of state as it exists today, goes back only to 
the second half of the 18th century, and it is western inclined. The contemporary state that emerged 
in Africa after independence is not African, but it is defined by the arbitrary colonial administration 
units designed as instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation. The colonial state was 
formed against African societies rather than evolving out of the relationships of groups and 
individuals in societies. People were either forced together or separated. It is common in Africa 
today to find people of the same language group, culture and tradition living in different countries. 
European colonialists divided the continent into the so-called states and thus created artificial 
boundaries that were imposed on various African societies. This has, therefore, created potential 
sources of conflict such as ethnic, racial and religious hostilities. In Africa ethnic and religious 
conflicts have led to civil wars in countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Somalia and Sudan.  
 
Drawing on examples from Africa, Erdmann and Engel point out that neopatrimonialism as a form 
of governance is widely accepted on the continent (2006:4). Neopatrimonialism is described as “a 
system of rule based on administrative and military personnel who are responsible only to one 
ruler” (Erdmann, 2002:3). It is argued that in post-colonial African states elements of patrimonialism 
and rational-bureaucratic rule co-exist and are sometimes interwoven. 
 
Van de Walle asserts that most African states have all the trappings of the Weberian rational-legal 
system with a clear distinction between the public and the private sector, written laws and 
constitutional order. Nonetheless, it is argued that official order in post-colonial African countries is 
often subverted by patrimonial logic, where office bearers appropriate public resources for their 
own use, and political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including patronage. These 
types of regimes are what some scholars refer to as ‘presidential’, where power is centralised 
around one person with ultimate control. The president personally exerts discretionary power over 
the state’s resources etc. (2000:4) 
 
Most African leaders who led independence movements and subsequently assumed political 
power believed that they had a mission to build a new society. This conviction supported their 
belief in building a strong state. Nonetheless, the concept of a strong state was narrowly defined in 
terms of concentration of power. As a result there were some African leaders whose sense of 
 40
mission and of work not yet completed drove them to continue their regimes, restrict opposition, 
and contain any efforts from any section that they considered detrimental to the success of their 
mission. Evidently, there were a few who saw their newly gained position as a comfortable job for 
life and were unwilling to give it up without a fight. 
 
Independent African states are characterised by most of the features of the colonial state. 
Therefore, the state is not well in Africa.  Max Weber has defined statehood as “the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (1991:78). In this regard, most African 
countries have failed to exercise a monopoly of physical force within the state. This is evident in 
failed African states such as Somalia, Sudan and others where the state has no monopoly of force 
because of numerous armed formations and warlords that control some parts of these countries. 
The weaknesses of the newly independent African states include their economic dependence on 
their former colonial masters, lack of skills and resources and weakness of social and political 
institutions and other mechanisms, resulting in leaders escaping control mechanisms that would 
normally hold them accountable. 
 
Quite often the failure of African states is also attributed to so-called tribalism. Africa has witnessed 
a growth of political movements based on ethnic background. For example, Eritrea broke away 
from Ethiopia to form an independent state after fighting a long civil war. In Rwanda, the ethnic 
conflict between the Tutsis and Hutus led to genocide. There was also a short-lived armed 
secessionist conflict in Namibia’s Caprivi Region. Tribalism can easily be exploited by politicians to 
further their own interests, but there are also many examples of African leaders who sought to 
achieve inclusivity and discourage the politics of division. The Frente de Libertao de Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) successfully achieved this objective after the FRELIMO government and RENAMO 
fought a bitter civil war whose origin could be attributed not only to tribalism but also to differences 
in political ideology. The United National Independent Party in Zambia sought inclusivity and 
successfully maintained unity in the country. SWAPO did the same in Namibia. 
 
Baynham has detailed eight methods and institutional mechanisms used by African civilian regimes 
to subordinate the armed forces to their authority. First, is ethnic/kinship selectivity where one 
ethnic group dominates strategic positions in the security organisation. For example President 
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Idriss Deby of Chad relied on his own ethnic group for his personal security. A variant is the 
appointment of presidential family members to key command positions in the military. An example 
is that of Ian Khama’s rapid rise through the ranks of the Botswana Defence Force. Numerous 
other examples are found in countries such as Kenya, Togo, Niger, Equatorial Guinea etc. It is 
believed that such appointments keep the presidential hand in operational control of the military. 
However, Decalo warns that this policy of preferential recruitment into the military leads to the 
creation of a predominately ‘ethnic army’ and has the potential of destabilising the country 
(1991:110). 
 
Second, is the instrumental pay-off. This control measure is used to ‘buy’ the loyalty of soldiers 
by maximising material satisfaction relating to pay, privileges and other rewards. Decalo argues 
that giving military officers material benefits unites the corporate and individual financial self-
interest of the military with those of the civilian authority, wards off the surfacing of political 
aspirations among the officer corps, and unites the support of the armed forces to the survival and 
stability of current civilian rule (1991:111). Examples are many: in Zambia and other African 
countries senior military officers were allocated land grants for commercial purposes or selected for 
overseas diplomatic posts and training courses.  
 
Third is the political or bureaucratic co-option where senior military officers and those in other 
ranks in most African countries have been co-opted into government or party circles and appointed 
to the boards of parastatals or as regional governors. In Tanzania and other African countries there 
has been a regular of transfer of officers from the armed forces to ministerial, diplomatic and party 
positions. 
 
A fourth control mechanism is the manipulation of military mission. This device involves the 
deliberate deployment of the armed forces in order to keep them occupied. This may take the form 
of using the military for civic action programmes or for domestic law and order operations in aid of 
the civil authority. The danger here is that internal security commitments have a potentially 
politicising impact on the minds of the military. 
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Fifth is ideological indoctrination – the intentional indoctrination of the armed forces with the 
ideological values of the governing party. This undermines the professionalism of the armed forces 
which entails, among other things, political indifference and neutrality. 
 
Sixth is expatriate recruitment. This control method involves recruitment of mercenaries to 
essential command posts and other sensitive posts in the armed forces to monitor the loyalty of the 
armed forces or serve as a barrier against the rank and file. These expatriates are often relied 
upon to be loyal and above factional scheming and are therefore trusted to be able to effectively 
neutralise any coup plotting against the state.  
 
Seventh, is the divide et impera: the development of security counter-weights, the creation of 
rival security formations to act as a check on the regular armed forces and monitor plotting from 
within. This is one of the most prominent mechanisms of control evident in independent Africa. For 
example, under President Moi of Kenya a para-military General Services Unit was established to 
end the monopoly of the regular armed forces. Similarly, in Ghana, Nkrumah’s National Security 
Services replaced and assumed the functions of the regular army. Likewise, in Gabon the elite 
Presidential Guard of President Bongo was created as a counter-weight to the regular army.    
 
The final method of civilian control found in Africa according to Baynham is in the form of external 
guarantees from friendly foreign powers (often the former colonial power) in case of domestic 
disturbances. Many African countries have defence agreements with foreign powers such as 
France or Britain. These foreign countries are supposedly there to ensure the stability of African 
countries. For example, British troops put down the East African army mutinies in 1964. France 
guaranteed the stability of a number of civilian governments in francophone Africa through 
strategies of military cooperation signed at independence and adapted over the years. These 
guarantees were fortified by the stationing of French soldiers and jet aircraft at bases in some of 
these countries to contain any trouble (Baynham, 1992:68). Conversely, a large number of African 
countries have provided military assistance to protect civilian neighbours from the political 
ambitions of their own armed forces. Nonetheless, Decalo (1989:75) observes that this “external 
guarantor modality” has not stabilised African civil-military relations. 
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Another control strategy over the armed forces pursued by African countries identified by Decalo 
(1991:79) is “systematic legitimacy”. It is believed that many African countries with civilian regimes 
have attained a noteworthy measure of legitimacy that has effectively sealed them from praetorian 
attacks. Decalo is of the view that a civilian regime that is widely seen and accepted by the society 
as legitimate likewise will be accepted by the military because they are also part of the society. 
This scenario is likely to prevent the armed forces from seizing power from the civilian authorities, 
because their regime enjoys wide popular support.  
 
Thomson (2000:107) meticulously projects post-colonial Africa states as broadly governed by 
personal rather than institutional rule, combined with clientelism. He argues that leaders are above 
the law and often make the law by personal decree. Some scholars have even gone further to 
suggest that the accurate model of independent African states is neopatrimonialism (Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1997:269). 
 
Bratton et al. suggest that Dr. Sam Nujoma, former President of Namibia and founding father of the 
nation, a civilian strongman, has succeeded in keeping the Armed Forces under control with a 
neopatrimonial mixture of rewards, deprivation and sometimes repression (1997:245).  And Stepan 
(1988) adds that, democratic governments will gain from such instances through democratic 
means, such as civilian oversight of the military through the Ministry of Defence, acumen over the 
Defence Budget, senior promotion and professional training. 
 
On the other hand, Omari’s (2003) article has identified models often used to describe civil-military 
relations in Africa and elsewhere as aristocratic, liberal, communist and professional. Each arises 
in response to the type of civilian institutional authority. In the aristocratic society the interest of 
the civil and that of the military are believed to be similar. There is also a notable absence of 
professionalism of the armed forces. In the liberal model, on the other hand, the civil elites are 
aware of the potential power of the armed forces that could be used to destabilise the society. 
There is, therefore, control to ensure that the armed forces are not involved in the political arena. 
The army is kept small and professional. The other model is the communist one, where there is a 
high degree of civilian control of the armed forces. In this system the military is politicised, and 
there are control mechanisms such as surveillance and purges of ideology and undesirable 
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elements. Unlike other models, the professional system puts emphasis on the expertise of the 
military. The civil elites encourage autonomous development of the armed forces. There is also 
civil control of the armed forces. Over and above, the armed forces see it as their duty to obey the 
civil authority.  
 
It is said that the professional model is rare in African countries. Countries such as Ghana and 
Nigeria tried to follow the liberal model, but they were among the countries that experienced coups. 
Egypt and Libya are reported to have followed the aristocratic model, but also had coups.  
 
From the above discussion it is clear that a combination of various factors contributed to stable 
civilian rule as well as to instability in most African countries. Bratton aptly puts it when he suggests 
that the development of the military in Africa is based on neopatrimonial forms. According to him 
African defence forces hardly ever look like they are being molded into a cohesive organisational 
force by professional training, nationalistic sentiments, and shared esprit de corps (Bratton, 
1997:269).  
 
It is however, important not to dismiss elements of the western tradition of civil-military relations in 
Africa because they can be applied contextually. All the approaches seem to agree that there is 
need to exert some form of constitutional and political control over the armed forces. The theory 
that underpins civil-military relations can be applicable to African countries, but the details will differ 
depending on the political, historical and constitutional dynamics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The literature on civil-military relations described the application of civil control of the armed forces 
as fundamental to democratic governance of the sector. The concept of civil-military relations is 
concerned with the effective democratic civil control of the military which is crucial for democracy. 
Civil control has an overriding importance for the success of democratic transformation, and at the 
same time it presents a significant theoretical challenge, because civilians lack the necessary 
competence to exercise the required control of the military.  The emphasis by traditional theorists 
such as Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), and Welch (1976) on civil control measures such as 
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the constitution and professionalising of the military is significant. The constitution serves as the 
supreme law of a country, and it is a kind of contract between those in power and those subjected 
to this power. Therefore, it defines the rights and duties of citizens including the military. In 
addition, it serves as a device that keeps those in power in check. On the other hand, 
professionalism of the armed forces as a model for minimising the power of the military is important 
to the study of civil-military relations. Professionalism would mean taking the military out of politics 
as well as civilians out of directing operational matters of the military. However, in reality this is 
more complex; the military cannot be completely excluded from the political process in the country. 
In one way or the other the military find themselves involved in politics through participating in 
national elections and policy-making processes. As argued by Perlmutter what is needed is a 
stable, sustaining, and institutionalised political regime (1977:80).  
 
This depends on the pattern of civil-military relations that is in line with the social, cultural, 
economic and political situation prevailing in a country.  
 
Successful democratic transitions in a country would be determined by the support given by the 
military to the transitional period. This is crucial because it promotes stability in the country as 
emphasised by Goodman (1997:2-3). Management and control of the military must be regulated 
effectively by the constitution of the country to ensure civil control. This is key to building stability 
and sustainable peace.   
 
African civil-military relations models mirror those of former colonial powers or those imposed by 
the international community. African countries are using the western models of civil-military 
relations, but the application differs depending on the historical, political and constitutional contexts 
prevailing. While the researcher acknowledges the impossibility of a blue-print or generic civil-
military relations model, the literature gives general principles of civil control that might be flexibly 
applied according to the given situation. 
 
The major limitation of the above literature review is found in its main strength. That is, while it 
provides a standard and useful conceptual framework for the assessment of civil-military relations, 
at the same time its contribution to some extent is undermined by the reality that the contextually 
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distinct practical and operational environment does not necessarily conform to the theoretical 
template. It is against the preceding definition and conceptualisation that this thesis will explore the 
nature of Namibia’s civil-military relations.    
 
This chapter discussed the literature on civil-military relations and concluded that civil-military 
relations have to do with civil control of the military. However, the application of civil-military 
relations depends on a specific context and is influenced by various factors such as historical, 
political, social and economic. Chapter 4 will look at various factors that have shaped Namibia’s 
civil-military relations. 
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CHAPTER 4   
 
NAMIBIA’S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 
 
The following six chapters will put together the various dynamics that have led to institutionalised 
civil control of the military in Namibia. The six chapters will also explore political institutions and 
control mechanisms in the country that have ensured democratic civil control of the military and 
contributed to the prevailing peace and stability in Namibia. 
 
This chapter examines various periods within which different actors have played the role of 
contributing to the nature of civil control of the military in the country. Namibia’s civil-military 
relations can be periodised in three broad categories namely: the colonial period, liberation 
struggle period, and the post-independence era.  These three broad categories are significant 
indicators that help to understand the nature of democratic civil control of the military in 
independent Namibia. The purpose of describing and analysing these broad periods of transition is 
to show how civil control of the military evolved in the country and consequently became 
democratic civil control in contemporary Namibia. It is believed that by doing so, only then can we 
have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of democratic civil-military relations in the 
country. This understanding is also shared by Feaver who asserts that the nature of transitions to 
democracy may also contribute to shaping civil-military relations (1999:223). 
 
The Colonial Legacy   
 
This section examines the colonial period to help understand how successive colonial regimes 
influenced the nature of civil control of the military in Namibia. The section begins with a brief 
background of the occupation of Namibia, to be followed by colonial mechanisms that ensured civil 
control of the military. 
 
European explorers first showed interest in Namibia as far back as the late 15th Century, followed 
by Afrikaner traders during the 17th Century. Imperial Germany’s desire to acquire its own colonies 
in Africa began in early 1880. German occupation began with the annexation of South West Africa 
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(SWA) after the Berlin Conference of 1884/85. The aim of the Conference was to regulate the 
conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilisation in certain regions of Africa, 
to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation on the two chief rivers of Africa flowing 
into the Atlantic Ocean, and to prevent the misunderstanding and disputes which might in future 
arise from new acts of occupation on the coast of Africa.  
 
In 1884 Imperial Germany declared SWA a protectorate territory, and in 1890 the country was 
declared Germany’s Crown Colony under Kurt von Francois as first governor. In 1893, Germany 
established colonial administration in the territory. The period after 1890 saw German ruthlessness 
and brutality vented upon Namibians in its ugliest form when the entire machinery of exploitation – 
an administrative system, land alienation, white settlement, a labour extraction system, mineral 
exploitation, and racial discriminatory - came into motion.  
 
Imperial Germany partitioned the territory into two divisions. Colonial administration was 
established to cover the southern 80% of the territory that came to be known as the ‘Police Zone’. 
This area was meant mainly for white people. In order to help the new immigrants from Germany to 
settle, large swathes of land were confiscated from the black people through deceitful means and 
repressive measures.  Where the indigenous population resisted, they were deprived of land by 
force. The first anti-colonial war in Namibia was launched in 1893 when the Orlam Chief, Hendrik 
Witbooi, and the Herero Chief, Samuel Maherero, started attacking the Germans. There were 
further clashes in 1894 between Germans and Khausas, followed by the revolt of Grootfontein in 
1901, the Swartbooi uprising of 1904-7, and the Herero revolt of 1904-7 (SWAPO, 1981:42). 
 
By the mid-1900s there was organised resistance against colonial occupation. The Herero people 
who lived in central Namibia, and the Nama people in the south had been forced to acknowledge 
German colonial authority, but as settlers and companies acquired land and cattle, both 
communities rebelled in defence of their remaining herds and pastures. They rebelled in 1904 and 
interrupted the activities of the colonial authorities. The resistance to German occupation was led 
by the Herero Chief, Samuel Maharero, and supported by the Orlam Chief, Hendrik Witbooi and 
Nama/Damara ethnic groups. They attacked towns and the colonial headquarters as well as the 
outlying areas.  The German military campaigns against the rebelling communities were ruthless 
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and genocidal. Between 1904 and 1908 the German authorities in SWA embarked upon a policy of 
extermination and genocide.  The Germans used superior military organisation and equipment, 
including rifles and machine guns, and mowed down the Hereros. Those who were caught were 
either hanged or starved to death. The rebellion was brutally crushed by the Germans who 
decimated the population of the Hereros to less than 10% (Dzinesa and Rupiya, 2005: 200). They 
were forced to flee into the desert, eastwards towards Bechuanaland (Botswana) where many are 
still found in places such as Maun. Those Ovahereros, Damaras and Namas, especially women 
and children, who could not flee were rounded up and herded into concentration camps. Two-thirds 
of the deaths registered during this time happened in the concentration camps (Geingob, 2006:34).  
 
In 1907 the colonial authorities imposed a brutal labour policy and started to recruit from the dense 
agricultural settlements of Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi along the northern border of the territory. 
Researchers such as Keulder argue that Owambo labourers and other ethnic groups from the 
north were recruited into the large-scale diamond and copper mining undertakings which thrived 
during the last years of German colonial rule (Keulder, 2000:34). The Africans in the territory were 
exploited. The Owambo and other ethnic labourers had no effective voice, whether through their 
chiefs at home or on contract in mining compounds.    
 
The land that was confiscated, as well as indigenous inhabitants’ cattle, was given to the white 
people. Additionally, white settlers were give generous financial support to help them settle in the 
colony. Consequently, black people were forced to live in the so-called tribal areas in the north and 
in scattered reserves in the Police Zone (Geingob, 2006:34). As a result of the banishment of black 
people to unproductive areas of the territory, the loss of their lands and livestock, and their 
resulting economic plight, they were forced to work on white-owned farms and in mines for 
miserable wages. By 1913 there were over 1300 farms consisting of 13.4 million hectares of land, 
all owned by Germans (UNIN, 1986: 29).  
 
The Imperial German colonial period came to an end with the defeat of Germany at the end of 
World War I in 1915.  The Union Defence Force of South Africa defeated the small German military 
detachments and subsequently occupied SWA from 1915 up until independence in 1990. However, 
it is argued that administrative and legal infrastructure established in the Police Zone, the 
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settlement pattern characterised by racial and ethnic segregation, and the labour extraction system 
established during German colonial control in Namibia laid a solid foundation on which South Africa 
erected its own apartheid state in the territory (UNIN, 1986:33). 
 
After 1918 the territory came under the administration of the Union of South Africa under a C 
Mandate of the League of Nations on behalf of Great Britain (Denoon et al, 1984: 173).  The 
League of Nations supervised the mandate through the Permanent Mandates Commission, 
composed mainly of representatives of the European colonial powers. 
 
Rather than looking after the welfare of the people of South West Africa, South Africa sought to 
annex the territory and exploit its resources. Consequently, South Africa took over the country and 
brought in Afrikaners, mainly as public servants. In 1944 the Nationalist Party government, led by 
Dr Malan, further integrated Namibia with South Africa in all areas. For example, apartheid laws 
that were being practiced in South Africa were also applicable in SWA. As a condition of 
incorporation, Namibia’s white inhabitants were allowed to elect members to the Union Parliament. 
The country’s economic activities such as commercial farming, mining, fisheries and emerging 
industries were integrated with that of South Africa causing great dissatisfaction and protests from 
the inhabitants of SWA. This provoked the African majority to seek other avenues of hastening the 
departure of South Africa from SWA.  
 
The colonial period was characterised by an almost complete absence of political relations of 
consent, with the exercise of coercive power being the order of the day. In 1948 the ruling Afrikaner 
National Party (NP) gave white people in SWA direct representation in the South African 
Parliament. On the other hand, the African majority were socially, political and economically 
deliberately excluded. In 1960 the South African government commissioned the Odendaal Report 
that divided SWA into 12 distinct Bantustans or homelands, resulting in the allocation of about 93% 
of the population to ‘homelands’ that covered about 40% of the land, and leaving the minority white 
people holding on to 60% of the most fertile land.   
 
The objectives of the Bantustan or homeland policy were to divide the black population into 
smaller, more manageable constituencies, to confound all attempts at black unity, and, as some 
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scholars have argued, “to give the South African authorities some room for manoeuvre in 
international affairs” (Denoon et al, 1984:173). 
 
The Odendaal Plan existed in Namibia until AG8 was established. AG8 was a law that established 
a three-tier government for Namibia in 1980. The first tier was responsible for handling the affairs 
of the central government under the supervision of the Administrator General. The second tier 
consisted of ten ethnically-based regional government administrations that included the Whites, 
Caprivians, Damaras, Hereros, Kavangos, Coloureds, Namas, Owambos, Tswanas and Basters. 
The third tier was comprised of the local authority administrations.    
 
These sad episodes provoked substantial rebellions and formed an important part in providing 
Namibians the inspiration and resolve to engage in a two-decade, protracted, armed liberation that 
began in 1966.  
 
Nonetheless, there were a number of developments during the colonial period that had critical 
implications for contemporary, democratic, civil-military relations in Namibia. First the Germans 
introduced constitutional mechanisms of civil control in South West Africa, as the country was 
known then. For instance, the colony’s budget, including military expenditure, had to be approved 
by the German legislature in Berlin. In addition, the colonial military, known as the Schutztruppen, 
was designed as a small professional force and based within the colonial ministry rather than in the 
German Army High Command, further reinforcing civilian control of the armed forces (Bhebe, 
Pikirayi, and Rupiya, 2000:104). 
 
Second, the tradition of constitutional and professional civil supremacy continued under the South 
African Regime. In 1975 Whites in Namibia were given some measure of political autonomy by the 
South African Parliament. This was facilitated by the South West African Constitution Act No. 42 of 
1925 that allowed the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, which had limited law-making 
capacity. Nevertheless, defence and a number of other critical legislative fields were reserved for 
the South African Parliament (Soggot, 1986:20). Even though one may not characterise civil 
control over the military during this period as democratic, there were, nevertheless, civil control 
mechanisms over the military through budget control, which is crucial in civil-military relations. 
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The composition of the South African Defence Force (SADF) that was deployed in large numbers 
in Namibia facilitated greater civil supremacy. It was comprised of a small Permanent Force of 
professional soldiers and an Active Citizen Force made of conscripted white males (Bhebe et al, 
2000:104). In addition, professional troops in the South West Territorial Forces (SWATF) were 
reinforced by conscripted black and white Namibians. In addition, it is argued that specialist units, 
the regular SADF and SWATF and Area Force Units were also deployed in the country (Cawthra, 
1986:200).   Military professionalism is significant in civil-military relations. This understanding is 
shared by Huntington (1957:83-84) who asserts that professionalism involves expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness. Therefore it is key to civil control of the military.  
 
With the intensification of the armed struggle by the South West Africa People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO), a state of emergency was declared in Ovamboland, and the SADF was deployed in 
large numbers in the north. After Angola’s independence in 1975, the SADF became the main 
security arm of the South African government in Namibia. The establishment of the South West 
Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) in 1979, which consisted of ethnic battalions of black Namibians, 
further strengthened the SADF (Dale, 1993:12).   
 
Another elite, counter-insurgency police unit, Koevoet, which is an Afrikaans word for crowbar, was 
formed in 1979. The main purpose of this police squad was for assassination and acts of sabotage 
against suspected SWAPO supporters. Members of this unit often disguised themselves by 
dressing up as SWAPO guerrillas, and their actions were committed in the name of SWAPO 
(Namakalu, 2004:144). Koevoet was a death squad used by the apartheid South Africa regime on 
‘search and destroy’ missions. This police unit was responsible for burning down homesteads and 
church buildings, and destroying boreholes in villages in Namibia. It interrogated civilians and often 
tortured and killed women and children, and took part in widespread looting of property of the local 
population (Namakalu, 2004:144). The aim of the creation of SWATF and other counter-insurgency 
units was first and foremost to fight SWAPO freedom fighters, and also to provide an “alternative 
political and military capacity that would displace the dominance of SWAPO and PLAN after 
independence in Namibia” (Dzinesa and Rupiya, 2005: 204).  
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PLAN fighters fought a decade-long bitter war of liberation against the heavily armed, apartheid, 
colonial South African Defence Forces (SADF) that was supported by locally created forces of the 
South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and the notorious counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet. 
Moreover, the apartheid South African regime engaged the services of mercenaries such as 
Chileans, Israelis, Philippinos, Portuguese ex-soldiers from Mozambique, former Rhodesians 
(Zimbabwe) forces, Australians, Britons, Moroccans, Americans and others to fight PLAN 
combatants. These foreign soldiers were not operating as a separate unit, but as members of the 
SADF (Namakalu, 2004:139).  
 
SWATF and Koevoet, which closely worked with units of the SADF, were used extensively in 
Namibia and Angola during the 1970s for counterinsurgency operations against the People’s 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the former military wing of SWAPO. Koevoet in particular got a 
reputation for brutality in carrying out its operations. The primary purpose of SADF was to perform 
counter-insurgency activities in support of the SWATF and Koevoet forces. 
 
SADF also provided support for apartheid government policies in Namibia. For example SWATF, 
32 Battalion (a black multinational light infantry force comprised of remnants of UNITA rebel units) 
and Koevoet counterinsurgency force had specific responsibilities for defending the status quo or 
government (South Africa-National Security Management, http://www.country.data.com/cgi-
bin/query/r-12195.html). SADF also conducted anti-SWAPO operations in Namibia and earned a 
reputation for ruthlessness and brutality. SWATF and Koevoet were largely disbanded after 
Namibia’s independence in 1990, and some of its members were incorporated into the Namibian 
Police. These and other developments led to the weakening of civil control of the military. 
 
The Liberation Struggle Experience 
 
This section explores how PLAN was subordinated to SWAPO, the liberation movement that fought 
for the independence of Namibia. The section begins with a brief examination of the Eastern model 
of civil-military relations to find out how it influenced the pattern of civil-military relations in SWAPO 
during the liberation struggle.  The eastern model of civil-military relations was mainly 
characterised by the Communist party control of the armed forces (Tagarev, 1997:7). It is further 
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argued that the military had control over defence information. “There was almost no civilian 
expertise on defence issues and the citizenry did not play any significant role in defence and 
national security decision-making” (Tagarev, 1997:15). The Soviet Union and other East European 
countries gave SWAPO military and financial support during the liberation struggle for the 
independence of Namibia.  
 
Since Namibia was a mandated territory, with a special relationship to the UN, the protestors of the 
South African occupation appealed to the UN and to the International Court of Justice for the 
removal of the regime. However, this strategy did not bring desired results. The South West African 
Union (SWANU), that was formed in 1959 and was dominated by Herero intellectuals, led the 
protest and petitioned the UN. Nevertheless, because of SWANU’s narrow support base in 
Namibia, it was the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) that moved rapidly from 
formal opposition to armed resistance. SWAPO took up arms after all peaceful means, including 
agitation in Namibia, petitioning at the United Nations, and seeking justice at the International Court 
of Justice, had failed. SWAPO was able to train a military force, which received the recognition and 
support of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the UN in the 1970s. SWAPO waged a 
political, diplomatic and military struggle against the South African colonial forces for more than 
three decades.  
 
SWAPO was established in 1960 as the first national movement with the aim of securing 
independence for Namibia. Its origins were in the Namibian labour movement, and it had been 
created out of a labour association called the Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) (Katjavivi, 
1988:45). Soon after its establishment SWAPO began the work of consolidating its support 
amongst South West African workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, clergy, and community 
leaders throughout Namibia, regardless of ethnicity. SWAPO’s primary strategy was the petitioning 
and lobbying of international organisations, such as the United Nations, to compel the South 
African government to withdraw from Namibia and facilitate a process that would lead to 
independence. At the same time the movement considered launching the armed struggle while 
peacefully petitioning the United Nations. By 1962, SWAPO cadres, who were later to constitute 
the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), were undergoing training in Egypt, Algeria and 
several other socialist countries.  
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It is also significant to note that, unlike the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) in South Africa, SWAPO was not banned inside Namibia. Consequently, since 
some of SWAPO’s political leadership was internally based, a limited civilian political experience, 
free from military intervention, was sustained. Nevertheless, as SWAPO’s Executive Committee 
was in exile, most of its operations were directed from outside Namibia. 
 
In the mid-1960’s the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s armed wing, was 
formed. There were some forms of civil control of PLAN. PLAN was created by the Central 
Committee of SWAPO which exercised civil control over the military. PLAN was subordinated to 
the political leadership of SWAPO. It should be mentioned here that SWAPO received military 
training and support from the former USSR, East European countries, North Korea and China. 
Institutions in these countries were modeled on an ideological basis. The most striking feature of 
the communist system was the so called ‘dual hierarchy’ in the party state. That is, everything had 
a double subordination, one to the state institution and the other to the Party. Such an institutional 
arrangement had a strong impact on the communist armed forces. The traditional national purpose 
of the military was loyalty to the political regime and defence of the communist system.  As 
Agnieszka Gogolewsk noted: 
 
The system of political indoctrination of the military, invigilation of the service personnel by the 
political officers, the near obligatory party membership for the high ranking officers were all set to 
ensure the performance of the international function of the armies. What was characteristic to the 
armed forces in the countries of Eastern Europe was their double subordination as an army, first to 
their own national commanders, secondly to the Soviet Union (Gogolewsk, 1998:2). 
 
The military in these countries was highly politicised, a result of the firm ideological compliance 
forced by the single party communist system. Nonetheless, it is argued that politicisation of the 
military required strong civil control of the armed forces as an institution, while this was to some 
extent ironically shared with a high degree of military autonomy in the actual framing of defence 
policy (Blackwell, 2004:93).  Therefore, we could say, by and large, PLAN was influenced by the 
eastern model of civil-military relations that subordinated the military to the party political control. In 
essence, the SWAPO Party exercised effective political control over PLAN. For example, the 
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SWAPO President was the Commander-in-Chief of PLAN, while the Secretary of Defence and 
Commander of PLAN were all appointed from the Central Committee and Politburo and 
accountable to the Party. Military commanders were accountable and answerable to the SWAPO 
leadership which was largely comprised of civilians. Moreover, there was Party political control 
over the activities of PLAN through Commissar Systems and political indoctrination of members of 
the military. In other words, PLAN was subordinated to the political leadership of SWAPO.  
 
Correspondingly, SWAPO as a liberation movement provided the overall political and military 
guidance to PLAN cadres. In terms of civil control, the Secretary of Defence, the commander of 
PLAN, the deputy PLAN commander and the Chief Political Commissar were members of the 
Central Committee and Politburo and accountable to the President of the Party. The institution of 
civil control of the military in SWAPO was structured in such a manner that there was nothing that 
could be done without a directive from the Central Committee of the Party, which was the highest 
decision making body. 
 
Major-General (Retired) Charles Ndaxu Namoloh, Minister of Defence and former PLAN Chief of 
Staff, argued that the Central Committee of SWAPO was responsible for the formulation of military 
policy (Interview, March 15, 2006). Similarly, SWAPO’s guiding principle was “It is politics which 
leads the gun” and that war was “an extension of politics by other means” (SWAPO, 1981: 262). As 
former SWAPO Secretary of Information Andreas Shipanga clarified: 
 
In SWAPO we don’t divorce military from political matters - it is always politics which leads the gun. 
We have no purely military leaders; we are not militarists. Everybody in PLAN is politically 
motivated; our cadres are trained both politically and militarily, and the military is completely 
integrated into the overall structure of SWAPO (Katjavivi, 1986: 282). 
 
The above argument was mirrored in the organisational structure of PLAN. The majority of the 
members of the Central Committee were civilians although the military was also represented by the 
commander of PLAN, Deputy Commander of PLAN, Chief Political Commissar etc. This 
arrangement ensured civil control of PLAN. (See appendix 3) dash  
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It is also imperative to note that PLAN had an oath of allegiance that required all members of PLAN 
to respect the hierarchy of SWAPO as well as members of the central committee. There was also a 
code of conduct that stipulated how members of PLAN should behave among the civilian 
population. For example, PLAN members were required to respect civilian population and protect 
their property as well as to not abuse children. The supremacy of SWAPO over PLAN was 
emphasised at all times. PLAN also had the military discipline code which stipulated the activities 
of all PLAN members.  
 
The Military Council was instrumental for policy and strategic planning. The general staff (who were 
also members of the Military Council) were responsible for drafting military tactics as well as 
implementation of the policies. Members of Military Council included regional commanders and 
commissars. Therefore, policy formulation followed the chain of command, that is, it was driven 
from the political level downwards to the military.  
 
The decade preceding Angolan independence in 1975 proved to be a successful time for SWAPO. 
It was a period that saw a dramatic expansion of SWAPO’s military operations, especially in the 
wake of the transfer of its political and military headquarters from Zambia to Angola. According to 
Katjavivi (1976) this was followed by an intensification of the armed struggle with PLAN units being 
deployed in larger numbers deeper into Namibian interior. By the late 1970s PLAN had gained the 
upper hand over SADF. PLAN had successful campaigns of urban sabotage in Windhoek, 
Swakopmund and Keetmanshoop, and had established “no go” areas. This led to the armed wing 
becoming more assertive within SWAPO (Bhebe et al, 2000:104).  
 
The forcefulness of PLAN became apparent as early as the latter part of the 1960s, when a group 
of SWAPO cadres who had received military training in China criticised the SWAPO leadership for 
lack of understanding of military strategy and tactics. Guy Lamb (2007) in his article “Militarising 
Politics and Development: The Case of Post-Independence Namibia”, writes that the ‘China-men’, 
as the group was called, criticised the political leadership for military inactivity and lack of weapons 
as signs of mismanagement and corruption. Consequently, on the instructions of the SWAPO 
leadership, the group was arrested and imprisoned by the Tanzanian authorities for fear that the 
group might cause rebellion within the liberation movement.  
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Similarly in the mid-1970s there was another serious crisis within SWAPO. The crisis in 1976 was 
brought about by a segment of PLAN combatants, including senior military officers who were 
operating from Zambia. This group rebelled against the political leadership of SWAPO as they lost 
confidence in their ability to direct the liberation struggle. They accused the leadership of lack of 
political accountability and military inactivity and complained about inadequate food, clothing and 
weapons supplies. The aggrieved combatants also accused the political leadership of being 
insensitive to their needs, and they therefore called for a change in the leadership of SWAPO. 
Katjavivi (1988) maintains that the disillusioned group demanded more efficient democratic 
governance from the Executive, and insisted that a SWAPO Congress be held. The disgruntled 
PLAN cadres also campaigned for what they perceived as financial mismanagement in SWAPO, 
and called for an organisational revamp of PLAN. Civil supremacy was only restored when the 
SWAPO Executive called in the Zambia military to quash the rebellion and enforce SWAPO 
political authority over PLAN. The SWAPO political leadership thereafter strengthened 
mechanisms of civil control within all units of PLAN.  
 
Then in the mid-to late-1980s, in the context of a severe civil-military imbalance in favour of PLAN 
that challenged the political leadership of the party, a major crisis emerged within the ranks of 
SWAPO. The crisis was caused by some units of PLAN combatants who were mainly operating at 
the Eastern Front. From Lamb’s point of view the crisis was because of low morale among PLAN 
fighters as a result of major military setbacks. It is further argued that the SWAPO leadership put 
the blame on South African spies who had infiltrated SWAPO (Lamb: 2007: 161). However, this 
researcher, who was a member of PLAN during that time, disagrees with Lamb’s argument. The 
crisis had nothing to do with military setbacks, but mainly with the political leadership of SWAPO 
that was seen to be aloof from the concerns of the military. In an attempt to restore the civil-military 
balance, the SWAPO leadership created a security organ with the objective of neutralising the 
political influence of the military (Lamb, 1999:122-125). The security organ had extensive powers 
and was answerable only to the SWAPO President. However, this organ, driven by intense 
organisational obsession, gained so much power and influence that it almost brought about 
SWAPO’s demise. Its main purpose was to identify potential spies, arrest and interrogate them. 
Those who were suspected of being South African spies were detained and imprisoned in covered 
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pits in Lubango and other SWAPO detention camps where they had to endure harsh conditions 
such as poor food and sanitation as well as inadequate medical care. An unknown number of 
SWAPO members were either arrested or killed on suspicion that they were enemy agents, thus 
sowing seeds of fear and mistrust among the combatants. The above mentioned incidents 
undoubtedly had a serious impact on civil-military relations not to mention generalised political fear 
within the SWAPO liberation movement as well as in PLAN.  
 
Independence and the establishment of the NDF 
 
In 1988, as part of the Angolan peace settlement, South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia, 
leading to the holding of democratic elections and the country’s independence in March 1990, thus 
ushering in a democratic dispensation. 
 
As in most transitions elsewhere, the Namibia process faced numerous impediments on the way to 
democratic governance. First, there was a violation of the ceasefire agreement between PLAN and 
the SADF. This was followed by widespread intimidation of SWAPO supporters by the South West 
African Police in the run up to the independence election. These events would have led to the 
resumption of the armed conflict, if it were not for the strict conditions put down by regional and 
international bodies that negotiated for the independence of Namibia.  
 
The democratic transition in Namibia began on April 1, 1989 when the process of implementing the 
United Nations (UN) settlement strategy began. Nonetheless, another crisis took place on the eve 
of the implementation of the peace agreement when SWAPO launched an incursion into Namibia. 
It is reported that a powerful militaristic faction within SWAPO was not in favour of the peace 
agreement (Lamb, 2007:162). The crisis was resolved only after officials from Angola, Cuba and 
South Africa held an emergency meeting that adopted what is known as the Mount Etjo 
Declaration, which called for the safe passage of SWAPO combatants to designated UN-mandated 
assembly points. The SWAPO leadership accepted the terms of the declaration, and PLAN forces 
were ordered to withdraw accordingly (Lamb, 2007:162).  
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UN Resolution 435 paved the way for the holding of free and fair elections for electing the 
Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitution of independent Namibia. Elections were held 
under the supervision of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) (Geingob, 
2006: 80, 88). This was followed by the process of drafting Namibia’s Constitution in accordance 
with the agreed Constitutional Principles proposed by the Western Contact Group. These 
Constitutional Principles included the following provisions:  
 
• Namibia would be a sovereign, unitary, and democratic state with a Constitution that 
provided for a system of government with three branches, an Executive Branch elected by 
universal and equal suffrage which would be responsible to the Legislative Branch; 
• A Legislative Branch to be responsible for the passage of all laws; 
• An independent Judicial Branch which would be responsible for the interpretation of the 
Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of law; 
• A Declaration of Fundamental Rights such as the right to life, personal liberty and freedom 
of movement, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression that includes freedom of 
speech and a free press, and freedom of assembly and association that includes political 
parties and trade unions; 
• Due process and equality before the law; 
• Protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property or deprivation of private property 
without just compensation; and 
• Freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination (Geingob, 2006:123). 
 
It was noted that the Declaration of Rights was to be in agreement with the provisions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and individuals would have the right to have the courts 
pass judgment and put into effect these rights (Geingob, 2006:123). 
 
Ten political parties qualified to participate in the United Nations supervised Constituent Assembly 
elections of 1989. These parties were Aksie Christelik Nasionaal (ACN), Christian Democratic 
Action for Social Justice (CDA), Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA), Federal 
Convention of Namibia (FCN), Namibia National Democratic Party (NNDP), Namibia National Front 
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(NNF), Namibia Patriotic Front (NPF), SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D), SWAPO of Namibia 
(SWAPO), and United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF).  
 
SWAPO was mandated to rule the country after winning democratic national elections with a 
majority vote of 57 percent (Electoral Commission of Namibia, 1989). Consequently, the former 
liberation movement was given legitimate authority to form the government of the new independent 
Namibia.  
 
The role of the military  
 
This section focuses on the role of the military in Namibia. The section explores how the Namibian 
Defence Forces (NDF) was created as well as legal instruments that provided the framework for 
the new vision of the country’s military.  
 
It is generally accepted that the primary role of the military is to protect both internal and external 
interests of the society. The Constitution, (Article 118), provides for the establishment of the NDF, 
and the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) which amended the South African Defence 
Force Act (Act 44 of 1957) for the structure, roles and functions. The primary roles of the NDF are:  
 
• To ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state by guarding against external 
aggression, both conventional and non-conventional; 
• Prevent violation of the country’s land, sea and airspace; 
• Provide assistance to civil authorities and the community; 
• Undertake peacetime operations in support of civil ministries, for example to help combat 
economic threat, and meet other defence commitments; and 
• Assist with the process of reconciliation. 
 
In addition, the Act provides for the deployment of the NDF within and outside the national borders 
of Namibia. Therefore, the way the military acts should be guided by a clear political mandate. The 
fifth role of the NDF, that is to serve as the conduit and instrument for national reconciliation, is 
inimitable in Southern African post-colonial and liberation history. South Africa’s policy of apartheid 
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colonialism had left considerably negative feelings between different racial and ethnic communities. 
The apartheid policy succeeded in driving a wedge between different ethnic groups. Consequently, 
at the attainment of independence the new SWAPO government made a conscious attempt at 
minimising hatred and mistrust built up over a long period by colonialism. Geingob affirmed the 
significance of reconciliation when he said, “The SWAPO government initiated and adopted the 
policy of national reconciliation so that all Namibians irrespective of colour, race or place of origin 
can live in peace, friendship and harmony. The policy of national reconciliation created conditions 
where Namibians could concentrate on building a peaceful and prosperous society based on the 
motto ‘One Namibia, One Nation” (Geingob, 2006:197).  
 
The fact that disarmament and demobilisation, including the withdrawal of SADF, had been 
executed under UNTAG’s supervision meant that Namibia had no constitutionally established 
national defence force at independence. Therefore, as soon as SWAPO came to power, the new 
government created the NDF from the demobilised former People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN), SWAPO’s military wing and the former South West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF) and 
Koevoet fighters.  
 
The ethnic-based SWATF was created in the 1970s but only officially acknowledged on 1 August, 
1980 by the former South African Defence Force. It was composed of eight full-time battalions and 
specialised support units. These included the so called ‘Bushman’ Battalion or the 31 Battalion 
later known as 201 Battalion that was established in 1974; the Owambo Battalion or 35 Battalion 
later known as 101 Battalion established in 1976; the Kavango Battalion or 34 Battalion later 
known as 202 Battalion established in 1977; a mixture of the San (‘Bushman’) or 36 Battalion later 
known 203 Battalion; the Caprivi Battalion or 33 Battalion later known as 701 Battalion; the 
Ovahimba and Herero Battalion later known as 102 Battalion; a multi-ethnic 41 Battalion later 
known as 911 Battalion that enlisted Tswanas, Damaras, Namas, Basters, Whites, Coloureds,  
San and Owambos (Namakalu, 2004:138).These battalions were capable of conducting cross-
border operations deep in search of PLAN combatants, inside Angola or wherever they were 
believed to be inside Namibia.  
 
 63
Accordingly, PLAN demobilised at the time of the implementation of the UN Resolution 435 in 
1989, and its members returned to Namibia as ordinary civilians. Similarly, SWATF and Koevoet 
were demobilised at the same time. Consequently, the SADF withdrew from Namibia along with its 
military equipment after South Africa signed an agreement with the UN in New York on 13 
December, 1998 agreeing to leave South West Africa (SWA). In the process, argued Charles 
Ndaxu Namoloh, Major General (Retired) and Minister of Defence, the SADF also destroyed 
certain infrastructures such as military bases which were crucial for the young NDF (Interview, 
March 15, 2006). 
 
PLAN embarked upon its transformation as the National Defence Force with an insufficient military 
infrastructure following the departure of SADF and the dismantling of SWATF. When the liberation 
war had intensified, and the SADF had used heavy motorized battalions, reaching a stage of 
conventional warfare which could no longer be contained by SWAPO guerrilla units, PLAN had had 
to adjust to a conventional force. Consequently, PLAN’s First Mechanised Infantry Brigade and the 
Second Mechanised Infantry Brigades were formed in 1978 and 1980 respectively. PLAN had a 
Striking Unit, Specialised Units such as Typhoon, Engineer Unit and Salute Unit. All these units 
were comprised of regular and semi-regular forces and were armed with all the conventional 
equipment, such as heavy artillery, Armed Personnel Carriers (APCc), surface-to-air-missiles, 
infantry assault-rifles, RPG-7Vs, Light Machine Guns (LMGs) and HMGs, rocket launchers, M-5, 
hand-grenades etc. (Namakalu, 2004:170,173). At independence, PLAN weapons and equipment 
were donated to the new SWAPO government, which was faced with the complex task of forming 
the National Defence Force. 
 
The newly independent SWAPO government had to take control over the formation of the 
Namibian Defence Force (NDF). The new cohesive defence force drew recruits from both PLAN 
and SWATF members, who were formerly adversaries. Since SWAPO had an overwhelming win at 
the polls, almost by default important posts went to former PLAN cadres. The former Chief of 
PLAN, Jerobeam Dimo Hamaambo, was appointed by the President as the first Chief of Defence 
Force. (Dzinesa, 2005:209).  
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NDF Chief of Staff and Brigadier Generals were all former senior PLAN members. The Minister of 
Defence, Charles Ndaxu Namoloh, who was the former Chief of Staff of PLAN argued that: 
 
The independence of Namibia came as a result of the liberation struggle led by SWAPO and the 
ballot had been achieved. PLAN was trained to take over control at independence. Additionally, 
PLAN fighters were numerically superior compared to SWATF soldiers. It was therefore logical that 
decisions on the filling of posts of senior military officers be left to the Chief of Defence Force 
(Interview, March 15, 2006). 
 
Most senior officers from SWATF were recruited into the NDF and an insignificant number 
resigned. Nearly all former Kovoet members who could not be conscripted into the NDF relocated 
to South Africa (Dzinesa, 1005:209-10).This study argues that there was need for the new 
government to make such an appointment to establish an army that was loyal and committed to the 
culture of SWAPO. The new government successfully integrated the former warring armies of the 
former SWATF, Koevoet and PLAN into a unified national army. As the Permanent Secretary of 
Defence, Peter Shivute remarked: 
 
Both ex-PLAN and Ex-SWATF senior officers who were recruited in the NDF retained their ranks. 
The MoD did not completely abolish divisions and offices that were there before independence. 
Certainly, we changed certain things in line with the new dispensation. Ex-SWATF and ex-PLAN 
soldiers continue to work together as a unified defence force serving one country (Interview, March 
14, 2006).  
 
This researcher argues that PLAN military structure as well as SADF was replicated in the NDF. 
Evidently, this laid the groundwork for the consolidation of a united and strong Namibian nation. 
 
At independence Namibia was guided by the Constitution of the country to ensure adequate civil 
control over the armed forces. Sub-article 1.2 of the Namibian Constitution recognises the 
sovereignty of the people as the basis for the state power. Additionally, Articles 27, 32, 40, 44, 63, 
75 and 118 of the Namibian Constitution provide for effective subordination of the military to civilian 
political control, by giving political office bearers overall policy making responsibility, including 
those relating to defence and security.  The Constitution further provides the framework for the 
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transformation of the NDF. The Constitutional responsibilities of the NDF, namely, to firstly defend 
and protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the people of Namibia against external attacks, 
and secondly, to assist civil authorities and community when required, were fundamental in the 
transformation process.  
 
The main framework for the transformation of the military was provided by the formulation of the 
Statement on Defence Policy that provided the new vision of the NDF. The Deputy Minister of 
Defence, Victor Simunja, suggested that the new vision is that of a broad representation of all 
Namibians at all ranks in the defence force to reflect the demographic composition of the 
population as well as a defence force that is trustworthy and legitimate in the eyes of the Namibian 
people (Interview, January 16, 2006). Subsequently, the transformation of the NDF included the 
following interrelated issues/steps: 
 
1. Institutionalisation of civil control over the armed forces  
2. The reintegration of the ex-combatants of PLAN and ex-fighters of the SWATF and 
Koevoet into a National Defence Force 
3. Amendment of the Defence Act (Act 20 of 1990) amending the South African Defence Act 
(Act 44 of 1957) 
4.  Disarmament, demobilisation/downsizing of the armed forces 
5. Affirmative Action and equal recruitment opportunity in the defence force 
6. Activities aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficient functioning of the NDF and 
Ministry of Defence. 
 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) 
 
The following section assesses how the UN carried out aspects of DDR and the results. The first 
part of the section gives the definitions and guidelines of DDR. Then a description of the 
relationship between DDR and civil-military relations follows. The section covers the stage in which 
UNTAGS ultimately presented a comprehensive and effective international institutional framework 
to carry out disarmament and demobilisation. The section ends with the examination of 
government’s efforts at reintegrating the demobilised ex-combatants.  
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Erskine notes that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are requirements for the effective 
termination and resolution of intra-state conflict. He further argues that it forms an integral part of 
peace plans designed to resolve internal conflict (1999:3). United Nations Resolution 435(1978) 
provided for the repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The Resolution also 
outlined a ‘peace plan’ for Namibia’s transition to independence under the United Nations 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Disarmament, and demobilisation were part of the ‘peace 
plan’ as enshrined in the mandate of UNTAG. UNTAG’s duties included: 
 
• Monitoring the ceasefire 
• Ensuring that troops of SADF and SWAPO were confined to bases and 
• Supervising the rapid reduction and eventual removal of South African military forces from 
Namibia (United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping, 1996:209-210).  
 
The World Bank defines demobilisation as “the process by which the armed forces, government or 
guerrilla force either downsize or completely disband” (Cilliers, 1995:13). The World Bank has 
recognised that reducing the size of the military through support for demobilisation and 
reintegration programmes can result in a significant shift of resources in the public sector. Cilliers 
further defines demobilisation as “the process through which armed forces of a government and 
opposition parties shed themselves of excess personnel after a period of conflict. Typically, 
demobilisation programmes include the provision of some short-term social reintegration 
assistance” (Cilliers, 1995:5). 
 
Colletta (1996:18) outlines an essential World Bank study that delineates practical guidelines and 
good practices that assist the design and implementation of effective demobilisation and 
reintegration processes, drawing on experiences from Mozambique and Namibia. Although not a 
blueprint for demobilisation and reintegration, which is a country-specific process, the study 
usefully detaches certain key actions for successful demobilisation and reintegration. These 
include political will on the part of the government, central coordination, and decentralised 
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implementation and classification of ex-combatants. However, one should be mindful of the 
obvious dangers of “one-size-fits-all” prescriptions. 
 
The importance of disarmament and demobilisation as part of post-war rehabilitation and 
development manifests itself in several areas. From Kingma’s point of view, these include the 
perceived release of resources from the military sector for use in the productive sector in order to 
precipitate sustainable development, the checking of the political power of the military, and 
enhancing security and human development (2000:181). It is also true, points out Kingma, that 
successful demobilisation and reintegration incorporates the need for an assessment of the 
beneficiaries, sensitisation of all stakeholders, mobilisation of resources and linkage of 
demobilisation with reintegration all through timely, elaborate and practical programmes. 
 
Generally, demobilisation involves the assembly, disarmament, administration and discharge of ex-
combatants with some form of a compensation package to help them reintegrate into society. 
Scholars such as Kingma are of the view that if the demobilisation and reintegration process is not 
well managed, ex-fighters could take up arms and derail the entire peace process (1997:87). On 
the other hand, it is argued that if the process is effectively managed, it can create good prospects 
for peace and human development. 
 
Forman et al (1998:27) have identified two goals for a demobilisation and reintegration programme. 
The first goal, according to them, is that demobilisation of ex-fighters or soldiers in the short-run 
provides an important window of time for the improvement of on-the-ground security. It also gives 
newly elected governments a chance to emerge without the threat of military repression or the 
need to spend scarce resources on a process that is expensive. Second, is the medium-term and 
long-range aspect of giving ex-fighters a new start by returning them to civilian life. This last 
process needs greater consideration as it is vital for any process of promoting improved civil-
military relations. 
 
DDR and civil control of the military share the objective of contributing to peace and stability in 
countries that have come out of war to peace. It is argued that in many instances, DDR and 
Security Sector Reforms should take place together to create conditions for democratic civil control 
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of the armed forces, and that the success of one will depend on the success of the other (Multi-
country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program Position Paper, htt://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/ssr-
paper.pdf). 
 
It is in this regard that DDR is explored in this study as a vital tool for setting conditions necessary 
for civil control of the military in Namibia. This study argues that certain decisions related to 
effective civil control of the military can set key parameters for DDR and vice versa. For example, 
key decisions on the size of the army, the extent of new recruitment, and the absorption of ex-
combatants, provide DDR planners with information on the numbers of ex-combatants that cannot 
be taken into the armed forces and thus need to be demobilised. Similarly, a Security Sector 
Reform decision on eligibility criteria for recruitment in the armed forces influences the eligibility 
criteria for DDR beneficiary (Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program Position 
Paper, htt://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/ssr-paper.pdf). 
 
DDR therefore has a direct impact on prospects for civil control of the military through Security 
Sector Reforms. DDR is often conducted before Security Sector Reform is addressed, setting the 
landscape for future reform efforts of the armed forces by establishing the numbers and nature of 
the armed forces. 
 
The decision to reduce the size, or whom to demobilise, was a precondition for the United Nations 
supervised election in Namibia. The country’s disarmament and demobilisation (DD) was facilitated 
by the multilateral New York Accords that provided for the implementation of the UN Settlement 
Plan. Consequently, DD was successfully undertaken by UNTAG (Dzinesa, 2006:275). The UN 
created the necessary security environment for DD, and their intervention was specific and short 
term. Nevertheless, UNTAG did not have a post-conflict mandate to assist with the reintegration of 
demobilised combatants. The planning and implementation of the long term activities were left to 
the new SWAPO government. There were no steps to ensure continuity through UNTAG’s post-
withdrawal synergy with relevant local bodies such as the Repatriation, Resettlement and 
Reconstruction Committee (RRR).  
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Namibia went through the experience of the United Nations managed disarmament, demobilisation 
and repatriation. The repatriation of Namibian refugees including PLAN combatants was the most 
significant aspect of the peace process as it dealt with the humanitarian element of the process. 
The safe repatriation of exiles was a measure of the political stability of the diplomatic solution to 
Namibia’s independence process. If exiles refused to return because they considered the situation 
unsafe, the whole election procedure could have been at risk.  
 
The Kenyan battalion assisted with the establishment of a military nucleus, comprised of members 
of the two former adversaries of SWATF and PLAN that provided a ceremonial guard of honour 
during the independence celebrations. Later the government was assisted by a British Military 
Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in reintegrating and establishing a professional NDF. 
 
The implementation of the long-term reintegration process of ex-combatants and returnees into 
Namibian society was handled by government with the assistance of non-governmental 
organisations such as the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), and the Socio-economic 
Integration Programme for Ex-Combatants as well as community committees. They assisted in 
activities such as job placements, providing temporary shelter, food, clothing, counselling and 
transport. Bilateral donors such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) and the European Community also assisted during the process. 
 
From 1989 to 1990 the Repatriation, Resettlement and Reconstruction Committee (RRR) that was 
headed by the CCN operated an employment agency to place returned exiles in the labour market. 
Their success was, however, very modest. It is estimated that between 500 and 600 persons 
forwarded applications for jobs in 1989, but out of 600 potential employers that were approached 
by RRR only five responded (Gleichmann, 1994:105). Most employers did not accept the 
qualifications of returnees. As a result only 60 persons could be placed in employment by the job 
placement agency, and the rest were either employed as watchmen in SWAPO security companies 
or as gardeners and household servants. 
 
It should, however, be noted that the job absorption capacity of the formal sector in Namibia is 
limited. The public sector is the largest single employer, whereas the formal private sector, 
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according to the Namibia Labour Force Survey of 2000, was estimated to employ only 39.2 percent 
of the labour force (IPPR, 2007). To this end, it was estimated that in 1995 there were 67, 000 civil 
servants in the public service and that this number has increased twofold since independence, 
partly as a result of the peace agreement that obliged the new government to keep in employment 
civil servants who served in the South African Colonial Administration (Colletta, 1995:2). On the 
other hand, the new SWAPO government also had to employ its members in the existing job 
structures, thus saturating the public sector. 
 
Correspondingly, the RRR assisted returnees not to be dependent on the food distribution 
programme by providing funds so that they could gain a livelihood for themselves and their families 
through small, income generating projects. To this end, returnees were involved in various small 
scale development projects such as baking, gardening, tailoring, metal welding, auto repair, metal 
work, chicken farming etc. (Liebaug, 1992:20). The idea was to create employment opportunities 
for ex-combatants in the informal sector, using skills they had acquired while in exile. 
 
The maintenance of national security hinges around democratic governance of the military. 
Governance has to do with service to the people. The civil authority to effectively control the 
military should govern in a way that optimises the security and welfare of all the citizens. 
Consequently, land distribution is one of the key mechanisms that may determine the success of 
the reintegration of ex-combatants in Namibia. In view of this, government has taken initiatives in 
this direction. According to Preston (1997) former combatants became one of the foremost groups 
catered for through Namibia’s Resettlement Programme. The National Resettlement Policy states 
that the aim of the resettlement programme is to improve the economic and social status of the 
previously disadvantaged communities (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, 1997). 
Since independence the government has pursued a ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ land reform 
program. According to the Freedom House Report (2006) government has purchased between 118 
and 135 farms, on which it has resettled about 37,100 people. Nevertheless, land reform remains a 
potentially explosive issue in Namibia. The programme has been criticised for not being viable in 
the long run as well as for inappropriate targeting. Moreover, the very slow and cumbersome land 
resettlement process has resulted in persistence of skewed land ownership patterns. It is estimated 
that about 3,800 white farmers own 44 per cent of arable land in Namibia, an imbalance which the 
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second President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, formerly the Minister of Lands and Resettlement, and 
currently the President of the ruling SWAPO Party, is determined to deal with by buying land from 
white commercial farmers (BBC News Africa, 2005: 1).  
 
To this end, since 2003, the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR) assessed 
the value of more than 12,000 commercial farms. In addition, 6 250 farm owners were identified for 
tax purposes. As has been documented by the MLRR, land tax has since been levied upon these 
farms and has generated an average gross revenue of N$ 30 million per annum. Revenue from 
land tax benefits the Land Acquisition and Development Fund which is used to acquire land for the 
resettlement of the previously disadvantaged Namibians, who, due to past discriminatory laws, did 
not have access to agricultural land. The Land Reform Programme also aims to reduce rural 
poverty among Namibians as well as to encourage participation in commercial agriculture by the 
previously disadvantaged black people. Funds generated are used for land acquisition and to 
support the development of farm related infrastructure on the farms once they are allocated to 
beneficiaries of the programme. Notwithstanding this, typical inadequacies have been lack of 
human capacity to implement land tax, uncertain funding for the development of components of the 
land tax process, inadequate legislation to cover all aspects of the process and lack of a 
consolidated land information system (MLRR). It should, however, be noted that farm owners who 
challenge the valuations may appeal in a court of law. 
 
Correspondingly, in 2004, according to the Freedom House Report (2006:3), the government for 
the first time declared that all Namibian landholders, foreign, absentee or unproductive landlords, 
were subject to expropriation under the hastened Land Reform Programme. As a result some 
846,583 hectares of land has been acquired, on which 6,256 families have been settled (SWAPO 
Party Election Manifesto, 2004:15). In addition, in September 2005, the government served 
expropriation orders on 18 white-owned commercial farms; however, only one of these farm 
owners accepted the government’s proposed price, while the rest were expected to contest the 
orders at the Land Tribunal (Freedom House, 2006). Although Government was successful in 
resettling a significant number of people, as illustrated above, on purchased farms, much still 
needs to be done. There is a need for Government to give adequate land management training 
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and support services to resettled farmers, so that they become productive and efficient farmers. 
Only then will the programme be sustainable.  
 
Nevertheless, the MLRR Resettlement Programme was too broad as it did not give preference to 
ex-combatants as a target group to meet their long term needs, but gave preference to internally 
displaced people as well.  This was best summed up  by MLRR Permanent Secretary, Frans 
Tsheehama, cited by Dzinesa (2006) in his article, “DDRRR in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South 
Africa”, when he noted that: 
 
Land resettlement was designed to benefit every Namibian and ex-combatants were not treated as 
a special category…. The ex-combatants are part of the categories that we target. However, in 
terms of number(s) that will not be easy because when we resettle, we resettle on the basis of 
applications that are coming in. We do not ask whether you were an ex-combatant. So all of us I 
think in this country are sort of ex-combatants. All formerly disadvantaged Namibians because we 
all have been at the periphery of the societal development (2006:248). 
 
In the face of this, one researcher, Head of Public Management Department at the Polytechnic of 
Namibia and an ex-PLAN combatant, Dr. Andrew Niikondo noted, “Many unemployed ex-
combatants were left eking out an existence on small plots” (Interview, April 6, 2006). This had an 
impact on sustainable ex-combatants’ reintegration in society. 
 
The other key initiative was a state-centred intervention which focused on the public sector that 
remained the major employment destination for ex-combatants. The majority of the skilled 
returnees and ex-fighters were employed in the public sector. However, the size of the expanding 
public sector was restrained by budgetary considerations. Additionally, most PLAN fighters had 
been engaged in military activities and found it hard to compete on the job market. Consequently, 
Government took an initiative requiring companies applying for government tenders to employ a 
certain number of ex-combatants. This initiative has not been largely successful, because most ex-
combatants are restricted by their lack of formal qualifications and job experience.  
 
There was a special effort made to facilitate the reintegration of spouses and female ex-
combatants (Coletta, 1996:54). In the absence of an inclusive and gendered programme, and an 
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immediate post-conflict reintegration plan, vulnerable groups faced alarming hardships. The 
physically challenged and psychologically affected received little or no rehabilitation help. Targeted 
help in the form of minimal monthly allowances was only given in 1998 after ex-combatants 
demonstrated. As a result of lack of explicit gender-specific reintegration support, women ex-
combatants, including single mothers, were confronted with momentous problems leading to 
disenchantment and general disillusionment. 
 
The short term financial assistance that was given to the ex-combatants also failed to guarantee 
their long term sustainability, thus threatening national stability. This was evidenced by protests of 
ex-combatants who were not effectively reintegrated into society fifteen years after the country’s 
independence (Gaomas, 2007:7). There are a significant number of unemployed ex-combatants 
who are still threatening to demonstrate and camp on the premises of State House if Government 
does not respond positively to their cash and housing demands. Hundreds of ex-combatants from 
all over the country are still threatening to hold peaceful demonstrations to petition Government for 
their compensation money (Gaomas, 2007:7). In late 2005 the ex-freedom fighters gave 
Government two options. Firstly, they argued that according to National Defence Force salary 
structures, they should receive N$32 000 times the number of years spent in exile by each and 
every ex-freedom fighter. Secondly, they requested payment of N$500 000 to each ex-combatant 
as a lump sum (Gaomas, 2007:7).  
 
Government has taken up the plight of ex-combatants. For instance, there is now a Ministry of 
Veteran Affairs mainly established to cater for the development needs of the ex-freedom fighters. 
In addition, Government has embarked on constructing low cost houses for the veterans of the 
liberation struggle and a few of them have already benefited. However, most ex-combatants are 
not happy with the criteria used for one to qualify as a war veteran, especially the age limit that is 
set for 60 years and the established period one left the country to join the armed liberation struggle 
(NDF Informant, 2006: Interview). Almost certainly, the reintegration of ex-combatants needs to be 
revisited to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings that might cause instability in the country. 
 
We argue that there is still a general disillusionment among ex-combatants who have suffered 
because of fifteen years of government’s unsuccessful reintegration efforts. Unemployed ex-
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combatants are still pleading for recognition from fellow Namibian citizens and government for 
sacrifices made during the liberation struggle. This was confirmed by a report cited in the New Era 
newspaper, titled “An investigation Into Lives of Namibia Ex-fighters – 15 Years After 
Independence” carried out by the People’s Education, Assistance and Counselling for 
Empowerment. The report showed that of the 296 SWAPO ex-combatants interviewed, the 
majority did not receive assistance in any form from any individual or organisation (Sibeene, 
2005:6). Only 14% of them received pension payments from government. Apart from ex-PLAN 
combatants who were targeted, it was reported that another 294 ex-SWATF and Koevoet fighters, 
who were also interviewed, were even less likely to have received any benefit of employment, 
pension and training (Sibeene, 2005:6). PLAN ex-combatants, protesting for recognition for their 
contribution to independence, felt they should be given monetary and material rewards in the form 
of housing, land, farms, income-generating projects, or pension that would improve their living 
standards. In addition, the report stated that even though slightly more than 31% ex-combatants 
had been provided with employment, this was a very small proportion, and it came mainly from the 
Namibia government, NGOs or CBOs and other sources (Sibeene, 2005:6).   This was a warning 
sign that the Namibian government could not ignore. The Government embarked on new initiatives 
to avert the security threat posed by unemployed ex-combatants. The Peace Project, as discussed 
already, which was a coordinated and sustainable reintegration plan, was developed by 
Government as a reaction to demonstrations by former fighters dissatisfied with their poor socio-
economic status many years after the independence of the country. The Project, aimed at giving 
employment to ex-combatants in the public service, demonstrated one moderately sustainable 
approach to long term integration. It guaranteed that ex-combatants were not confined to 
dependence on state-funded, monthly, humane handouts. While granting ex-combatants 
employment in the public service probably removed the current and immediate threat to the peace 
and legitimacy of the Government, it lessened the poverty of the ex-combatants in the long term.   
 
The DDR of ex-combatants in Namibia was facilitated by international assistance and local political 
will. However, the DDR’s potential for contributing to peace was not fully realised. As had been 
illustrated in the research findings of this study, the haphazard measures that were put in place to 
implement DDR programmes were inadequate, and as a result, the long-term reintegration plans 
were clearly deficient. The deficiencies were mirrored by general and various human security 
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indicators such as unemployment, and poverty among ex-combatants. The deficiency was also 
reflected in the post-1995 public protests, where ex-combatants who found themselves almost 
useless and marginalised in the new society marched and demanded cash payments, employment 
and appreciation from Government. Although Government was able to respond to the demands of 
the disenchanted ex-combatants, thus preventing a potential crisis, the problem is far from over. 
Dzinesa (2006) clarifies that demobilisation exercises unravel within ten years for a number of 
reasons. Partly, this is because of limited focus on the initial plans in terms of time and lack of civil 
re-employment of the thousands of ex-fighters who then become social and economic outsiders. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the prevailing internal stability in Namibia is a result of the deliberate 
use of military integration as a tool to unite society and create stability. This fact of the policy has to 
some extent been successful.  
 
Financial packages were also given to ex-combatants as part of the reintegration assistance. PLAN 
combatants were paid an unvarying one-off gratuity of R 1 400. The funds were given by the South 
African government to balance earlier monetary compensation that they provided to former SWATF 
and Koevoet fighters who were their surrogate forces during the liberation war. 
 
The Government also developed a skills training programme for the unemployed ex-combatants, 
the Development Brigade, that was later renamed Development Brigade Corporation (DBC), with 
the view to impart practical agricultural and construction skills sufficient for sustainable future self-
employment. The DBC operated between 1991 and 2001. Its principal aim was to train ex-
combatants as electricians, carpenters, plumbers, bricklayers, plasterers and skilled agricultural 
workers in several centres around the country. It was planned to incorporate all of the 18, 000 ex-
fighters registered in 1990. However, Preston (1997:460) specified that “Only 4, 000 were brought 
in, and most of them were retrenched during the last years of the operation of the DBC”. Alongside 
its skills development initiatives, the DBC established income-generating projects including crop 
production, poultry farming, brick-making, and the drilling of boreholes. In 1996, the DBC launched 
four subsidiary companies (Preston, 1997: 464-5). Additionally, a pension fund for old and 
physically impaired PLAN and SWATF fighters, as well as a Social Integration Fund (SIF), was set 
up by government to help former fighters who had concrete plans to start their own businesses. 
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Government initially transferred from the Treasury N$1.5 million to start off the fund (Namibia 
Review, 1996:28).  
 
In 1996 the government transferred the responsibility of addressing the question of ex-combatants 
from the Committee of Deputy Ministers to the country’s National Planning Commission (NPC). 
This phase represents a shift from the patchwork of various non-coordinated schemes, such as 
PLAN Veteran Trust, SWAPO Veteran Trust, the DBC and the Government Resettlement 
Programme to a centrally coordinated effort at reintegrating ex-combatants through direct 
employment creation. This move followed the suggestion of the Technical Committee, and it is also 
in agreement with World Bank recommendations (Colletta et al. 1996). Most government policy 
makers agree that this came about as a result of the failure of previous attempts, notably the DBC, 
to provide a complete and permanent solution to the ex-combatant problem. In addition, a 
company called the Socio-economic Integration Programme for Ex-Combatants (SIPE) was 
established through NPC. The main responsibilities of this company were to seek out and create 
jobs, provide training opportunities for ex-combatants and assist children whose parents had died 
during the liberation struggle for independence. Nevertheless, SIPE was constrained at first by 
insufficiencies in ex-combatants’ registration as well as lack of manpower. 
 
Although there is peace and stability in Namibia, during 1998 ex-combatants demonstrated 
throughout the country. Large numbers of ex-combatants assembled at the Windhoek Showground 
and Ondangwa Airport in the north of the country, demanding to be employed by the government. 
The Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security then set up a Technical Committee to address 
the problem. It consisted of Permanent Secretaries and other high-ranking government officials 
from different ministries, government institutions and agencies, and the ruling SWAPO Party. In 
cooperation with SIPE, the Committee carried out a country-wide registration of ex-combatants 
(also done in connection with the payout in 1991) and classified them into two main categories. 
According to the Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants (1998), anyone who was trained 
and deployed in a combat formation, or was incapacitated after training and deployment, was 
classified as belonging to Category A. Category B included “anyone, who while in exile was given 
assignment in any capacity by SWAPO, or anyone who was born in exile by parents who were 
both or one of them Namibian citizens participating in the liberation struggle under the leadership of 
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SWAPO, and anyone who was assigned to school or training by SWAPO during the liberation 
struggle” (Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 6). The Technical Committee 
made proposals regarding the Government’s policies on ex-combatants. These proposals included 
direct government employment for most of those registered, and the discontinuation of the DBC 
(Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 3-5). The proposals of the Technical 
Committee were endorsed and implemented by Cabinet in 1998. 
 
It is significant that the work of the Technical Committee was not easy at all. To facilitate 
registration of ex-combatants, members of the Committee were people with extensive knowledge 
of PLAN and those who were in exile. Consequently, during registration of ex-combatants the 
background of everyone who presented themselves for registration at designated registration 
points was carefully scrutinised first by registration officers and then by verification officers using a 
standard questionnaire. Committee members or other trusted persons identified those who did not 
have any documents (Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 7). Despite all this 
close scrutiny, the Committee reported that non-ex-combatants may have been classified as ex-
combatants (Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 8).  
 
The registration of ex-combatants was very important. The Technical Committee Report on Ex-
Combatants affirms that “The absence of a reliable database has created many problems because 
the target population is not known. The database created by the Committee should be properly 
protected and developed further” (Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 14). This 
is significant as there may be many ex-combatants who may not know about the registration 
exercise because of the remoteness of the areas where they live and therefore may be left out of 
the process. On the other hand, others may be aware of the registration exercise, but may lack 
transport to go to designated registration points or may fail to register for different reasons. 
 
There were also counselling services that were offered during the registration exercise. According 
to the Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants (1998) verifying officers conducted 
counselling services such as family planning and child spacing as well as formalisation of 
matrimonial unions. In addition, the purpose of the exercise and possible courses of action were 
explained, and care was taken not to raise unrealistic expectations. It is reported that as a result of 
 78
counselling, the majority of ex-combatants who were demonstrating and camping in Windhoek 
Showground and other places in the northern parts of the country left and went back to their 
respective homes to wait for the outcome of the work of the Committee (Technical Committee 
Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 7). 
 
The registration exercise was a practical action in the sense of being a prerequisite for effectively 
and methodically targeting ex-combatants with employment or other benefits. Nevertheless, as a 
significant side effect, it formalised ex-combatants’ identity according to the criteria established by 
the Technical Committee. Those who were accepted as being ex-combatants or former freedom 
fighters were given “ex-PLAN combatant identification cards” (Technical Committee Report on Ex-
Combatants, 1998: 6). In this way, the registration exercises acknowledge a particular category for 
ex-combatants and in that manner depart from the politically correct line that says, “The ex-
combatants are just like others” and “We are all Namibians”, therefore “we should be treated the 
same” (Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 7-13). The registrations also 
brought about a change in the appraisal of ex-combatant character. In the past, the ex-combatants 
were broadly seen as heroes who brought about the independence of the country. They were also 
seen as an economic burden to their families as well as irresponsible and disruptive. When the 
registration started and people realised that being registered would most possibly lead to 
employment or other forms of benefit, being an ex-combatant rapidly became desirable. There 
were extensive efforts at cheating during registration process. Those who became eligible for the 
ex-combatant category were obviously pleased, while those who did not were profoundly 
disappointed (Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 7-13).  
 
Likewise, the registration depended a great deal on individual recollection. In the lack of extensive 
information, identification papers and other documents, the registration relied on interviews in 
which the details of the interviewee’s background and life history were cautiously chronicled. This 
process was helpful for combining personal identity with an official, technical one, with the tag of 
and related talk of ex-combatants.  
 
The Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants (1998) emphasises that its “proposals if 
considered and worked out could go a long way in finding a lasting solution to the plight of the 
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former freedom fighters and if possible they should be considered within the short period of time. It 
should, however, be emphasized that the current exercise has invoked new hope and expectations 
and might be the last opportunity to retain confidence in the government” (Technical Committee 
Report on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 16). Therefore, whether perceived or real, the government and 
SWAPO would certainly not want to estrange the ex-combatants.  
 
There are conflicting reports on the exact number of ex-combatants who were demobilised and 
registered. Colletta (1995) in her research recorded that there were a total of 57, 000 ex-PLAN and 
SWATF fighters who were demobilised. According to Preston (1997) the registration for 
demobilisation gratuities and training that took place from August to October, 1990, produced a list 
of about 18, 000 ex-Plan fighters. On the other hand, other researchers such as Preston (1997) 
have estimated that only about 8, 000 to 10, 000 ex-fighters from both sides of the conflict were 
absorbed into the army and police. This means that a large number of ex-fighters remained 
unemployed. According to the Technical Committee Report on Ex-Combatants (1998) a total of 9, 
577 ex-combatants were registered, 6, 472 in Category A and 3, 039 in Category B. It is estimated 
that about 6, 443 were registered in the four northern regions of the former Owamboland, and 1, 
874 in the Khomas Region, about 4, 540 and 4, 673 women respectively. However, those in 
Category A were predominantly men (3, 860 men, 2, 610 women), whereas those in Category B 
were predominantly women (680 men, 2, 610 women). Most of the registered ex-combatants 
belonged to the age groups 31 to 40 and 41 to 50. In later registrations, the number has continued 
to grow considerably although at a slower speed. Ex-SWATF and Koevoet members were also 
included after they had demonstrated for being excluded from registration process. On the other 
hand, the government reported that in 1997 and 2002 a total of 17, 362 ex-combatants were 
registered by the Technical Committee on Ex-combatants (TCEC) for possible employment (Final 
Report of TCEC to Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security: 9). It is estimated that by 2002 
about 14, 875 ex-fighters were employed in various government ministries and agencies. Of those 
employed, 9, 188 falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, mostly in the Namibian Police 
(NAMPOL) including the Special Field Force, and the Ministry of Defence, mainly the NDF. Seven 
other ministries have taken 5, 504 ex-combatants and the rest others. Other than that, by and 
large, the government of Namibia had some successes in achieving its objective of maintaining 
peace in the country (Final Report of TCEC to Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security: 10).  
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The other measure taken was the establishment in 1989 of the SWAPO Veterans Trust which 
among other things, was aimed at providing loans and grants to SWAPO veterans, organising 
workshops and training courses, coordinating complaints and requests from the veterans, acting as 
an ombudsman with the government, and assisting veterans to overcome psychological problems 
through the provision of a forum for sharing experiences (Colletta, 1995:63). However, the Trust 
had various problems such as its dependence on SWAPO for funding, and as such it was not 
sustainable. In addition, the Trust was weakened by the fact that it essentially served only PLAN 
veterans, thus exposing itself to criticism of political bias.  
 
Namibia encountered some institutional and operational problems such as lack of funds, lack of 
technical expertise and qualified personnel in running these projects and programmes. Additionally, 
the country’s slow and cumbersome Land Resettlement Programme weakened the process. 
Access to land was problematic for ex-combatants who were not treated as a preferential target 
group under the Land Reform Programme. This situation presented a potential threat to national 
security and stability, as was confirmed in the mid-1990s when dissatisfied, unemployed ex-
combatants took to the streets. The ex-combatants felt they were unwanted and marginalised in 
the new society. Therefore they demonstrated and demanded cash payments, employment and 
recognition from Government. This was a red flag that political leaders could hardly ignore. In 
response, the Government implemented a ‘Peace Project’ aimed at affirmative job placement of 
ex-combatants mainly in the public service. The project was adopted amidst calls for cutting the 
size of the public sector. However, this project enhanced the prospect of long term reintegration of 
ex-combatants into the society as well as prevented them from causing insecurity in the country. 
As the former Prime Minister Hage Geingob affirmed: 
 
If you take the Peace Plan, 9, 000 people added to our already bloated civil service, that is a 
disaster! But what was a better option? To have them demonstrate every day and eventually 
occupy the farms? They are not happy yet, but we took concrete action and that stemmed those 
demonstrations (Parliament of Namibia, 2000: 339).  
 
Similar sentiments of preserving peace and stability in the country as a reason for Government’s 
ex-combatant policies were also shared by the then Minister of Home Affairs, Jerry Ekandjo, who 
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contended that the Namibian Police Special Field Force (SFF) is “the price we have to pay for 
peace” (The Namibian, 2000). The SFF is a paramilitary unit of the Namibian Police comprised 
mainly of ex-PLAN combatants who could not be absorbed into the NDF. 
 
Most government reports, as well as interviews conducted by this researcher with both SWAPO 
leaders and civil society actors; seem to support the policy of integrating ex-combatants to maintain 
peace and stability in the country. First, some observers refer to ex-combatant demonstrations as 
an embarrassment to government, making it appear they are not doing anything for the people who 
brought about the independence of Namibia. Secondly, most people feel the nation and the ruling 
SWAPO Party in particular have a moral obligation to those who sacrificed for the liberation of 
Namibia. Thirdly, other people are of the view that the SWAPO government had to take care of the 
ex-combatants in order to nurture its main support base among the Oshiwambo-speaking 
Namibians. The SWAPO Party and ex-PLAN have their core foundations among the majority of 
Oshiwambo-speaking people. Therefore, because of the sacrifices made for the liberation war, 
which was mainly fought in the northern parts of the country inhabited by the Owambo people, the 
majority are largely sympathetic to the plight of ex-combatants.  
 
There is an ongoing debate on the significance of the contribution to the liberation struggle made 
by the internal wing of the SWAPO Party as opposed to the external component of the Party. This 
has somehow created a division between internal and external components of the liberation 
struggle. However, the independence of Namibia was made possible by the able leadership of 
SWAPO and the dedication offered by revolutionary and peace-loving people around the world. 
Similarly, the people inside the country participated in the liberation struggle in many ways. For 
instance, PLAN cadres had overwhelming support from the local population. The internal wing of 
SWAPO mobilised the local population. As such they gave information to PLAN fighters about the 
activities of the SADF, supplied food and material and provided necessary aid including transport, 
shelter, accommodation and medical treatment (Namakalu, 2004:186). There could have been no 
victory without the support of the local population. Fourthly, both SWAPO leaders and activists hold 
the view that the opposition parties and other undisclosed hostile ‘elements’ in society have seized 
the opportunity to capitalise on the plight of ex-combatants for their own selfish political needs. 
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They are accusing the ruling SWAPO Government of neglecting unemployed ex-combatants, 
hoping to gain political support from them. 
 
It could be argued that demobilisation and reintegration not only impact a nation’s security, but also 
affect the way in which a nation’s pool of workers can be reintegrated into civilian society after 
years of fighting. Additionally, demobilisation and reintegration do not only support short-term post-
conflict security needs, but also help to refocus public sector expenditures on crucial areas like 
health, housing, education, and other areas of developmental needs (Forman and Welch, 
1998:27).  
 
Democratic civil-military relations featured strongly in Namibia’s transition to democracy and 
independence following the negotiated settlement to the lengthy, armed liberation struggle.  The 
armed, anti-colonial struggle was supported by the former Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries as well as communist China and North Korea. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
through its Liberation Committee, assisted with logistical and training support for PLAN’s liberation 
war effort. Many PLAN combatants were also trained in Angola by Cuban military units. Angola and 
Zambia provided rearguard support to PLAN combatants. These countries have a strong tradition 
of subordination of the military to party political control. Therefore the training PLAN combatants 
received while in exile reinforced this tradition. Correspondingly, it was easy for the new defence 
force, which is mainly comprised of ex-PLAN fighters, to accept being subordinated to civil control 
in an independent Namibia. 
 
Namibia’s transition to independence was managed by a United Nations that was ready to assert 
itself at the end of the Cold War, in spite of the near derailment of the UN assignment as a result of 
the tragedy of 1 April, 1989, which saw hostile forces clashing, and which “almost ended the UN 
mission before it had begun” (Thornberry, 2004: 87). Nonetheless, the UN went ahead with its 
mission and oversaw Namibia’s transition to independence. The UN’s determination for UNTAG to 
succeed is reflected in the vigorous, complex institutional structure of UNTAG. This made the UN 
assignment both trustworthy and effective and significantly contributed to its success. As 
Thornberry further notes, UNTAG’s novel features of success were the funding and promptness. In 
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addition there was a distinctive sense of worldwide responsibility and support when the assignment 
was called to action.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Namibia’s civil-military relations in transition were influenced by the colonial, liberation struggle and 
independence periods discussed in this chapter, although we cannot characterise them as 
democratic. These periods were characterised by praetorian types of rule. Democratic civil control 
of the military in modern Namibia was primarily influenced by international actors that negotiated 
for the independence of the country. Although the country’s Constitution, which provides for 
effective subordination of the military to civilian political authorities, is based on the principles of 
Western countries, it laid a firm foundation for Namibia’s success story.  
 
The UN described UNTAG as a demonstration of “how much the United Nations can achieve by 
making full use of all its resources, including the diverse skills, and the commitment, of its staff” 
(UNTAG, http:www.un.org/Deps/dpko/co_mission/untagFT.htm#Functions>). UNTAG and the 
UNHCR implemented their military and repatriation responsibilities as part of Namibia’s successful 
transition to independence.  
 
However, the reintegration of ex-combatants and returnees was not fully realised, as within a 
decade after independence, disenchanted, unemployed ex-fighters engaged in demonstrations 
threatening peace and stability in the country. The Government’s Peace Project, aimed at 
affirmative job placement for ex-combatants mainly in the public service, and was a short-term 
relief measure as pockets of disgruntled and riotous unemployed ex-combatants continue to pose 
a security threat. We could argue that Government failed to put in place comprehensive 
reintegration mechanisms that would make those who could not be absorbed in the NDF 
productive members of the society. The failure by Government to provide support to facilitate the 
long-term reintegration of ex-fighters and returnees, besides the UNHCR’s immediate post-
relocation assistance, caused serious hardships on segments of ex-combatants. 
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This researcher argues, however, that SWAPO’s liberation struggle experience, where its armed 
wing was subordinated to the party, helped to sustain civil control of the military in Namibia. The 
next chapter will look at democratic institutions and mechanisms that have ensured civil control of 
the military. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
This chapter focuses on democratic institutions necessary for civil control of the military. The 
chapter looks at conventional requirements necessary for democratic oversight of the armed forces 
such as judicial arrangements, an effective constitution, and the rule of law, legislative oversight, 
consolidated democracy, accountability and transparency. These oversight mechanisms provide a 
solid manifestation of the dominance of the rule of law in a democracy. Therefore these 
mechanisms are necessary for effective democratic control of the armed forces. Civil-military 
relations and democratic control of the military evolve only in constitutional and legal framework 
(Pantev, 2005:127). The main emphasis of the chapter is on how Namibia’s civil-military relations 
evolved after independence. 
 
BMATT driven civil-military relations 
 
This section explores how the British civil-military relations influenced the nature of civil-military 
relations in Namibia. Armed forces of most independent Africa countries have adopted their former 
colonial masters’ security institutions. Namibia’s civil-military relations have been tailored along the 
lines of those of Britain. At independence the Namibian government was modelled on the 
democratic principles of the Western world. Among the first countries that came to assist Namibia 
put state institutions in place was Britain. Since Namibia was coming from a background of war into 
peace, the situation at independence was very fragile. The new government was faced with the 
daunting task of pacifying the former adversaries of PLAN and SWATF for state and nation-
building. The British and Namibian governments entered into an agreement that brought in the 
British Military Assistance Team (BMATT) that provided training to the new united defence force. 
BMATT was accepted as a professional and competent institution. This fact was confirmed by 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Peter Shivute who claimed that: 
 
…it was able to provide training, professionalisation and unification of former adversaries. The 
primary objective of the reintegration of ex-fighters was to establish a united Defence Force that 
would protect the integrity of the state from external threats, minimise the threat of unrest which 
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could have occurred as a result of ex-fighters losing their jobs, and to provide assistance in case of 
unforeseen disasters (Interview, March 19, 2006).  
 
British civil-military relations were adopted in Namibia. According to the British model, in a 
democracy the military, as the custodians of the defence of the country, should fall under control of 
the civil authorities. According to the Deputy Minister of Defence Victor Simunja the British model 
has “Indeed contributed to confidence and trust in the military as well as changed the norms and 
values of individual members of the defence force with regard to attitudes towards each other, 
levels of respect and tolerance of each other’s views and concerns” (Interview, January 16, 2006). 
 
The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Peter Shivute, argues it was the Namibian 
Government’s decision and desire for the NDF to be established in line with other defence forces in 
Commonwealth states. It was further argued by Shivute that, since Namibia’s independence was 
achieved at the end of the Cold War, Britain was seen as a neutral party, and it was also 
acceptable to all parties involved in the settlement of the Namibia dispute. “The Namibian 
Government approached the British Government for assistance in establishing the new defence 
force based on the Commonwealth doctrine and training” (Interview, March 19, 2006). Eventually, 
the British Government offered to assist the new Namibian government to establish the NDF and 
design the Ministry of Defence structure. A 57-strong BMATT contingent, headed by Brigadier 
Tony Ling, assisted in the selection and training of members of the unitary NDF.  
 
BMATT assisted Government in formulating an integration plan that would bring together equal 
volunteers from SWATF and PLAN to constitute a strong National Defence Force. The newly 
created defence force had a small headquarters and five infantry battalions with a number of 
supporting units. Dzinesa (2005) is of the view that command-and-control of the new armed force 
was to be shared, “but due to the overwhelming win by SWAPO during elections, almost all key 
posts in the NDF went to former PLAN cadres while SWATF dominated the police force”. However, 
SWATF was comprised of white officers, mostly South African, who left Namibia soon after 
independence in 1990. 
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The integration process required military re-orientation but not basic military training as fighters 
from both sides had been fighting the war, albeit under different political leadership and orientation. 
In this regard, the BMATT assisted in providing standardisation training, an 8-week Leadership 
Cadre course, tactics, conventional army administration and weapons training or conversion. This 
prepared graduates for command and instruction positions in the new Defence Force. Training was 
modelled around British military doctrine. 
 
BMATT also assisted in setting up the structure of the military as well as the Ministry of Defence. 
The NDF consisted of: 
• Five motorised infantry battalions 
• A Presidential Guard battalion 
• A combat support battalion 
• A reconnaissance company 
• An engineering company 
• An artillery group 
• A logistics support brigade 
• Air force and  
• Navy (Dzinesa, 2005:210). 
  
Senior Staff Officer Training in the Ministry of Defence, Colonel Karel C. Ndjoba, argued that the 
decision taken by the new Namibian government to introduce the British model of civil-military 
relations in the country immediately after independence immensely contributed to peace and 
stability (Interview, June 28, 2006). 
 
Following the reintegration of the former adversaries from PLAN and SWATF, Government created 
an oversight and command-and-control structure of the NDF based on the British civil-military 
relations model. At the top of the civil control structure of the NDF is the Council of Defence which 
is chaired by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Members of the Council 
of Defence include the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Home Affairs as well as 
the Chief of the Defence Force and the Permanent Secretary of the MoD. 
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In an attempt to prevent military involvement in politics, the NDF is expected to be politically neutral 
and serving members are prohibited from holding political office or being engaged in political 
activities. NDF members are encouraged not to be influenced by political party affiliations when 
performing their duties. For example, Section 14 of the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) 
prohibits members of the Defence Force from nomination, election or appointment as Members of 
Parliament or any prescribed public body. This provision is significant in preventing the type of 
military involvement in partisan politics that has often characterised non-democratic governments. 
Furthermore, it is equally important to note that political parties are not allowed to carry out political 
activities on military bases. However, soldiers are allowed as individual private citizens to belong to 
political parties of their choice as well as to vote since this has been recognised as a fundamental 
political right. This therefore does not imply that the military is entirely excluded from politics. 
 
Namibia has a hybrid civil-military relations model reflecting both PLAN and British civil-military 
relations. For example the MoD is comprised of civilian and military employees who work together. 
As Colonel Frederick Siluzungila explained: 
 
The British model of civil-military relations that subordinates the military to civil control is being 
practiced in Namibia. For example, we have the military staff that fall under the office of the Chief 
of Defence Force and civilian staff under the office of the Permanent Secretary of the MoD. The 
Permanent Secretary, who is a civilian, is the Executive Officer of the MoD and the NDF.  Both 
military and civilian employees complement each other in performing their duties to achieve one 
goal.  Likewise, PLAN was under civil control where the political leadership of SWAPO provided 
guidance to the military and this pattern continued after independence (Interview, November 19, 
2007). 
 
PLAN was subordinated to civil control. The Commander-in-Chief of PLAN, who was a civilian, is 
now the Commander-in-Chief of the NDF. Minister of Defence and former PLAN Chief of Staff, 
Major General (Retired) suggested that: 
 
PLAN was under the control of the party. During the liberation period the Secretary of Defence, 
PLAN commanders and Political Commissars were all subordinated to the party thus ensuring civil 
control of the military. All PLAN members took an oath of allegiance to respect the hierarchy of 
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SWAPO. The supremacy of SWAPO over PLAN was emphasised at all times. In an independent 
Namibia, the military accepts its constitutional mandate and is regulated by the Constitution which 
is the supreme law of the country (Interview, March 15, 2006).    
 
This study notes that a hybrid of the British civil-military relations that emphasises subordination of 
the military to civil authority, and the liberation struggle tradition where PLAN was subordinated to 
the party is being practiced in Namibia. This is evident in the appointment of senior military officers 
such as the Chief of Defence Force, NDF Chief of Staff etc., who are all former PLAN soldiers to 
ensure loyalty to the Government. 
  
Governance context 
 
Scholars such as Pantev have summarised some useful requirements necessary for effective 
democratic control of the military activities. These include the following: a clear judicial separation 
of authority between the constitutionally prescribed political authorities – to guarantee checks and 
balances as prescribed by the Constitution, especially in relation to emergency powers in crisis and 
the authority to introduce emergency law as was in the case of the Caprivi armed uprising; 
separation of the military from areas such as internal security and the fight against organised crime 
– this is to be done so that the military concentrates in the area of its specialisation; and 
appropriate judicial oversight over the activities of the military to ensure that security forces act only 
within the framework of the law and international humanitarian norms (2005:8). 
 
Institutionalised checks and balances as per the Constitution have enabled Namibia to preserve 
stable civil-military relations since independence. Democratic values and respect for civil 
institutions by the Defence Force are evident. Prime Minister of Namibia, Nahas Angula, noted 
that: 
 
Namibia has democratic institutions in place such as the Constitution that specifies the President 
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Constitution also established the NDF as an 
institution. The military respects the Constitution as the supreme law of the country and have 
accepted the supremacy of civil authority over their activities. That is the reason Namibian has not 
experienced military interference in the governing of the country (Interview, October 4, 2007). 
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The Constitution of Namibia, Chapter 15, Articles 118 (2), Chapter 6, Article 40 (e, j), Chapter 7, 
and Article 44 outlines the following principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships 
necessary for civil-military relations: 
 
• The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force; 
• The President may, with the approval of Parliament, declare a state of national defence; 
• The Minister of Defence shall be accountable to Parliament for the activities of the 
Defence Force; 
• Parliament shall approve the defence budget annually; a joint standing committee on 
defence and security shall be established in Parliament to investigate and make 
recommendations on matters affecting defence and security. 
 
The Constitution establishes Namibia as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary state 
founded on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all. Additionally, the 
Constitution outlines the principle of separation of powers and recognises the dignity, equal and 
inalienable human rights of all members of Namibian society. The Constitution that has been 
mainly respected since independence is looked upon as one of the most liberal and progressive 
constitutions in the world.  
 
Immediately after independence the government prioritised its focus. It committed itself to 
consolidating peace and democracy, establishing and consolidating institutions for promoting the 
welfare of the citizens and strengthening the economy of the country.  Researchers such as Pantev 
are of the view that the establishment of the rule of law is at the heart of a successful transition to 
and consolidation of democracy. He further argues that the adoption and enforcement of essential 
legal acts, such as the constitution, are crucial to the rule of law (2005:29). In addition, he suggests 
that the change of the entire cycle of state establishments to serve the rule of law, rather than the 
agencies of repression, is one of the vital requirements for both successful transition and 
progressive consolidation of democracy. This view is shared by Tjitendero, the first Speaker of the 
National Assembly, who asserted that before independence, Namibia did not have any 
parliamentary system, and therefore after independence the Parliament of Namibia was the first 
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institution that was established to serve the interests of citizens (2006:2). The new independent 
government replaced apartheid structures with those that reflected the new reality of 
independence. For example legislative instruments for affirmative action, for the advancement of 
persons within Namibia who had been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by 
past discriminatory laws and practice, were created and strengthened. Also, the government 
created and consolidated policies and programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation and nation 
building, boosting socio-economic reconstruction, consolidating the rule of law and security sector 
reform, as well as supporting development programmes across the political and security sectors. In 
addition programmes and policies were strengthened to redress social, economic or educational 
imbalances in Namibian society arising out of past discriminatory laws or practices or for achieving 
a balanced structuring of the defence force, the police public service and the prison service.  
 
Key posts that play a role in Namibia’s Constitutional checks and balances have also been 
established and consolidated. The Office of the Ombudsman is one such office that plays the role 
of a watchdog body that guards human rights, promotes fair and effective administration in the 
public service, combats corruption, and protects the environment. It has powers to investigate 
complaints, including issues of defence and security, and to refer matters to the courts or other 
authorities. The other is the Office of the Auditor General that audits government spending and 
presents an annual report to the National Assembly. The Auditor General is appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission and with the approval of the 
National Assembly. The other post is the Attorney General who is the main legal advisor to the 
President and the Government, protects the Constitution, and has the final responsibility over the 
Prosecutor General. The Attorney General is appointed by the President from the National 
Assembly, and he/she is invited to attend Cabinet meetings. 
 
Civil control and supervision of the Armed Forces in Namibia is vested in democratic structures 
such as the Constitution, Parliament and the civilian dominated Ministry of Defence.  
 
Traditional forms of political and parliamentary control over the armed forces that have been 
successfully applied elsewhere in the world and are being practiced in Namibia include the 
institution of a strong and legitimate civil-dominated Ministry of Defence that supervises the NDF, 
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and the Minister who directs the Chief of the Defence Force in executing his peace-time roles. The 
civil authorities maintain control over the Defence Force through Parliamentary Committees that 
have total or partial jurisdiction over defence and security matters such as budget, public accounts, 
foreign affairs and intelligence; the authority of the Ministry of Finance over defence spending, the 
Ombudsman system to whom aggrieved civilians or military personnel can refer military related 
complaints, and the provision of legislation allowing the public access to and information on military 
related developments. Nonetheless, the MoD has been challenged, without success, by individual 
citizens and civil society organisations to avail information on the casualty figures of NDF soldiers 
during the DRC conflict where Namibia sent troops. Since there is no law on access to information 
in Namibia nothing much could be done in this case.   
 
In Namibia, the legislature possesses oversight powers which include the enactment of legislation 
that seeks to prevent excessive secrecy with respect to the budget. The legislature determines the 
military’s budget allocation and procurement expenditure. The National Assembly has the power to 
approve budgets. As per the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Cabinet Ministers are 
accountable to both the President and Parliament (Articles 63 sub-Article 2A, 41). Equally, the 
National Council, which is composed of representatives from the thirteen political regions of the 
country, has the power to review bills passed by the National Assembly and has certain 
investigative powers (Article 59 sub-Article 3). These are important mechanisms for ensuring 
checks and balances. However, their effectiveness is undermined by lack of in-depth debates in 
Parliament on issues of defence and security. A lecturer in Political Science at the University of 
Namibia, Phanuel Kaapama, argued that: 
 
When it comes to debate on defence budgets, Members of Parliament do not interrogate issues 
sufficiently, probably because of lack of knowledge in finance and budgeting. Politics also plays a 
major role especially since the ruling SWAPO party has a two-third majority. This has an impact on 
transparency and the extent of debate in the national parliament (Interview, April 5, 2006). 
  
Moreover, civil supremacy in Namibia was further consolidated by the failure of SWAPO to win a 
two-thirds majority in the first democratic elections when the opposition parties secured 31 out of 
72 seats in the National Assembly. The existence of a reasonably strong opposition meant that the 
risk of using the military for political reasons by the ruling party was significantly reduced (Lamb, 
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1999:7). This view appears to be valid because the ruling and dominant SWAPO party is 
constrained by legal instruments from directly influencing the activities of the Defence Force. 
Similarly, political activities within the NDF are forbidden by relevant defence regulations. 
Nevertheless, voting from military bases helps SWAPO to win some constituencies they would not 
carry otherwise. As the President of the Congress of Democrats (CoD) and Member of Parliament, 
Ben Ulenga, put it: 
 
The Defence Force as well as other security agencies is largely comprised of former PLAN fighters 
as well as SWAPO returnees. Obviously this makes SWAPO easily garner votes from the military 
sector compared to other parties. This is a reality of the Namibian political landscape (Interview, 
August 14, 2006). 
 
This researcher argues that the military vote is essential because it is a democratic right of every 
citizen to exercise his or her vote. The military like any other group of voters in the country is 
affected by the policies and decisions of elected leaders. Therefore, the military has a stake in the 
outcome of elections. To disenfranchise the military may cause a military coup d'état. Winning the 
military vote is crucial for the ruling party as it may be seen as an acceptance of the ruling party’s 
policies and programmes, thus strengthening civil-military relations.  
 
Incidentally, it is felt by other observers that stable civil-military relations have been successful in 
Namibia because of a wide range of benefits that are given to the Defence Force such as a pay 
promotion and increasing the number of senior officers with high remuneration, although this is not 
sustainable in the long term. In addition, senior military officers such as retired NDF Chiefs of Staff 
have been given generous overseas appointments as ambassadors. An NDF informant claimed 
that other senior military officers were seconded to the parastatal sectors, such as August 26 
Holding Company, as managers, and also serve in various companies on boards of directors with 
high remuneration (Interview, April 11, 2006).  These stabilising strategies that were adopted by 
the political leadership further cemented the control of civilian authority over the military in Namibia 
and somewhat militarised the society.  
 
 
 
 94
Social context 
 
Although there are democratic institutions that ensure civil control of the NDF, social factors such 
as poverty and corruption may undermine the effectiveness of these institutions. Poverty in 
Namibia is one of the factors that may pose a security threat to the country. Poverty in the 
Namibian context is defined as “income differences among the country’s citizens” (Sibeene, 2007: 
9). It is argued that when a community spends 98% of its income on food consumption and cannot 
afford to spend money on other basic needs, and then such a community lives in poverty. 
According to the Poverty Bulletin (2005:9) about 38 % of the Namibian population lives in poverty. 
On a positive note there is complete national leadership commitment to improve both the quality 
and quantity of public service delivery. In 1998 Cabinet approved a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
which mapped out the central path for poverty reduction in the country including (i) fostering more 
equitable and efficient delivery of public services through decentralisation; (ii) accelerating 
equitable agricultural expansion, food security and other crop development; and (iii) exploring 
options for non-agricultural economic empowerment as well as informal and self-employment 
(Poverty Bulletin, 2005:9). The government had attempted to address the basic needs of citizens. It 
is estimated that 87% of the population has access to potable water compared to 46% in the pre-
independence period. In addition, more people have access to electricity. Similarly, government 
has made progress in the education sector, where the historical disparities before independence 
were evident. It is estimated that 90% of children aged six to 24 are now in school (Sibeene, 2007: 
9). However, despite the great strides made by government in addressing poverty, the problem still 
persists. The Government has performed less well on this policy issue. 
 
In Namibia the economy is performing reasonably well, and therefore there is no general frustration 
among the civilian population or in the military. This observation was also confirmed by D. Motinga, 
a Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research, who said, “Where there is rampant corruption, 
ongoing suffering of civilians, the continued lack of development in a country, and when 
government’s policies are not working it is a serious concern” (Interview, April 24, 2006). The 
military intervene when civilians fail to manage the country properly and may actually become 
popular under such circumstances. In Namibia, there are instances of corruption that need urgent 
attention from all stakeholders. According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the 
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Transparency International (TI), an organisation that reports on the state of corruption in the world, 
from 1998-2004 Namibia was regarded as one of Africa’s  cleanest countries, second only to 
Botswana (NID, 1990-2004:18). Namibia’s index position was centred in the ten-point scale (NID, 
1990-2004:18). The CPI ranks countries from completely clean (10) to completely corrupt (1) (NID, 
1990-2004:18). According to the CPI score, from 1998-2002 Namibia moved from 5.3 to 5.7 
showing a slight improvement. However, in 2003 Namibia’s CPI score was 4.7 and in 2004 it was 
4.3 (NID, 1990-2004:18). The CPI score during 2002-2003 dropped, putting Namibia on the 
negative side of the CPI scale. The drop in the CPI position during 2002-2003, could be attributed 
to two key corruption cases such, the Social Security Commission case and the Roads Authority 
case (NID, 1990-2004:19). This researcher argues that although some people may argue that 
corruption is not widespread, it would be unwise to conclude that all is well and under control. 
Corruption is a problem in Namibia that cannot be ignored, because it undermines good 
governance.   
 
It is a contradiction that Namibia is classified as a ‘middle income’ country.  The categorisation is 
based on a high annual GDP per capita of about US$2,000 per annum (Poverty Bulletin, 2005:8), 
which translates to more than N$14, 000 per month per individual. However this average does not 
reflect the realities on the ground. Speaking at the Junior Achievement Namibia Business Hall of 
Fame function in Windhoek, the country’s Prime Minister, Nahas Angula, estimated that “Only 15 
per cent of our population consumes over 80 per cent of our wealth, and the rest is shared by the 
poor majority of our people” (Mukuzunga, F., 2007:4). The country has a dualistic economy where 
abject poverty exists alongside extremes of wealth. This is partly attributed to the country’s colonial 
past. Namibia inherited widespread poverty at independence because of the discriminatory laws 
that kept the majority of black people in poverty. According to a research study conducted in 
1993/94 --the Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) --37% of households 
were categorised as poor, with food accounting for 98% of their household expenditure. There are 
also wide income disparities in the population. For instance, studies indicate that the average 
income of a German speaking Namibian is over 23 times than that of a San speaking Namibian 
(NHIES, 1993/94). It is estimated that more than one third of Namibians live on less than US$1 per 
day. At the same time the urban middle classes and landowning farmers enjoy a comfortable 
lifestyle similar to anywhere in the developed world (OneWorld.net, 2007). It is also reported that 
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Namibia’s Gini Coefficient of 0.6, the figure signifying the level of economic discrepancy, positions 
the country as one of the world’s most unequal societies (OneWorld.net, 2007). This disparity has 
increased since independence in 1990, challenging the guarantees of freedom from the colonial 
period and the fruits of independence. In addition, there are large disparities in infrastructure 
development between the impoverished northern parts of Namibia, where the majority of the 
population lives, and the central and southern regions.  Poverty poses one of the biggest security 
challenges in Namibia. Among these challenges is that poverty can undermine political institutions 
in the country; it can also affect the credibility of the state as well as expose people to 
manipulation. The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that corruption has been the cause of political 
uprisings, economic decay and even military coup d'état in some nations. “It undermines the quality 
and quantity of public service, and leads to reduced confidence, trust and respect in the public 
service; and respect for the Rule of Law is undermined and ultimately lost ” (Ombudsman, 2007:2). 
Overall, poverty does not only affect civil-military relations, but it has wide implications for 
democratic governance in general. 
 
The other factor that most respondents felt poses a security challenge in Namibia, and therefore 
needed serious attention, was the widespread corruption in government and parastatals that has 
contributed to poor public service delivery. Corruption is a world-wide phenomenon and generally 
refers to the abuse of public office for private gain. Public office is abused when an official accepts, 
asks for or forces someone to give a bribe, or when a private agent offers a bribe, to avoid public 
policies and procedures in order to get a workable benefit and profit from that advantage. This 
understanding is further elaborated by Bottelier (1988) cited by the NID (2007:6) who outlines the 
following as methods of how public office can also be abused for personal rewards: patronage – 
the control of appointments to office, privileges, etc; nepotism – favouritism shown to relatives and 
friends in awarding jobs or privileges; under pricing state assets; collusion – making a secret 
understanding to divert public resources; or outright theft (Namibia Institute for Democracy, 
2007:6). Generally, Namibians have a high level of confidence in their political leadership, and 
there has been a modest popular outcry in response to the allegations of corruption reported on a 
regular basis in the media. However, the international perception differs from the local discernment 
that corruption is not a severe problem in Namibia. A survey in Transparency International’s 2005 
Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Namibia number 47 out of 159 countries worldwide in terms of 
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the perception of corruption (Freedom House, 2006:1). This indeed indicates that Namibia has a 
corruption problem.  
 
The most common forms of corrupt practices elsewhere in the world are also found in Namibia. 
The following are notable forms of corruption: favouritism shown to friends or relatives, party 
affiliations, tribe, religion and other preferential groupings in awarding privileges such as jobs or 
services; fraud – involves some type of deception or counterfeit pretence to achieve a benefit; 
bribery – promise, offer or giving of any benefit that inappropriately influences the actions or 
decisions of a public official; theft – of resources by persons assigned with authority and control 
over anything of value; extortion – forcing a person to pay money or other valuables in exchange 
for acting or failing to act. This coercion can be under the threat of physical harm, violence or self-
control; abuse of power – using one’s vested authority to give excessive special treatment to any 
group or individual or to discriminate against any group or individual; conflict of interest – engaging 
in transactions or attaining positions or business interests that are irreconcilable with one’s official 
role and duties, for the reason of illicit enhancement; illicit donations – where political parties or 
government in power receive money in exchange for not interfering with the activities being 
provided by those making the donation (Namibia Institute for Democracy, A Namibian citizen’s 
guide to Anti-corruption, 2007: 10 ). If corruption is left unchecked, it may lead to the collapse of 
certain important areas such law enforcement, the security of the country etc. Corruption 
undermines the rule of law. The principle of equality before the law will be disregarded, as those 
who corrupt a law enforcement officer will not be arrested and prosecuted for their crimes. In the 
long run corruption will lead to a rise in the crime rate. Corrupt offices that deal with the security of 
the nation such as the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration, may issue identity documents or 
passport, or allow undesirable people to enter the country, thus endangering the security of 
Namibia.  
 
In terms of the statistics on corruption practices over the last few years, the Namibia Institute for 
Democracy (NID) has estimated that 467 cases between 1990 and 2004 were reported in the local 
media (Graham Hopwood, 2007:13). Corruption has serious costs to society such as losses in 
economic efficiency, distortion of incentives and distribution, loss of political legitimacy by 
government institutions, dilution of the work ethic and damage to the moral fabric of society 
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(Accountability and Transparency in Africa, http://www.pdgs.org/Archivo/d0000090.htm). One could 
also add that corruption promotes ethnic loyalty, ethnicity, nepotism and dishonesty; therefore it 
must be fought at all costs. To this end, political will is crucial to the effectiveness of any anti-
corruption measures. Accordingly, the second President of the Republic of Namibia, Hifikepunye 
Pohamba, upon taking office declared tackling public corruption to be his top priority. He said, 
“Government is committed to address corruption with a sledgehammer”. According to Hopwood 
(2007:15) some of the preventive and curative measures to be instituted were the removal of 
lethargy and inefficiency in the public service and the removal of meritorious recruitment of civil 
service (which can contribute to the reduction of patronage). There can be no uncertainty regarding 
the helpful paradigm that is being set by the President in his efforts to encourage a new move 
toward the elimination of corruption. Accordingly, then Deputy Minister of Works, Transport and 
Communications, Paulus Kapia, was forced to resign after being caught in a fraud scandal at the 
Social Security Commission and the Avid Investment Corporation, relating to the misdirection of 
government monies and illicit payments to certain SWAPO members.  
 
However, there are many other high profile cases that still need to be accounted for, such as the 
missing N$ 3 million at the MoD, the missing N$ 100 million at the Offshore Development 
Company, which implements projects on behalf of government, and the missing N$ 30 million 
investment at the Social Security Commission in 2005. In the case of the latter, the investigation is 
now in the hands of the Prosecutor General, but it has been there for more than a year without any 
sign of progress on the case. Other irregularities that involved high ranking government officials 
and senior politicians in the early years of independence and were widely reported by the media 
include the irregularity in 1991 in the allocation of fishing rights, where Cabinet Ministers were 
allegedly involved; the Borehole Scandal in 1992 that implicated some ministers and other senior 
government officials; the Single Quarters housing scandal where millions of Namibian dollars went 
missing; corrupt dealings that came to be known as “Merc-Scandal” involving the Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and corporate donations for the wedding of Minister of 
Fisheries in 1999. The Minister’s wedding was funded by donations from the fishing industry, thus 
causing accusations of conflict of interest. Although Government, in terms of democratic principles 
and rule of law, put up commissions of inquiry, such as the Frank Commission of Inquiry in 1990, 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Activities, Affairs, Management and Operation of the Social 
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Security Commission in 2002, the Commission of Inquiry into the Activities, Affairs, Management 
and Operation of the Roads Authority in 2002, and the Commission of Inquiry into the Activities, 
Affairs, Management and Operation of the former Amalgamated Commercial Holding (Pty) Ltd and 
the former Development Brigade Corporation in 2004, to investigate a number of irregularities in 
government and parastatals, the findings of such commissions have not yet been made public nor 
has any punitive action ever been taken on these reports from 1990 to 2005. The Anti-Corruption 
Act was introduced to Parliament in 2001, but significantly, the Anti-Corruption Commission only 
became a reality after President Pohamba was sworn in as President in 2005. According to the 
Executive Director of the NSHR, Mr. Phil ya Nangolo, the findings of the commissions have been 
deliberately and systematically hidden from public scrutiny and kept secret for political reasons 
(Interview, November 01, 2006).  
 
The general view was created that the authorities were either unwilling or unable to tackle graft, 
especially if it occurred within their own ranks. Therefore, it could be said that the government 
exercise of setting up commissions of inquiry has served little purpose and has cost the taxpayer a 
lot of money. Additionally, the secrecy surrounding the findings of these commissions of inquiry 
was inconsistent with government’s policy of transparency and accountability, further casting doubt 
on its credibility and integrity.  These are serious issues that may affect healthy civil-military 
relations in the country. The Executive should be seen to be clean and not conduct business in a 
corrupt way. As discussed above, corruption has led to military interference in the political 
governance of some countries. Therefore Government, in collaboration with other stakeholders, 
needs to address the issue of corruption, because if left unimpeded, it leads to high levels of 
wasteful government spending and increases the gap between the rich and poor. Consequently, 
this may lead people to despair and lack of trust or confidence in the political governance, thus 
destabilising the country. 
  
Parliament also has a potentially major role to play in the battle against corruption, but 
unfortunately it seems to play an ineffective role in this regard. For instance, the reports of the 
Auditor General on the expenditure by line ministries are presented to the Committee on Public 
Accounts and the Economy on an annual basis for discussion and later presented to Parliament for 
consideration and approval. Some of these reports contain instances of fraud, unauthorised 
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expenditure and theft, but hardly any punitive action is taken by parliament. As Mr. Hans-Erik Staby 
remarked, “As a rule, the reports receive merely superficial attention and are considered primarily 
from a party political perspective, perhaps because so many of the delegates are acknowledged 
addicts of patronage and possibly because the accused might be integrated in the aforementioned 
system” (Hopwood (ed.), 2007:14). This is indeed unfortunate as it undermines the integrity of the 
political leadership as well as the confidence citizens have in democracy and government. 
 
It is also felt by some observers such as William Lindeke, a Senior Research Associate: 
Democracy and Governance, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), that there was no 
transparency with regards to the manner in which Namibia was given a diamond concession in the 
DRC following Namibia’s military involvement in that country’s civil war (Interview, April 21, 2006). 
A diamond mine, which was estimated to cover 25 square kilometres of land along the Kasai River 
40 kilometres from Tshikapa, was granted to Namibia as a five-year concession. According to 
Dzinesa and Rupiya (2005) the proceeds from the diamond mine were meant to counterbalance 
the increasing military operating cost incurred by Namibia’s involvement in the DRC, which was 
projected by the UN Panel to have depleted Namibia’s treasury of more than N$700 million. The 
exploration activities of the diamond mine were undertaken by a parastatal company, August 26 
Holding Company, a 100 per cent government-owned company. This company is run by the MoD 
as a shareholding ministry on behalf of the Government of Namibia. William Lindeke noted that the 
activities of the company are not very transparent, “as its books are audited privately and in 
secrecy” (Interview, April 21, 2006). This raises some suspicions on the governance of the country 
as it clearly shows the military-political corruption nexus. Therefore, there is a need for checks and 
balances, and this is where a robust civil society, strong opposition political parties, 
parliamentarians, Auditor-General and Ombudsman’s office are needed. The absence of effective 
institutional control in any country undermines good governance including that of the armed forces. 
This researcher argues that by employing best governance practices civil authorities may be able 
to control the military, and military officers can come to understand that, in the long run, such 
control benefits them and their nation. Therefore, these institutions should be consolidated and 
entrenched with particular reference to the armed forces. These are valuable commodities for any 
government to ensure peace and stability in the country. Moreover, institutional consolidation is 
significant for civil-military relations as it also facilitates effective oversight over the military. 
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Notwithstanding this, there is a positive relationship between citizens and the state. Keulder and 
Wiese claimed that most Namibians generally hold the state in high esteem and regard the 
SWAPO government as legitimate. They regard the state as having sufficient capacity to enforce 
its laws (2003:35). Citizens also believe the current system is responsive to their needs and they 
trust government.  
 
To attest to the point above, in 2005 there was an ethnic dispute over grazing land in the Kwangali 
speaking area in Kavango Region involving the cattle of Oshiwambo speaking Namibians. The 
cattle owners have been using grazing areas in the Kavango Region dating back to 1991. It is 
estimated that about 1, 670 head of cattle are grazing in the part of Kavango Region that is the 
focus of the dispute. It is being argued that the cattle are illegally grazing in the area, because they 
came from elsewhere without proper authorisation from the local traditional authority. Additionally, 
it is argued that the presence of the animals exerts an enormous problem of competition for 
grazing in the area. In an effort to defuse mounting ethnic tension, the Government ordered over 
200 farmers from the Oshiwambo tribe off the land owned by the minority Kavango people.  
 
Moreover, the political authorities are handling the ethnic dispute with extreme caution and 
patience. The case is now in the hands of the High Court. This case was important as it affirmed 
the rule of law in Namibia which is essential to peace and stability. Chapter 1 Article 1 (1) of the 
Constitution stipulates that the Republic of Namibia is a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary 
State founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all. Therefore, the 
fact that the Oshiwambo-dominated Executive did not take the side of their fellow Oshiwambo 
speaking Namibians in this dispute was in line with the above Constitutional principle, thus 
ensuring unity among different ethnic groups in the country. Moreover, the Executive’s non-
interference in the dispute that is now before the courts shows the independence of the Executive 
Branch from the Judiciary Branch, further enforcing the principle of the separation of powers 
among the three branches of the State. The Executive’s conscious handling of this dispute had 
prevented a potential explosive tribal conflict that would have destabilised the country. Since the 
NDF is comprised of all ethnic groups in the country, the tribal conflict could have also created 
tension within the military, endangering healthy civil-military relations in Namibia. 
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Operational context  
 
This exploratory section attempts to describe various democratic mechanisms, principles and 
practices that guide the operations of the NDF. The section assesses the principles and 
operational practices of the NDF and the impact on civil control of the military in Namibia.  
 
Military operations involve the employment of military resources to achieve a specific objective. 
The operations require planning of force structure, budget approval, procurement and other 
administrative activities. The operations of the NDF are subject to democratic mechanisms in the 
country such as the Constitution and the legislature, and thus have an impact on civil-military 
relations.  To understand the conditions in which the NDF operates it is significant to examine the 
basis of Namibia’s Statement on Defence Policy. The Parliament of Namibia approved the 
country’s Statement on Defence Policy (White Paper) in 1993.  
 
According to the Statement on Defence Policy: 
 
Namibia’s foreign and defence policy is founded on the principle of peaceful co-existence and 
cooperation with other countries and in the operation of international law. The day-to-day 
guarantee of security lies in the maintenance of international order and, in particular, in regional 
stability (MoD, 1993:6).  
   
The above provision is significant because since independence Namibia has lived peacefully with 
its neighbours. Moreover, the NDF has participated in numerous UN peacekeeping operations as 
well as in regional military exercises that have ensured international peace and served as 
confidence building measures for the armed forces in the region. The NDF has participated in 
regional military exercises to enhance its capacity for peacekeeping missions. These programmes 
include Exercise Morning Star -- a map reading exercise that was held in South Africa in 1996; 
Exercise Blue Hungwe at a battalion level that was hosted by Zimbabwe in 1997; and Exercise 
Blue Crane at a brigade level that was held in South Africa in 1999. In addition, the NDF took part 
in a French-led military exercise ‘Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities’ (RECAMP) 
or Tanzanite Recamp 3, in Dar es Salaam and Tanga in Tanzania in 2002. This mutual exercise 
involved armed forces of sixteen African countries under the auspices of the UN in collaboration 
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with the OAU. The purpose of the exercise was to enhance harmonisation among African militaries 
in the areas of peacekeeping and response to humanitarian or natural catastrophes. The exercise 
was part of the SADC proposal to find a general approach among the armed forces of countries in 
case of natural or humanitarian catastrophes. Moreover, this researcher argues that joint military 
exercises are essential because they assist in building confidence and trust among defence forces 
thus ensuring peace and stability. The NDF has also participated in military operations in the DRC, 
Angola and in the Kavango and Caprivi Regions of Namibia. 
 
In 1998 the DRC was invaded by armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda. The President of the DRC, 
Laurent Desire Kabila, requested Namibia, along with Zimbabwe and Angola, to repel the military 
aggression by Rwanda and Uganda.  In his argument, a SWAPO Senior Official and former 
Minister of Defence, Errki Nghimtina, opines that “In defence of the AU and SADC principles 
Namibia heeded the call of the government of the DRC for military assistance to ward off foreign 
invasion and aggression”(MoD, 2000/01). Consequently, Namibia deployed an estimated 2, 000 
NDF soldiers and equipment in the DRC, and in the process Namibia incurred financial and 
material costs in addition to human casualties. The then Minister of Defence, Erkki Nghimtina, told 
Parliament when motivating the N$ 172 million allocated to the MoD under the Additional Budget in 
2000 that N$74.5 million would cover conditions of service for NDF soldiers in the DRC, while more 
than N$36.8 million would be spent on the purchase of a variety of ammunition and explosives 
(MoD, 2000/01). Subsequently, Namibia’s Defence Budget increased so as to maintain NDF 
soldiers in the DRC. This also meant that the taxpayers had to dig deep into their pockets to 
finance Namibian troops deployed under the SADC alliance with Angola and Zimbabwe to support 
President Laurent Kabila’s government, which was threatened by an invasion. In spite of this, the 
defence budget did not have a big impact on the budget deficit and inflation, unlike the Zimbabwe 
case. This was confirmed by the then Finance Minister, Nangolo Mbumba, who claimed that the 
participation of the NDF soldiers in DRC would not have any serious impact on the country’s 
finances: “No expenditure item, programme or project of the Namibian Government will suffer as a 
result of our military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (The Namibian, 2000). 
In addition it did not negatively impact on public opinion, as there were no protests or civil 
disobedience against troop deployment in the DRC. As a member of SADC, Namibia has certain 
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security obligations to fulfil and this was one instance. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Hidipo Hamutenya, explained: 
 
Proceeding from the standpoint of Pan-African solidarity and commitment to regional peace and 
stability, the three countries responded to the Congolese request to blunt the advance of the 
aggressor forces on Kinshasa and other major Congolese economic and population centres such 
as Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi, Matadi etc. (Parliament of Namibia, 2000:178). 
 
The deployment of NDF soldiers in the DRC paid peace dividends in the Southern African Region. 
For example, it was only after the SADC allies’ intervention that an enabling framework for peace 
talks in the DRC took place. Therefore, Namibia’s participation led to the signing of a cease-fire, 
opening up the way forward for peaceful and democratic transformation in that country. The signs 
of a long lasting peace and stability look promising, the then Namibian Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Hidipo Hamutenya, informed Parliament in 2002: 
 
With Rwanda and Uganda aggression blunted and their hegemonic ambitions checked, it was now 
possible for other parties, such as the UN and South Africa, to step forth with proposals for 
peacekeeping and national reconciliation…talks are going on between the government of the DRC 
and the various groups in that country in an effort to find a formula for the setting up of a 
transitional government of national reconciliation. These talks are talking place on the basis of the 
Pretoria Agreement, which is the latest attempt aimed at achieving national reconciliation in that 
country (Parliament of Namibia, 2000:179). 
 
This researcher argues that Namibia’s military involvement in the DRC defused the potential 
human, social and economic devastation. As the Deputy Minister of Defence, Victor Simunja, 
claimed, “It could have had far reaching economic and security consequences in the SADC 
Region” (Interview, January 16, 2006). But, it also led to corruption, especially since there was no 
transparency and accountability in the operations of the mine that was awarded to Namibia as 
earlier explained in this chapter. 
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Similarly, researchers such as Dzinesa and Rupiya (2005) are of the opinion that Namibia’s military 
expedition in the DRC earned the country a respectable standing among the SADC member states 
as a dependable nation.  
 
All the same, the deployment of troops in the DRC introduced a new dynamic (also related to 
secrecy and MoD’s hostile attitude toward media) into Namibia’s civil-military relations. The MoD 
was not giving sufficient information to the public on the wellbeing of the NDF soldiers in the DRC. 
Similarly, there was no transparency in the deployment of NDF soldiers in the DRC conflict, thus 
undermining one of the fundamental principles of democratic control of the military. Although there 
are differing views on the extent of consultations made by the President before deploying NDF 
troops to the DRC, this researcher argues that the event exposed how the President exceeded his 
authority by unilaterally sending soldiers to the DRC, because he did not consult a constituted  
Cabinet or Parliament. Some analysts considered the President’s action an abuse of constitutional 
power that could seriously undermine the democratic dispensation in Namibia.  The President’s 
action to deploy the NDF in DRC is ominous to civil-military relations as it undermined the 
constitutional checks and balances function of Parliament on the Executive. Details are discussed 
in Chapter 6 and 7 of this study. 
 
It is also interesting to note that Namibia has chaired SADC in the past, as well as the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 2005, but ordinary citizens do not know the implication 
of this to the country. A lecturer in Political Science at the University of Namibia, Phanuel 
Kaapama, remarked that: 
 
Namibia has regional and international security obligations to fulfil. However, citizens are not 
properly informed about Namibia’s foreign agenda. As a result there was a public outcry when NDF 
soldiers were deployed in the DRC. It is unfortunate that citizens who play a decisive role in the 
successful implementation of Government programmes are not adequately informed about the 
country’s foreign agenda (Interview, April 5, 2006).   
 
This is an area that needs a serious review by Government to strengthen civil-military relations in 
Namibia.  
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Internally the NDF carried operations to restore peace and stability in the Caprivi and Kavango 
Regions. In 1988 Mishake Muyongo, a former Member of Parliament and leader of the Official 
Opposition Party, the DTA of Namibia, after expulsion from the party revived his United Democratic 
Party (UDP). The UDP spearheaded an attempt to secede the Caprivi Region from Namibia 
alleging marginalisation of the local inhabitants. He also alleged that the Caprivi Region was 
historically, geographically and culturally not part of Namibia (Human Rights Practices for 1998: 
Namibia Country Report, http://www.usemb.se/human1998/namibia.html). 
 
Following the 1998 rebel attacks by the Caprivi Liberation Army secessionists, the armed wing of 
UDP, on the NDF military base, at the police station, at an NBC radio station and other government 
installations in the Caprivi Region, NDF soldiers were deployed in the area. Eventually, the 
rebellion was crushed, but afterwards the security forces, particularly the paramilitary police unit, 
Special Field Force (SFF), was implicated in random beating of civilians, looting of property, and 
shooting and wounding civilians who were fleeing arrest (Human Rights Practices for 1998: 
Namibia Country Report, http://www.usemb.se/human1998/namibia.html). In 1999 government 
also confirmed revelations in the media of human rights abuses against suspected secessionists 
by security forces. 
 
In 1999 the NDF launched pursuit operations deep in Angola against UNITA rebel forces that were 
threatening the security of residents in Kavango and Caprivi Regions. The purpose of the 
operations was to minimise UNITA atrocities on the civilian population in the two regions. 
According to NDF military commanders, the operations subsequently led to the annihilation and 
elimination of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, on 22 February, 2002 (Personal Communication, 
August 21, 2002). 
 
As well as these military operations, the NDF also has rendered the following services in support of 
the civil authorities and communities:  the repatriation and settlement of Namibian nationals from 
Botswana; apprehension of foreign trawlers illegally fishing in territorial waters; joint operations with 
Namibian Police to ensure law and order during holiday seasons; search and rescue mission of a 
Cessna aircraft that crashed in the Namib-Naukluft; mine clearance operation in the country’s 
northern regions of Kunene, Omusati and Ohangwena as well as Kavango and Caprivi Regions 
 107
where hundreds of unexploded ordinances were destroyed; recovering of stolen cattle; assistance 
to the Ministry of Health and Social Services in escorting pension paymasters; emergency relief 
operations and assistance to civil communities affected by natural disasters such as floods in the 
Caprivi Region and fire fighting services. 
 
In the international arena the NDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions is well 
documented. Mindful of the fact that the struggle for Namibia’s independence was boosted by 
international support and solidarity, the government adopted a deliberate policy of active 
participation in efforts to bring about peace and stability in the SADC Region and beyond. To this 
end, Namibia contributed NDF soldiers and equipment to United Nations peacekeeping operations 
such as the United Nations mission to monitor elections in Cambodia in 1993 (Government of 
Namibia,1990-200:388). The NDF contingent worked as part of the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 
745 of 28 February, 1992, to ensure the implementation of the agreements on a comprehensive 
political settlement of the Cambodia conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October, 1991 (Dzinesa, 
2005:222). The mandate of UNTAC incorporated aspects relating to human rights, the organisation 
and conduct of free and fair elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance 
of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced people, 
and rehabilitation of critical Cambodian infrastructure during the transition period. The above 
operations of the NDF are important issues in the governance of the military in the country. 
Decisions to contribute troops to multinational peace support operations were made by the 
executive in consultation with the legislature, thus ensuring transparency and accountability in the 
governance of the security sector in Namibia. 
 
In addition the NDF participated in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) in 
1996 and 1997, where it was charged with road verification, VIP escort, as well as serving as a 
Rapid Reaction Force. UN Security Council Resolution 976 of 8 February, 1995 established the 
multidimensional UNAVEM to support the Angolan government and UNITA in re-establishing 
peace and achieving national reconciliation alongside a backdrop of a delicate, politico-military 
setting. The NDF continued to serve with the subsequent United Nations Observer Mission in 
Angola (MONUA), and its duty ended in 1999 (Government of Namibia, 1990-200:389). These 
 108
operations were essential as they built the professional capacity of the NDF which is an important 
element in civil-military relations.  
 
In 2004-2005 the NDF was deployed to serve with the UN observer mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
as well as with the African Union (AU) observer mission in the Sudan. Also an NDF battalion 
comprised of 860 personnel was deployed and served in the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL). The battalion, that was drawn from the 26 Brigade and attachments from 12 Brigade, 4 
Brigade and Engineering Regiment, was charged with securing and safeguarding Liberia’s western 
corridor next to Sierra Leone. The contingent also included six civilian police, four staff officers and 
three military observers. Two-thirds of the battalion had previously served in different foreign 
missions in Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the DRC 
(http://www.geocities.com/athens/4795/Namibia.htm). 
 
The NDF’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, as we have discussed, is in line with 
Namibia’s Defence Policy Statement, which among other aims, is to guarantee international peace 
and stability. This researcher argues that peacekeeping operations contributed to exposing the 
NDF not only to organisational, managerial and technical skills required to undertake such 
operations, but also to the respect for the rule of law and accountability to civil authorities. 
 
Additionally, Namibia is a signatory to various international agreements and protocols such as a 
bilateral agreement between Namibia and Brazil on maritime cooperation (1994); a protocol 
between Namibia and China on the provision of military assistance (1995); a Memorandum of 
Cooperation between the United States of America and Namibia on the removal of landmines and 
other unexploded ordinances (1995); Agreement between Namibia and Russia on military 
cooperation (1997); the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1997); the Treaty on an African Nuclear 
Weapons-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty); and the Ban on Landmines (1999). Moreover, Namibia 
continues to play an active role in the activities of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) such as in the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); the Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security; and the country has Joint Permanent Commissions on Defence and 
Security with all its neighbours, thus consolidating peace and stability in the SADC Region.   This 
researcher argues that such bilateral agreements and the role Namibia continues to play in SADC 
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helped to develop and strengthen regional or geographical approaches to solving common security 
problems. The cooperation with other countries on military activities also assisted in fostering the 
principle of transparency which is the cornerstone of ensuring accountability in the security sector 
governance. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The nature of civil-military relations in Namibia is an emulation of the British civil-military relations 
as reflected in both the structure of the MoD and NDF as illustrated in this chapter. Additionally, the 
composition of the command structure of the military that is civilian-dominated is significant in the 
oversight of the armed forces. The Minister, who is a member of the executive and political head of 
the MoD, is responsible to parliament, further strengthening the accountability of the military to the 
legislature except when the executive and legislature decide to collude.  
 
Likewise, the legal instruments that outline the relationships necessary for civil-military relations in 
Namibia are vital for the control of the military. Additionally, legal instruments that limit the 
involvement of the military in political activities have helped to ensure the military’s non-
involvement in the political process of the country. These instruments have also contributed to 
successful subordination of the NDF to civilian political authorities. Civil control of the Armed 
Forces, as provided in the democratic institutions such as the Constitution, Parliament and other 
relevant Defence Acts, has further strengthened civilian control of the NDF.  
 
The unilateral decision by the President to deploy the NDF in the DRC undermined the 
constitutional principles of checks and balances. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the 
oversight function of the Legislature and the Cabinet over the Chief Executive.  
 
Widespread poverty in the society and corruption in the public sector may undermine the 
effectiveness of democratic institutions that perform oversight functions over the military. 
Therefore, there is a need for enhanced political will to fight poverty and corruption to consolidate 
civil control over the military.  The next chapter assesses the division of powers and the 
responsibilities of the Executive with regard to civil control of the military. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
 
Control of the armed forces is vested in the Executive Branch of Government, which represents the 
contract between elected officials and the electorate. This chapter looks at the Executive Branch of 
the Namibian Government and how it ensures the subordination of the military through legal or 
constitutional mechanisms.  
 
Across almost all the world, democratic constitutions implement the principle of civilian supremacy 
by naming the head of state or government, whether it is the president or prime minister, as the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It is evident that African states have adopted a western 
approach to military governance that ensures the subordination of the armed forces to civilian 
authorities through legal or constitutional institutions.  
 
In Namibia, executive power is vested in the President and the Cabinet, comprised of the Prime 
Minister and Ministers appointed by the President from the National Assembly, who initiate laws 
and ensure their implementation. Article 32 (4) (c) (aa) of the Namibian Constitution empowers the 
President to appoint the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) on the recommendations of the Security 
Commission. The Constitution, Chapter xiv Article 114, establishes the Security Commission.  
 
The Function of the Security Commission, according to the Namibian Constitution, Chapter XIV, 
Article 114 sub-Section (1) is to make recommendations to the President on the appointment of the 
CDF, the Inspector-General of the Police and the Commissioner of Prisons and other functions as 
may be assigned by an Act of Parliament. The Security Commission consists of the Chairperson of 
the Public Service Commission, the Chief of the Defence Force, and the Inspector-General of the 
Police, the Commissioner of Prisons and two members of the National Assembly, appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the National Assembly. This composition strengthens civil 
control over the military and other security establishments and further ensures checks and 
balances needed for good governance. 
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Nonetheless, in October 2000 there was a widely publicised case involving a certain individual, 
Josè Domingo Sikunda, who was identified by Government as a UNITA representative and activist 
living in Namibia illegally. It was reported that he was involved in terrorist activities in Namibia, 
furthering the interest of UNITA to the detriment of Namibia. The Minister of Home Affairs wrote a 
letter to the Chairperson of the Security Commission to recommend to his office to declare Mr. 
Sikunda a persona non grata and removal from Namibia as his presence endangered the security 
of the State (Supreme Court, 2002 NR 203: 211). The four-member Security Commission 
responded positively to the Minister’s request. However, Article 114 (2) of the Constitution of 
Namibia stipulates that the Commission shall have six members. Therefore, the Commission was 
considered not properly constituted, and its decision was declared null and void (Supreme Court, 
2002 NR 203:204). 
 
Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court is exemplary of the fundamental principle of the 
independence of the Judiciary as provided in Article 78 (2) of the Namibian Constitution. The ruling 
of the court, to set aside the Security Commission decision to deport and declare Sikunda persona 
non grata, shows that judges are able to decide cases based on the law and facts without being 
influenced by politics, the media or public outcry to sway their decisions. Central to the decision of 
the court was the conduct of the Minister of Home Affairs as a member of both the Executive and 
Legislative Branches of Government to take such as decision. The court further set aside the 
Security Commission’s decision because of its non-compliance with principles of administrative 
justice and statutory law.   
 
It is remarkable to note that the Commission, which was no longer properly constituted for a 
considerable period, took such a decision. Two members of the Commission, the Attorney-General 
and the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, had vacated their positions. Therefore, 
the Commission could not form a quorum and thus could not perform its duty. This indicates that 
although structures are there, they do not always perform their work properly.  
 
The President may remove the Chief of the Defence Force from office for good cause and in the 
public interest, as well as in accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament which may 
prescribe procedures considered to be advantageous for this purpose. This is a key mechanism for 
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ensuring civilian supremacy over the Defence Force.  In addition, the Permanent Secretary chairs 
the Military Steering Committee (MSC) and performs such duties and functions as may be 
necessary for democratic and civilian management of the defence functions to enhance 
parliamentary and ministerial control over the Defence Force. 
 
Article 32 of the Constitution further outlines the functions, powers and duties of the President as 
Head of State. He/she has the powers to appoint and accredit ambassadors and other diplomatic 
representatives; appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers and deputy ministers who also serve as 
Members of Parliament, the Attorney General, judges, the Ombudsman, the Prosecutor General, 
the Inspector General of the Police and the Commissioner of Prisons, among others. The President 
also has the following legislative powers: 
 
(a) to assent to, and promulgate legislation; 
(b) to initiate and submit legislation to, and for consideration by, the National Assembly; 
(c) to appoint six non-voting members of the National Assembly on the basis of their skills, 
expertise and experience;  
(d) to open Parliament and deliver the State of the Nation Address in which he/she outlines 
the government’s future policies and accounts for past performances; and  
(e) to declare martial law or state of national defence. 
 
The Constitution obliges the President to act in consultation with Cabinet except where the law 
says he/she can act on his own or in consultation with other bodies. This implies that the President 
has an obligation to seek and consider the views of the Cabinet on issues of national importance.  
Ideally, the President and Cabinet should not only agree but take the decisions together. Article 41 
of the Constitution specifies that all ministers are accountable individually for the administration of 
their ministries and collectively for the administration of the work of the Cabinet, both to the 
President and to Parliament. Members of Cabinet supervise the activities of ministries and 
government departments, including parastatals, and are responsible to provide Parliament with 
regular reports on matters under their control. Cabinet initiates bills for submission to the National 
Assembly. They are expected to explain government actions to Parliament in areas such as 
defence and security, foreign policy, international trade agreements and the national budget. 
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The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and ministers must be appointed from the National 
Assembly, although Deputy Ministers can also be drawn from the National Council. The Prime 
Minister, who is the leader of government business in Parliament, coordinates the work of Cabinet 
and advises and assists the President. In Parliament, the Prime Minister is responsible for the 
announcement of major government policies and programmes. All members of the National 
Assembly look up to the Prime Minister to clarify and explain government issues in case of doubt or 
uncertainty. Moreover, the National Assembly gives time to opposition Members of Parliament to 
hold the Prime Minister accountable by asking questions relating to matters for which they are 
responsible. 
 
The Office of the Prime Minister not only provides the required administrative and technical 
assistance to the President as head of the executive authority, it is also responsible for the 
management of the Cabinet Secretariat which is the nerve centre of government machinery. In 
accordance with the principle of accountability of the Executive Branch to the Legislature, which 
requires ministers to be answerable to Parliament, the President is empowered by the Constitution, 
Article 27, to dismiss any minister if the majority of members in the National Assembly pass a no-
confidence vote on such a minister. In the same vein, the President may also dissolve the entire 
Cabinet if the majority of members in the National Assembly pass a vote of no-confidence in all 
ministers. In terms of Article 57 of the Constitution, the President is obliged to form a new cabinet, 
failing which he/she must dissolve Parliament, because the Government would have been deemed 
to have failed to govern the country effectively.  
 
The Executive is the instrument of the state vested with powers and charged with duties, among 
others, to formulate policies, suggest laws and implement laws passed by the Legislature; to 
account to the National Assembly for state revenue and expenditure as well as development plans.  
This arrangement weakens the Legislature since Cabinet Ministers who are also Members of 
Parliament are part of the Executive. Principal Legal Counsel in the National Council, Brian Chaka, 
is of the opinion that the Namibian Parliament is weakened by a heavy Executive. He argues that, 
in some democracies such as the United States members of the Executive Branch are separate 
from the Legislature. The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature is 
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crucial for the success of democratic governance (Interview, February 19, 2007). However, it 
should be noted that the NDF is subordinate to the Executive and the Legislature to ensure checks 
and balances. (See appendix 1 attached). 
 
In Namibia, the Head of State, who is an Executive State President, is also the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces according to Article 118 (2) of the Constitution. The command and 
authority over the Armed Forces rests with the Head of State, which is sometimes delegated to the 
Minister of Defence. This understanding is shared by Welch who suggests that “As long as the 
head of state is drawn from a civilian background, his personal command over the military provides 
a veneer of civilian control” (1976:6). In essence, the Executive power decides when, where and 
how the military will be used. As per the Constitution of the country, the President as the Chief 
Executive Officer of the nation has the duty to ensure the upholding, protection and defence of the 
constitutional order, and has the power to declare a state of emergency and martial law. 
Additionally, the Defence Act (Act 20 of 1990) Chapter VI Article 29 (1) empowers the President, in 
time of national defence, by proclamation in the Gazette or in such other manner as the President 
may consider expedient, to call upon the Defence Force for service –  
 
(a) In the prevention or suppression of terrorism; 
(b) In the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in Namibia; 
(c) In the preservation of life, health or property; or 
(d) In the maintenance of essential services. 
 
This implies therefore that a president may call upon the military if he/she deems it necessary to 
uphold, protect and defend the constitution of the land as well as to suppress internal order, as 
happened during a secessionist rebel attack on government installations in the Caprivi Region of 
Namibia.  In August 1999 a secessionist organisation calling itself the Caprivi Liberation Army, a 
military wing of the Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM) under the leadership of Mishake Muyongo, 
former leader of the main opposition DTA in Namibia, launched a surprise attack on the regional 
capital, Katima Mulilo. The attack was efficiently and brutally countered by the Namibian Defence 
Force (NDF). Nevertheless, this set up puts excessive concentration of power in the Executive and 
limits accountability.  
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Similarly, to comprehend democratic civil-military relations in Namibia it is vital to look at the 
country‘s Constitution, which empowers the Executive to engage the Defence Force. According to 
the Namibian Constitution, the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force has the 
authority to appoint senior military officers and to declare war (Article 27, 32 sub-Article 4c).  
 
From a democratic perspective the above legal requirement is a cause for concern because it 
gives extensive power to the executive. Moreover, the legal provision gives extensive freedom to 
the President as Commander-in-Chief of the NDF to utilise the military and therefore leaves wide 
opportunities for misuse of the Armed Forces. This view was proved right after the President 
deployed the NDF in the DRC in 1998, without the knowledge or approval of Parliament. This 
aroused debate on the Constitutional issues regarding deployment of the NDF, in particular by the 
President as the Commander-in-Chief. The first Prime Minister of Namibia, Hage Geingob, claimed 
there was nothing unconstitutional in the actions taken by the President to deploy soldiers in the 
DRC. As he clarified: 
 
The Constitution is very clear. If Parliament is in recess, he can take action and report later. 
Immediately when the session of Parliament opened, as the Prime Minister I addressed the 
Parliament and explained the situation. The President consulted the Cabinet Committee for 
Defence and Security which I was chairing as Prime Minister. Later we met at State House in a 
broader and extended group including senior Ministers and members of the Committee on Defence 
and Security. The Constitution does not stipulate how many ministers the President must consult in 
a situation like that. So if he consulted key ministries, then he met the constitutional requirements 
(Interview, October 4, 2007).   
 
But the deployment of NDF soldiers in conflict areas outside Namibia is not clearly stipulated in the 
Constitution. However, Article 32 (1), of the Defence Act 1 of 2002 makes provision for members of 
the NDF to perform services at any place outside Namibia whenever it is necessary. It further gives 
details on the authority of the President when it comes to democratic control of the Armed Forces: 
(a) The President may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, deploy members of the NDF outside 
Namibia in compliance with a resolution of the United Nations Security Council or the African Union 
or the Southern African Development Community; or (b) in the execution of an obligation arising 
from a bilateral or multilateral agreement to which Namibia is a party, for the purpose of 
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maintaining, bringing about or restoring peace, security and stability in a country other than 
Namibia. Notwithstanding these privileges, the President is required to inform the National 
Assembly as soon as possible about the deployment of the military. The President has the power 
to summon the National Assembly to meet if, during the time the deployment is made, the National 
Assembly is not in session. Upon being informed in terms of subsection (3) of a deployment, the 
National Assembly may, by a resolution proposed by one third of all members and passed by a 
two-thirds majority of all members, disapprove of the President’s decision to deploy members of 
the Defence Force. If the deployment is disapproved under subsection (5), the President is 
required to withdraw the members of the military not later than 30 days from the date of such 
disapproval. If a resolution considered in subsection (5) is not implemented, the deployment is 
judged to have been accepted by the National Assembly. However, it is interesting to note that the 
deployment of NDF soldiers in DRC took place before the amendment of the Defence Act 1 of 
2002, Article 32 (1). This researcher argues that the amendment to the Defence Act 1 of 2002, 
Article 32 (1) came about as a result of strong opposition from opposition parties to the manner in 
which NDF soldiers were deployed in the DRC. Therefore, we argues that there was no 
transparency and accountability in the deployment of the NDF soldiers to the DRC, undermining 
the principle of checks and balances between the Executive and the Legislature which is 
fundamental to civil control of the military.  
 
The framers of the Namibian Constitution unanimously agreed that Executive power should not go 
unchecked. They feared that the absence of checks and balances on the power of the Executive 
would result in a dictatorship, a concentration of power in one person and an undemocratic 
Namibia. Some of the drafters of the Constitution were also aware that executive presidencies in 
Africa were not on the whole successful. To this end, Hage G. Geingob argued that the problems 
of many African countries were not a result of executive presidencies, but of inadequate 
constitutional checks and balances. He further argues, “In the absence of checks and balances 
trouble could come from where the executive power rested. Therefore Namibia opted for an 
executive presidency with appropriate constitutional checks and balances” (Geingob, 2002:8).  
 
Nonetheless, while the Constitution stipulates that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces, as a necessary condition for asserting civil control over the armed forces, it is not 
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enough. The Head of State generally does not have the time or the skill to personally direct the 
formulation and implementation of defence policy. As a result, he/she ends up delegating 
responsibility to the Minister of Defence. 
 
The administration of the military in Namibia is entirely under the control of the Executive Branch of 
Government. The Defence Act 1 of 2002, Chapter V, Article 11 (1) (2) (3) provides for the 
establishment of the Council of Defence, which is responsible for guidelines on the military strategy 
of the country. The Council of Defence consists of the Minister of Defence and five members 
appointed by the President. The Council is also chaired by the President as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Defence Force. 
 
There are bodies such as the Council for Defence which is chaired by the President; Defence Staff 
Council chaired by the Minister of Defence, which is comprised of five officers appointed by the 
Minister; Senior Management Committee chaired by the Permanent Secretary of Defence; and 
Military Steering Committee chaired by the Chief of Defence Force, whose members include all 
Chiefs of Staff and all heads of arms of services. According to Article 12 of the Defence Act 1 of 
2002, the Defence Staff Council is responsible for the policy on the defence of Namibia. Edward 
Hauanga explained that “The Council meets weekly to review security issues and make 
submissions to the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security for consideration” (Interview, 
March 3, 2003). This provision of the Defence Act is significant because it empowers the Executive 
to guide and ensure effective coordination of activities of the military. 
 
To further ensure civil control of the security sector there is also a Cabinet Committee for Defence 
and Security (CCDS) chaired by the Prime Minister, which looks after defence and security matters 
and makes recommendations to the Cabinet. The CCDS is important for policy coordination and 
democratic control of the defence and security sector in the country. According to Du Pisani (2003), 
the CCDS is responsible for coordinating the activities of the Namibia Central Intelligence Service 
(NCIS); determines policy in respect of the deployment and undertakings of the NDF, the Namibian 
Police (NAMPOL) and other security agencies; and deals with the top management of national 
emergencies inside and outside the country.  
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The Executive plays a significant role in civil-military relations in independent Namibia. The 
Defence Budget, which is an important control mechanism of the military, is first discussed by 
CCDS before it is tabled in Parliament. Furthermore, the Executive ensures the day to day control 
of the military. Colonel Frederick Siluzungila claimed that: 
 
Everything the military intends to do have to pass through the Minister of Defence as well as 
problems faced. Additionally, the Permanent Secretary, who is part of the Executive Branch of 
Government, authorises military spending, recruitment, purchasing of military equipment, 
renovation of bases etc. (Interview, November 19, 2007). 
  
In most modern societies the indispensable support for the position of the military in the state, as 
well as the mechanisms for the democratic civil control over the military, are often found in the 
constitution.  A crucial function of the country’s constitution and of the classic features of 
democracy is the separation of power among the three branches of governments (the Legislature, 
the Executive and the Judiciary) insofar as they perform their important functions. There is a 
mutual relationship between these various branches of government when carrying out their tasks, 
in that they keep careful watch on each other while at the same time are independent of each 
other. This function implies the provision of checks and balances that is intended to ensure 
successful governance. For example, it is enshrined in the Namibian Constitution that laws passed 
by the National Assembly are subject to review by the National Council. It is an institutional 
arrangement that is supposed to limit the power of one branch of government over the other. If one 
critically looks at the Constitution, the Armed Forces are an institution of Government and therefore 
part of the system of the separation of powers. The military are bound by law and justice, 
subordinated to legislative and judicial control. For this reason, the principal legitimate source for 
the direction and actions of the military should come from civilians outside the military institution. 
However, in the case of Namibia the separation of powers is somehow blurred. It is argued that the 
executive power has dominated legislative power because of the dominance of SWAPO in the two 
Houses of Parliament. Chapter 4, Article 35 of the Constitution empowers the President to appoint 
his/her Cabinet from the members of the National Assembly. This therefore, means Cabinet 
Ministers who constitute the Executive Branch of Government are also Members of Parliament. 
The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers and their Deputies are members of the 
Legislature. While executive authority is vested in the President, under a weaker version of 
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separation of powers, not only is the President responsible to the National Assembly, but Cabinet 
is accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the 
performance of their functions. Therefore, the Legislature can not effectively perform oversight 
function over the Executive under such an arrangement.  
 
The fact that the separation between the Executive and Legislature in Namibia is contested has to 
do with the country’s Constitution and the political set up. The Constitution of Namibia requires that 
the Executive is answerable to the President and the Legislature. In that respect, a member of the 
Executive must also be a member of the Legislature. The Constitution requires ministers, first and 
foremost, to be members of the National Assembly and deputy ministers may be appointed from 
the National Council. Therefore the President is somehow forced to appoint his/her Cabinet from 
Parliament. The other dimension to the problem is the political issue that has to do with the 
decision of the electorate. As Nahas Angula claimed: 
 
Political parties must see to it that they canvass enough political support from the electorate to get 
more members in Parliament to tilt the balance of power. If they increase the number of their 
members in Parliament, they would create a proper balance between the Executive and the 
Legislature in terms of performing the oversight function of Parliament over the Executive 
(Interview, October 4, 2007). 
 
It is significant that during the 1989-90 when the Constituent Assembly met to debate on the 
structure of government, SWAPO was strongly in favour of an executive presidency to lead the 
nation. In contrast, opposition parties that were represented were not in support of the executive 
presidency. They instead favoured a second house of parliament, the National Council, to check on 
the activities of the National Assembly. Nonetheless, over the years, the National Council has not 
played an effective role in checking the National Assembly because of its limited powers and the 
dominance of SWAPO members of Parliament. Researchers such as Hopwood (2004) contend 
that the real power is in the presidency and that the Legislature and to some lesser extent the 
Judiciary fail to offset the concentration of power in the Executive. Other critiques argue for the 
distribution of the executive power of the President as a result of his sharing executive power with 
the Cabinet. Some people are of the view that the Legislature can only have more correcting power 
if votes of the opposition parties improve, leading to an increase in the number of their 
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representation in Parliament. This view is supported by the Chairperson of the National Council, 
Asser Kapere, who claimed the current situation had to do with the weak opposition. “If you have 
an opposition that can marshal enough votes to make the two-thirds required in certain things, and 
the ruling party does not have the two-thirds, then they can block issues. But here the issue is 
opposition parties are not garnering enough votes. SWAPO has two-thirds majority and that is 
where the problem lies” (Interview, October 3, 2007). However, only time will tell if political parities 
can improve on their performance and whether the distribution of executive power will succeed in 
protecting the country from the possibility of any dictatorial biases. In the interim the media and 
some sections of the civil society and NGOs have to some extent succeeded in playing the role of 
checks and balances in the absence of an effective oversight function from the Legislature. 
 
While Namibia has made significant progress in democratic governance, the role of the founding 
President, and founding President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, continues to be on the agenda of the 
debate on good governance. At independence in 1990, the Namibian Constitution limited the 
President to two terms. However, the Constitution was amended to allow President Sam Nujoma to 
serve for a third term. Former Minister of Trade, Hidipo Hamutenya argued that: 
 
When we sat down to reflect on the demand we were hearing…we heard: “We want Sam Nujoma 
once more”. I was one of the drafters of the Namibian Constitution. Now you draft a piece of paper 
that runs counter to the will of the people, and they say, “Our will must be first. [So] we allowed a 
third term to take place”. We were emerging out of a long struggle, and in that struggle Sam 
Nujoma stood tall for three decades, nearly four decades. He had won the hearts and the minds of 
the people of Namibia, so they wanted him around for some time, at least to solidify the 
independence we had achieved through that very difficult struggle (allAfrica.com Interview, 12 June 
2002). 
 
The Constitutional amendment to allow Nujoma to run for a third term as President does not augur 
well for good governance. A critical issue of national importance such as a constitutional 
amendment should not be done to suit one person, as it may also undermine the checks and 
balances role of political institutions necessary for civil control of the military.  
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Namibia experienced a smooth transition of power from the founding President Sam Nujoma to 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba. A firm ally and friend of Nujoma since the days of the 
independence struggle; Pohamba was Nujoma’s personal choice as successor and enjoyed his 
open support in the run-up to the SWAPO Party Congress (Price, 2004:1). 
 
Hifikepunye Pohamba won the presidential election and took over from founding President Sam 
Nujoma in 2005. However, despite standing down, Nujoma continued as the leader of SWAPO, a 
position that he has held for the last four decades. Critics argued that since Nujoma remained at 
the helm of the Party, President Pohamba would replicate Nujoma’s style of governance. 
According to Opposition leader Ben Ulenga, President of the Congress of Democrats (CoD), 
“Pohamba was handpicked by Nujoma as his successor. Essentially, his leadership will not be 
different from that of Nujoma. Additionally, Nujoma remains heavily involved in both party and 
government activities. We want to see Pohamba engage more independently on the political front 
to distinguish himself from Nujoma” (Interview, August 14, 2006).  
 
Nonetheless, President Pohamba has a different style from that of Nujoma who had displayed an 
autocratic style towards the end of his 15-year rule as President (Weidlich, 2006:1). President 
Pohamba’s strong standpoint on tackling corruption and his approach of consulting with 
stakeholders rather than taking unilateral decisions has been well received by the Namibian public. 
Professor Andre du Pisani, a lecturer of Political Science at the University of Namibia affirmed that: 
 
President Pohamba has emerged as a capable leader who follows the approach of collective 
decision-making and he is not iconic (Weidlich, 2006:1). 
 
President Pohamba’s biggest challenge has been to become his own man, capable of stepping out 
of Nujoma’s shadow and applying his own authority and developing and implementing his own 
policies.  
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Conclusion 
  
The Constitution stipulates that the President serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
and outlines his/her powers and oversight functions over the military. As illustrated above, the 
President, as Chief Executive, has constitutional powers to declare war or utilise the Armed Forces 
in consultations with relevant oversight bodies. However, there is a weak separation of powers 
among the three branches of state that compromises checks and balances. For this reason, too 
much power is concentrated in an Executive Branch that also dominates the Legislature. This 
weakens the oversight powers of the Legislature over the Executive. Therefore, it raises not only a 
concern about providing effective oversight function over the military, but also about good 
democratic governance in the country. 
 
The ongoing political relationship between President Pohamba and Nujoma has somehow 
overshadowed Pohamba’s leadership. Nevertheless, SWAPO’s collective leadership and President 
Pohamba’s emphasis on inner stability, peace and harmony has served Namibia well thus far. The 
success of civil-military relations centres on the role of Parliament when issues of democratic 
control are considered, because Parliament should scrutinise both the military and the executive. It 
is against the foregoing conceptualisation that this study will analyse Parliamentary oversight on 
the military. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT 
 
The specific role of the parliament in civil-military relations is at the heart of issues of democratic 
control. The purpose of this chapter is to asses the role of the Namibian Parliament in providing a 
critical check on the dictates, authority, and the roles of military establishments and structures. 
Accordingly, the constitutional and legal role of the Namibian Parliament in civil-military relations is 
examined.  
 
The general role of the Legislature in defence and security matters, according to Pantev is to pass 
legislation and to approve procurement decisions, approve the budget for defence and security, 
discuss the suitable numbers for funding and adequate policies for the military, and overview and 
amend the budget funds as well as deployment of forces. In this framework, Parliament has 
responsibility regarding force structures and defence strategies and personnel planning 
conceptions. The Legislature also has the final authority in deploying troops and deciding on the 
participation of military forces in international missions. An additional responsibility is procurement 
decisions, the right to approve or reject contracts related to weapons, military equipment, supplies 
and armament (2005:35).  
 
Therefore, parliamentary oversight of the military is an essential element of the arrangement of 
checks and balances found in a democratic constitution, serving as a counterbalance to executive 
power and monitoring the Executive on defence and security issues.  
 
The legal basis of the Namibian State and its institutional structures were decided by the 
Constituent Assembly elected during the UN-supervised elections in 1989. The crucial framework 
for the position of the military in the state, as well as the mechanism for the democratic civilian 
control over the Armed Forces, is set forth in the Constitution. Similarly, nearly all constitutions in 
democratic countries make a distinction between different government bodies along the lines of 
separation of powers (Rautenbach, 1996: 68). Likewise, the political power of the Namibian state, 
according to the Constitution, is divided into three branches that have certain powers and perform 
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different responsibilities. The first branch is the Executive – that initiates legislation, enforces the 
law and accounts to the law for its action. The executive authority is vested in the President, who 
together with his Cabinet, is responsible for implementing national legislation, developing and 
implementing national policies, coordinating the functions of government ministries, offices and 
agencies. Secondly, the Legislature is responsible for law making, changing any law and amending 
laws that are deemed not necessary. Thirdly, the Judiciary is responsible for law enforcement and 
also determines what law is in dispute and how it should be applied to the dispute in question.   
 
According to the Namibian Constitution, the Armed Forces are part of the government institution 
and entrenched in the system of separation of powers. They are constrained by law and justice, 
subordinated to political leadership, and like the other branches of the state, the military is subject 
to legislative and judicial control.  This set of constitutional regulations ensures that the exclusive 
legitimate basis for the direction and actions of the military is derived from civilians. 
Correspondingly, the Namibian Constitution grants accountability for the overall control of the 
military to the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the NDF. 
 
Constitutions usually reflect the wishes of the people and therefore legitimise the system of 
government. The people elect governments into power. For that reason, governments are 
expected to serve their interests. The Legislature should be made up of representatives elected by 
the people, and the implementation of laws should be subject to certain, clearly defined controls to 
ensure accountability. The crafters of the Namibian Constitution settled for a bicameral system of 
Parliament. The Namibian Parliament is comprised of the National Assembly and the National 
Council. In terms of the Constitution, Article 146(2) (a) Parliament is defined as the National 
Assembly “acting, when so required by this Constitution, subject to the review of the National 
Council”. This has led to some people referring to the Namibian Parliament as a quasi-bicameral 
legislature. Nonetheless, the Constitution provides for two chambers whose function is to make 
laws for the Republic of Namibia. In respect of the quantum of powers assigned to the two houses, 
the National Assembly is by far the more significant of the two. This is supported by the fact that 
the National Assembly is exclusively vested with oversight powers and functions to control the 
activities of the executive authority; in addition, the Executive Branch is drawn from the same 
house. 
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The Legislature is the supreme lawmaking branch of the state. The Executive Branch of 
government normally prepares and recommends defence and security policies and executes them 
after approval by Parliament. The functions and powers of Parliament include the following: 
 
1. To oversee the activities of government ministries/offices/agencies and ensure detailed 
scrutiny of the Executive’s work;  
2. Hold public hearings to hear the views of citizens on the bills being considered; 
3. Approve government spending and regulate taxation by considering the budgets prepared 
by government ministries; 
4. Approve international agreements entered into by the Government of Namibia with other 
governments/organisations; 
5. Defend and uphold the Constitution; 
6. Initiate, approve or decide to hold referenda on issues of national concern; and 
7. Debate issues and advice the State President on matters the Constitution authorises 
him/her to undertake (Parliament of Namibia, 2001:2). 
 
To fulfil the above responsibilities, Parliament has various committees, including Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Security Committees in both houses. Each house of Parliament has the constitutional 
power to create multi-party joint parliamentary committees with oversight powers of all defence and 
security activities (Article 59 (3) and Article 74 (2)). Thus the Constitution gives effect to the 
principle of transparency and accountability in the activities of the military. Parliament as a whole is 
too cumbersome a body to make full inquiries into matters of interest to it and to consider issues in 
detail. This is why parliamentary committees have become one of the most powerful tools for 
efficient parliamentary business. To this end, both Houses of Parliament have established 
multiparty Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security comprising a limited 
number of members of parliament. Their responsibility is to perform in depth the vast and complex 
task of overseeing the defence and security area.  
 
Parliament controls the military as one of the machineries of the state. It does that in various ways 
such as through the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Security and the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts. The Legislature, among other things, ensures the 
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principle of transparency in the activities of the NDF. In this regard, the Permanent Secretary of the 
MoD is regularly summoned to appear before the Standing Committee on Public Accounts to 
account for the utilisation of financial resources by the Ministry and the NDF. Parliament also 
passes legislation related to defence. For example, Namibia’s Defence Act, which was initiated by 
the Executive, was passed by Parliament. While in Parliament the bill is referred to committees 
where the public is expected to give input before it is passed into law. Standing Committees on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are empowered by legislation to discuss issues that have 
been referred to it. However, a significant deficiency in the process of enacting legislation related to 
the military is lack of in-depth debate in Parliament and lack of civil society input. One could 
attribute this to insufficient military understanding on the part of members of the Standing 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security who are expected to scrutinise the Defence 
Bill and other security issues before they are passed into law. Henk Mudge argued that: 
 
Our problem is that the Executive has a strong presence in Parliament. For example bills and the 
budget are tabled in Parliament by the Executive. This weakens the oversight function of the 
Legislature on the Executive and thus on the military. Therefore these committees are somehow 
performing inadequate oversight function on the Executive (Interview, October 16, 2007). 
 
The National Assembly consists of 72 Members elected from the political party list through 
elections held every five years using a proportional representation system. Six additional, non-
voting members are appointed by the President for their special expertise in certain matters, status, 
skill or experience. However, none have been military or former military thus far. The National 
Assembly was established in terms of Chapter 7, Article 63 of the Namibian Constitution, which 
gives it the power to make and repeal laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
country in the best interest of the people of Namibia.  
 
The National Assembly has Standing Committees consisting of Members of Parliament (MPs) from 
all political parties represented in Parliament who scrutinise bills and other documents in details. 
The Committee members are drawn from MPs who are not ministers or deputy ministers and are 
appointed by the Speaker of the National Assembly. These members usually look at specific issues 
and can ask for input from experts and hold public hearings. The Committee can suggest changes 
to a bill as part of its findings. Sometimes a Select Committee is set up to deal with a particular 
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matter before the National Assembly. The National Assembly has a Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security which has the duty to: 
 
• monitor, investigate and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the 
legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, 
organisation, structure, personnel, policy formulation in the Ministry of Defence; 
• exercise an overall oversight function with regard to security matters in Namibia; 
• investigate issues relating to human rights violations; 
• obtain information from Government regarding any real or perceived threat to the 
security of the Republic of Namibia; 
• enquire into and monitor international protocols, conventions and agreements that 
may affect the security situation in Namibia (Parliament of Namibia, 2003:17-18).  
 
A lecturer in Political Science at the University of Namibia, Phanuel Kaapama, commented that 
“There is very little of evidence to suggest that the Committee is performing the above mentioned 
activities. The only visible activity is familiarisation tours of military bases” (Interview, April 5, 2006). 
However, the Prime Minister of Namibia, Nahas Angula, claimed the Committee is effective as 
“They conduct tours of military bases and compile reports on their findings and submit to the 
President who is the Commander-in-Chief. As a result their recommendations are being 
implemented by Government. This can be seen in the renovation of their barracks and military 
installations” (Interview, October 4, 2007). 
 
The National Council’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (2006) 
declared that various issues continue to impede the effective performance of the military. These 
issues include inadequate budgetary allocation which restricts the military from fully implementing 
their programmes; poor working conditions and sub-standard accommodation  facilities, as most of 
the bases are old and inadequate – leaking bathtubs, broken pipes, leaking geysers and broken 
ceilings;  shortage of vehicles and fuel – about 70% of existing vehicles were inherited from 
UNTAG and are no longer in good working condition; lack of career development for the soldiers to 
improve their skills; poor remuneration compared to their counterparts in the Namibian Police 
(NAMPOL). This disclosure is serious, as it may affect healthy civil-military relations in the country. 
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As indicated above, the National Assembly is empowered to oversee and control all actions of the 
Executive. This power may be exercised by way of reviewing, correcting or even reversing any 
action taken by the Executive. Although this power depends on the balance of power in the 
National Assembly, Executive actions may be reviewed, reversed or corrected only if a resolution 
to that effect is tabled by at least one third, and passed by at least two-thirds of all members of the 
Assembly. The very existence of the National Assembly is a vital check on the powers of the 
President and his/her Cabinet. It should be noted that the mere fact that the National Assembly is 
empowered to debate on the activities of the Executive with the view to determining their wisdom 
and correctness, offers an effective device for ensuring transparency and public accountability.  
 
The National Council consists of 26 Members – two (2) from each of the 13 regions of Namibia. 
Each Regional Council selects two representatives for the National Council from their elected 
members. If one political party controls the Regional Council, then its representatives to the 
National Council are normally from that party. But if no party has overall control of a council, then 
its members can agree to send counsellors from different parties to the National Council.  The 
National Council members are the only MPs who are elected to represent territorial constituencies 
and are therefore expected to raise regional concerns during debates on legislation. Like the 
National Assembly, the National Council has a Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Security whose functions are: 
 
• To review international and regional cooperation as regards trade, tourism, peace and 
security; 
• To review Namibia’s foreign policy and make recommendations to the Council; 
• To review and monitor the defence and security policies and requirements and advise the 
Council; 
• To deal with questions falling within the ambits of Ministries of Foreign and Home Affairs, 
Defence and Security matters (Parliament of Namibia, 1999:56-57). 
 
Parliamentary committees differ in their powers to collect and receive evidence from external 
sources. Some parliamentary committees, such as the ad hoc committee of the British House of 
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Commons, are not entitled to collect evidence themselves, whereas other committees, such as 
those in the US Congress, have nearly unlimited power to take evidence from external sources. In 
Namibia the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security has the power to 
access expert advice and opinions of academics, businesses, professionals and interested groups, 
individuals and groups on specific legislation through convening public hearings. Additionally, 
parliamentary committees in the National Assembly and National Council have the vital role of 
scrutinising bills and the work of the Executive. These committees also oversee the activities of 
various ministries under the Executive Branch of government and keep the Public Service 
accountable to Parliament.  
 
According to a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Public Policy Research, William 
Lindeke, despite the existence of the parliamentary Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Security in the two houses of Parliament, neither of these committees seems to have 
effectively performed its duties so far. However, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts has 
been effective as it frequently performs an auditing function of annual reports of the Auditor 
General on various ministries, and scrutinises government’s financial proposals and fiscal policies 
(Interview, April 21, 2006). In this regard, Accounting Officers of government ministries, including 
the MoD, are summoned to appear before this committee to account for the expenditure incurred. 
This is significant as it ensures transparency and accountability when it comes to public 
expenditure and financial demands of the government.  
 
Phanuel Kaapama argued that the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security 
are not active but reactive with regard to security and defence issues that are of national concern. 
For instance, they are seen to be doing something when there is a bill to be debated, but on other 
days they are dormant. These committees need to oversee defence policy and to examine 
operations and performances of the military on the ground. They are supposed to scrutinise 
defence and security issues and offer better expert advice or guidance to the legislators on the 
floor when they are presenting executive drafts or amendments to the house for full debate. 
“Unfortunately, this oversight function by committees is not adequately performed. Perhaps this 
could be attributed to a residue of fear toward the military” (Interview, April 5, 2006). The main 
problem seems to be a serious shortage of skilled support staff and Members of Parliament who 
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are well versed in defence and security issues. On the contrary, argued Nahas Angula, “We do not 
expect them to be military experts, but they must be able to look into the welfare of the soldiers. 
Soldiers do not have trade unions to speak for them, so somebody somewhere should be able to 
alert the Government what needs to be done for the military” (Interview, October 4, 2007). The 
Namibian Legislature requires people with detailed knowledge of a range of defence and security 
related issues in order to make the much-needed improvement in the decision making processes 
with regard to checks and balances on the military. In any event, Parliament alone can not 
guarantee effective oversight of all executive activities and policies within the defence and security 
establishment. Other national institutions also responsible for overseeing the defence and security 
sector, such as the Judiciary, the Auditor General’s Office and the Ombudsman could come in and 
assist. 
 
In some countries, the parliamentary committee on defence and security is required to present an 
annual report to Parliament on the activities of the military. This report can be followed by a vote, 
and even sometimes by a vote of no confidence. This routine evaluation is an area in which 
Namibia needs to improve. On the other hand, the significant role of parliament in legislating on 
defence and security matters is an important requirement for good civil-military relations. This role, 
argues Pantev “is fundamental in the formulation of defence and security policies, the decision-
making process concerning defence budgets, and controlling mechanisms for spending the 
resources” (2005:34-35).  
 
In most countries, Namibia included, Parliament is not a principal player in the budget process until 
the Executive Branch of government tables the budget to the Legislature for review and enactment 
into law. Once the Executive tables the budget in the National Assembly, the budget is debated 
before voting on the total amount of the budget. The budget is discussed in four stages: first, is the 
first reading where it is introduced by the Minister of Finance. It is during this stage when the 
objective of the budget is also stated. Second, is the second reading stage where the budget is 
debated. Third, is the committee stage – when the whole assembly goes into committee to discuss 
the budget referred to it, or the budget is referred to some other committee to debate in detail the 
allocation of resources among and within ministries and government agencies. During this stage 
the money bill is examined vote-by-vote, but no changes have ever been made to the proposed 
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budget. The last stage is the third reading where the money bill is read for the third time. 
Thereafter, it is referred to the National Council with the message that it has been passed by the 
National Assembly which desires the concurrence of the National Council.  In the National Council, 
which is the House of Review, similar discussion stages are followed. If the money bill that has 
been passed by the National Assembly is returned by the National Council without amendment, it 
is forwarded to the President for assent (National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia, 1993:41).  
 
In some countries such as the United States the Legislature is involved at the formulation phase 
where the Congress plays a vital function in setting initial spending limits. Also in South Africa, a 
special working group brings together representatives from the Department of State Revenue, 
Department of Defence, and the Parliamentary Defence Committee (Giraldo, 2001:16).  One could 
therefore argue that the Legislature can only have a meaningful input into the budget if it is 
involved at the initial stage of the budget process. It is at this stage that it will have enough details 
to understand what it is approving or rejecting. The US Congress, for instance, makes substantial 
changes to actual spending allocations during budget debates. 
 
The major role of the Parliament in legislating on defence and security issues is also a vital 
precondition for healthy civil-military relations. This role is crucial in the formulation of defence and 
security policies, the decision making process concerning defence budgets, and the controlling 
mechanisms for spending the resources. Hage Geigob commented that the major control measure 
over the military by the Legislature is through the budget. “Parliament gives and approves military 
budgets. Therefore money is a key control measure that is exerted over the military by the 
legislature” (Interview, October 4, 2007).  
 
Vibrant opposition political parties exist in Namibia, but unfortunately they are not robust enough to 
ensure checks and balances. As Henk Mudge claimed: 
 
Opposition parties do not really exercise checks and balances on Government. In most cases 
Government does not listen to the opposition. The reason is because the opposition did not make 
positive and constructive contributions in the past. I am quite sure that a responsible Government 
will listen to advice. We certainly offer solutions where possible. We do not only come in public and 
criticise and present our solutions, but we also do it in private by consulting with the President and 
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ministers. Hopefully one day we will have a vibrant opposition party to ensure checks and balances 
on Government, not by number or voting power in Parliament but by discussion and making them 
realise what they can do and should do (Interview, October 16, 2007). 
 
This situation could be attributed primarily to the dominance of the ruling SWAPO Party. Over the 
last two elections since independence SWAPO has won a two-thirds majority and controls both 
Houses of Parliament. In the absence of an alternative political party, this could weaken the 
oversight function of parliament. Detailed discussion on the role of political parties in civil-military 
relations will be covered in Chapter 9 below. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Besides the normative, law-making function of the Legislature, Parliament is also responsible for 
overseeing the activities of the military. Various Parliamentary Committees have oversight powers 
over defence and security. Therefore, they play a significant role in ensuring efficiency, 
transparency and accountability within the military. However, for the role of Parliamentary 
Committees over the NDF to be effective, much needs to be done. Besides, their lack of 
knowledge in military issues is somehow a deficiency. The functions of the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security are not clearly specified. There is a need for additional 
functions such as monitoring of the defence budget,  oversight over declaration of state of 
emergency, deployment of troops and ensuring transparency in the financial activities of defence 
institutions such as August 26 Holding Company. These are issues that need to be assessed and 
addressed to strengthen the capacity of oversight function of the military. Defence establishments 
and procedures that focus on the role of civilians in security issues are vital in civil control of the 
military. Against this understanding, the next chapter examines the structure and mechanisms in 
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that assist in oversight function of the armed forces.  
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CHAPTER 8   
 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the structure of the MoD and the relationship between civil 
and military components that ensure civil control of the military in Namibia. Most democratising and 
democratic countries have civilian dominated ministries of defence to provide political direction and 
oversee the activities of the military. However, researchers such as Giraldo assert that the 
challenge faced by these countries is the lack of expertise, procedures, or legal power to 
coordinate a defence and security planning process that will inform their decisions on military 
activities (2001:35). This is important because if civilian authorities do not have the necessary 
military skills, they will not be in a position to take informed decisions on defence and security 
issues. Moreover, a lack of mechanisms to guide civilians in their performance of the oversight 
function over the military will undermine the process of civil-military relations. 
 
The MoD of Namibia was established immediately after independence in 1990 to respond to the 
new defence and security challenges facing the new country. The Ministry was established taking 
into consideration the history of the country. Peter Shivute explained that: 
 
When the country was under the colonial apartheid regime of South Africa, there was, in effect, no 
organised structure responsible for defence matters in Namibia. At independence the apartheid 
regime withdrew personnel, equipment and expertise from the country. Consequently, the new and 
inexperienced government had to put new structures in place to keep government machinery 
working. It was during this process that the MoD was conceived (Interview, March 19, 2006).  
 
The personnel in the Ministry are comprised of former adversaries of PLAN, the former military 
wing of the now ruling SWAPO Party, and the former members of the SWATF, an extension of the 
apartheid defence force, composed mainly of Namibians. The Namibian MoD, therefore, was 
designed to meet the defence and security needs of the country as well as to ensure national 
reconciliation. Additionally, the MoD serves as a department of state responsible for setting up the 
organisational and administrative structure necessary to manage the Namibian Defence Force. 
The British government assisted the new Namibian Government to set up the structure of the MoD. 
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Basically, as discussed in Chapter five, Namibia’s MoD is organised and operates along similar 
lines to the British Ministry of Defence.  The Ministry of Defence was created to fulfil the 
complementary roles of a department of state and headquarters of the defence force, co-locating 
the Chief of the Defence Force with the seat of political authority.  The primary benefit of this plan 
is that it facilitates clear political control and management of the Defence Force. This arrangement, 
according to Victor Simunja, Deputy Minister of Defence, “ensures that military advice is readily 
available when decisions of a military nature are taken; it simplifies the chain of command, reduces 
duplication of work among the three arms of service and encourages an integrated approach to 
operations, thus further entrenching democratic civil-military relations”(Interview, January 16, 
2006).  
 
Moreover, to replicate the MoD’s twofold roles, the Ministry is comprised of both civilian and 
military staff. Military officers seconded from the Defence Force work alongside civilian employees. 
This arrangement ensures that military advice provided to senior management is up-to-date. There 
is also regular liaison between the MoD and the Army Headquarters to ensure that military views 
are heard at the political level. Civilians formulate defence policy and the military executes it. Also 
civilians are responsible for the political dimensions of defence. However, military officers 
contribute to policy formulation on the basis of their functional expertise in their field of 
competence. However, critics argue that such an arrangement seldom works well because there 
are likely to be some communication problems. As Chuter adds: “Two centres of power will always 
compete with each other, especially if they work for the same master who, in practice, must choose 
between their advices”. Furthermore, it is argued that “The motivations of a ministry of defence and 
defence HQ will be quite different and often opposed” (Chuter, 2000:59). The Namibia Ministry of 
Defence has parallel structures where the defence function is divided into a defence headquarters 
which deals with technical military issues, and on the other hand, a defence ministry that is largely 
staffed with civilian staff who handle political and financial issues as well as support the Minister. 
 
The MoD’s main responsibilities are to: 
 
• Formulate and execute defence policies for the government; 
• Provide central operational and administrative headquarters for the NDF;  
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• Procure equipment for the NDF; and 
• Present the defence budget to Parliament (Government of Namibia, 1990-200:389). 
 
The above functions of the MoD are an indication that government recognises that civil military 
relations will be stable if the required control is accompanied by the fulfilment of certain 
responsibilities towards the military. In addition, Chuter suggests a number of useful functions of 
the Ministry of Defence such as the command and control of operational forces; operational 
planning and exercises; the peacetime recruitment, training and administration of military 
personnel; intelligence analysis and sometimes collection; formulation of defence policy; equipment 
research and development; equipment procurement; and administration of the organisation itself 
(Chuter, 2000:55). Namibia seems to have co-located most of the above functions within the MoD 
to save costs. This is evident in the structure of the MoD discussed in this chapter below. 
Additionally, Namibia’s MoD has specific management priorities that include the determination of 
force levels, equipment requirements, training, recruitment and deployment policy of the defence 
force; career planning, the refinement and review of the concept of operations; the effective 
management of resource allocation and distribution; and the articulation of the defence programme 
into detailed long term financial planning (MoD, http://www.mod.gov.na/mod_pol.htm). 
 
Structure of the MoD  
 
As shown in Appendix 2, the Ministry is hierarchically structured and emphasises 
supervision/subordination relationships. In essence, it is a bureaucratic organisation, characterised 
by features identified by Max Weber, cited in Starling, such as division of labour based on 
functional specialisation; hierarchy of authority; a system of rules, rights and duties of employees; a 
system of procedures for dealing with work situations; and impersonality of interpersonal relations 
(Starling, 1986: 300). 
 
From the hierarchical structure of the Ministry, one can clearly see that one level is subject to 
control by the next level. To further strengthen democratic civil control of the military, the MoD is 
headed by a minister, who is a civilian and political head of the ministry. He/she also chairs the 
Defence Staff Council, the Ministry’s highest management committee. The Defence Staff Council 
 136
consists of five officers appointed by the Minister. The Defence Staff Council is responsible for 
policy on defence. The Minister also represents the Ministry in the National Assembly and Cabinet. 
As the civilian head of the defence and security institution, the Minister of Defence is accountable 
to the Cabinet, Parliament, and finally to the citizens of the country. Some researchers are of the 
understanding that a civilian minister of defence has a responsibility to provide comprehensive 
regulations for policy implementation, to issue detailed guidance on the implementation of policy, 
set by the Legislature or the Executive, to elaborate priorities, to determine budget requirements, to 
account for the money spent, to recommend changes in policy, sign contracts for the most 
important procurements, nominate senior personnel for appointment and promotion, and propose 
changes in  organisational structure and operating procedures (Pantev,2005:38). The Namibian 
Minister of Defence to a large extent performs similar duties. The Minister is assisted by a Deputy 
Minister, the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force in performing some of the 
above outlined duties. To illustrate the above, all major changes that take place in the military, such 
as senior promotions and implementation of policies, have to be approved by the Minister of 
Defence. This is supported by the Minister of Defence, Charles Ndaxu Namoloh, who affirmed that: 
 
The Minister of Defence is accountable for the operations of the military. Every year he reports to 
Parliament activities and programmes of the NDF and defends the defence budget. In addition, he 
is responsible for informing the public, through Parliament, of important military decisions, 
procurements, contracts, training etc. (Interview, March 15, 2006). 
 
The Permanent Secretary, who is a civilian, is responsible for the financial, administrative and 
political aspects of defence policy and its execution. As an accounting officer, he/she controls the 
spending level of the NDF. Under the Permanent Secretary there are different offices in charge of 
controlling the expenditure of and accountability for the usage of money. The Permanent Secretary 
is also responsible to the Minister and to the National Assembly for the financial propriety and 
regularity of the MoD business and for its prudent and efficient administration. When it comes to 
the usage of funds allocated to the Armed Forces, there are commodity managers in different 
directorates who are charged with ensuring that money is spent accordingly. These managers form 
a body known as the ‘economising committee’ responsible for the monitoring and control of the 
usage of the funds. The committee is chaired by a Brigadier General who is responsible to the 
Permanent Secretary of the MoD. On the other hand, the Defence Act, 2002 (Act No. 1 0f 2002) 
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specified that the executive command of the Defence Force is vested in the Chief of the Defence 
Force (CDF). The CDF is responsible under the terms of the Constitution for the organisation, 
training, discipline and efficiency of the Defence Force and any auxiliary services, medical services 
and reserve forces (Government Gazette, No. 2749, 2002:7). 
 
The Minister, Deputy Minister, Permanent Secretary, and Deputy Permanent Secretary constitute 
the civilian authority on military matters on behalf of government. Therefore, there is regular civilian 
interaction with experienced military professionals in the NDF at the most senior leadership levels. 
Such interactions, based on trust, open lines of communication and shared inclusion, prevent a 
division between politicians and the military. Therefore, civilian and military officers in the MoD are 
integrated and work together as a complete whole. As Robbins stresses, “In an organization, this 
integration is typically achieved through devices such as coordinated levels of hierarchy; direct 
supervision and rules, procedures, and policies” (Robbins, 1990:4). Consequently, a corporate 
MoD provides a better organisational environment for such interactions and thus facilitates 
effective democratic civil military relations.   
 
Sharing the same understanding, Negonga writes that civilians in the MoD formulate defence 
policy and are responsible for the political dimension of defence (2000:5). On the other hand, 
military officers execute defence policy and contribute to policy formulation on the basis of their 
functional expertise. The Defence Secretariat, which is civilian, dominated, is responsible for 
coordinating functions in the ministry. Moreover, there is business-like interaction between military 
and civilian personnel in the MoD. For instance, civilians in the Ministry are employed permanently 
on the basis of their specialised skills, while military officers are seconded for a certain period and 
rotate between defence force units throughout the country. It is therefore argued that this 
arrangement assures healthy civil military relations in the highest decision-making hierarchy in the 
MoD. 
 
Chuter advises that there has to be a regular contact between the military and civilian staff, and it 
should be a basic principle of the Ministry’s operations that there is a single source of advice to 
ministers, reflecting both military and civilian viewpoints (2000:60).  
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The MoD consists of the following six directorates and two divisions, namely, Policy and 
Operations, Personnel, Logistics, Medical Services, Military Intelligence, and Finance, and 
divisions Central Staff (Secretariat) and Procurement, Research and Development:  
 
• The Directorate Policy and Operations formulates operational concepts, organisation, 
deployment, planning of force structure, policy for support arms, management of day-to-
day military cooperation, and combat support services of the NDF. The Chief of Staff: 
Operations, who is also a member of MoD’s Senior Management Committee (SMC) and 
the Military Steering Committee (MSC), is the head of the directorate. 
 
• The Directorate of Personnel is responsible for the management of human resources 
including selection, recruitment and career development of all NDF personnel and MoD 
civilian staff. In addition, the directorate coordinates training of officers, soldiers and 
civilians. It is also responsible for discipline and welfare, terms and conditions of service, 
pay policy, pensions and allowances, promotion and commissioning policy, leave and 
dress code. The Chief of Staff: Personnel, who is a member of both the SMC and the 
MSC, heads the directorate. 
 
• The Directorate of Logistics is accountable for the provision of the combat support and 
material that the Ministry needs to discharge its functions effectively and efficiently. The 
directorate also prepares logistics policies, plans and their implementation, records 
acquisition of new material and equipment in line with the defence procurement policy, and 
manages all vehicles and transport-related issues through an efficient, cost-effective 
management practice. The Chief of Staff: Logistics, who is a member of both the SMC and 
MSC, is the head of the directorate. 
 
• Health issues are taken care of by the Directorate of Medical Services. The directorate is 
in charge of formulating health policy, oversees medical supply services and ensures the 
general wellbeing of all NDF personnel. The Chief of Staff: Medical Services, who is also a 
member of both the SMC and MSC, heads the directorate. 
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• The Directorate of Military Intelligence in the MoD is charged with dealing with all 
matters concerning military and security. These include ensuring the security of all military 
installations, personnel and equipment, the collection and dissemination of security 
information, production and management of the MoD’s communication policy, and 
managing media relations. This directorate is bound by directives issued by the Minister, 
and the Permanent Secretary. The Chief of Staff: Military Intelligence heads the 
directorate. 
 
• The management of financial matters is the responsibility of the Directorate of Finance. 
The directorate manages and prepares the defence budget, the accounting of defence 
expenditure, internal financial administration, and management of the financial system of 
the MoD through efficient financial accounting practices. The directorate operates 
according to the directives of the Ministry of Finance and the Auditor-General’s office. The 
head of the directorate is the financial advisor to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry 
(Government of Namibia, 1990-2000:383).   
 
Each directorate consists of a number of divisions. For all practical purposes, all the directorates 
and divisions of the MoD fall under the Permanent Secretary who is the Accounting Officer. The 
Permanent Secretary is the overall head of the civilian component in the MoD. He/she is 
responsible for the financial, administrative and political aspects of defence policy and their 
execution. This ensures civilian involvement in military decision making. In addition, the inclusion of 
a Secretariat to the MoD structure enables civilians to do the work such as finance, administration, 
policy formulation, judiciary, medical etc. that can be done better and at lower costs by civilians 
rather than the military. 
 
The Division Central Staff (Secretariat) was established to coordinate the work of the Ministry. It 
is the main body tasked with processing submissions from directorates to the Permanent Secretary 
and the Minister. It is also charged with coordination of all policy matters and the preparation of all 
policy papers in partnership with heads of directorates for approval by the Defence Staff Council 
and Senior Management Committee. The division is also responsible for the preparation of 
meetings and regional conferences concerning defence and security, production of agendas for 
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these meetings and preparation of minutes as well as protocol and policy on VIP visits. The Central 
Staff (Secretariat) is also responsible for ensuring effective production and presentation of the 
Ministry’s development plans, and creating a good public image of the MoD and NDF through the 
media (Government of Namibia, 1990-2000:385).  Within the Secretariat there is the Information 
and Systems sub-division, which executes strategies and plans for the development of Information 
Systems. There is also a sub-division of Internal Audit, which oversees the ministry’s internal 
auditing functions. The Secretariat is headed by a deputy director who is a civilian and serves as 
the secretary to the SMC. 
 
The Division Procurement, Research and Development was established to coordinate capital 
procurement for the NDF. This includes the acquisition of all military, ammunitions and materials, 
contract negotiations with suppliers, service providers, inspections and reviewing conditions of 
sales as per purchase terms, attending military exhibitions to ensure effective sourcing, and liaising 
with manufacturers. The division also has the responsibility for researching, designing and 
developing military materials for the defence force (Government of Namibia, 1990-2000, 2000:385-
6).   
 
Civilians and military officers work side by side in these various directorates and divisions. 
Nonetheless, there are some areas that fall within the domain of the military in the MoD. As Chuter 
asserts, both military and civilians should be satisfied to work for each other to ensure efficiency. 
Furthermore, he is of the view that jobs will be performed much better if they are tasked 
accordingly, for instance operational planning can be performed more efficiently if it is left to the 
military. On the other hand, personnel issues within the MoD should be left to civilians (2000:61-2).  
 
Factors that shaped the MoD  
 
There are many factors that contribute to the establishment of the structure of a defence ministry 
that sometimes go outside the power of the authorities (Chuter, 2000: 58). Chuter argues that the 
principle of institutional integrity is essential, as the organisation has to be arranged in such a 
manner that it supports the realisation of its purpose. At independence, certain people, especially 
the opposition parties, were against the establishment of the NDF and by implication the MoD. 
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They argued that there was no immediate threat that faced Namibia. The Chief Editor of the 
Windhoek Observer Newspaper, Hannes Smith, was of the opinion that: 
 
Namibia has no threat from outside. We peacefully co-exist with all our neighbours. Therefore there 
is no reason for the country to have a defence force. I also do not see why Namibia should have a 
big defence force that is expensive to maintain (Interview, July 24, 2006). 
 
The factors that could have contributed to the establishment of the Namibian MoD and the way it is 
shaped are mainly political. First, instability in the region may have convinced political authorities of 
the general risk, and thus justified the maintenance of an independent national defence capability. 
Second, since the country attained independence after a liberation war, the political leadership saw 
it fit to create the National Defence Force to take care of the liberation fighters and those who were 
in the colonial South African Defence Force. The other factor could have been regional balance of 
power. The security situation in the region at the time of independence, and presently, remains 
volatile as the country is surrounded by heavily armed neighbours, though the country has sound 
relationships with them. The other is to defend and protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Namibia. However, one could also argue that the people, as an input to the organisation, had 
influence on the Ministry. Since there were thousands of soldiers who were demobilised after the 
war, their skills and services were still needed by the new government, and hence the 
establishment of the Ministry.  
 
Moreover, the establishment of the Ministry of Defence that co-locates the defence force 
headquarters is a confidence-building measure for both civilians and the military. This was affirmed 
by Negonga (2000) who argued that it reduces suspicions in the operations of both civilians and 
the military. For example civilian officials and military personnel work together as a team in 
preparing defence budgets, policy formulation etc. It also limits the duplication of duties by the 
three arms of services (the army, the air force and the navy) and improves the quality of military 
advice to political elites. Additionally, the fact that the defence force budget is debated in 
Parliament ensures transparency and accountability on the part of the military. This arrangement 
has created confidence in the operations of the military in Namibia. 
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It is also important to note that the structure of the MoD clearly stipulates the vertical flow of 
authority and responsibility from the highest level of the organisation that is the Minister to the 
lowest levels. This guarantees that each level in the structure is responsible for activities or tasks 
taken. The divisions that give specialised support further strengthen the organisation. People in 
various directorates and divisions of the MoD have technical knowledge and skills and assist the 
organisation to keep up with current changes or developments in the technological field. 
Relationships between job levels are clearly spelt out. In addition, the MoD structure shows, for 
instance, specialised task activities divided into directorates that perform specialised functions. In 
this way, the structure of the establishment has provided a means for achieving organisational 
goals through specialisation and division of labour. However this is in variance with what some 
employees in the MoD feel, that there is too much delegation of tasks from supervisors, resulting in 
many tasks not being properly performed (MoD Informant Interview, May 20, 2006). This could be 
as a result of lack of job descriptions or lack of self-confidence on the part of supervisors. 
 
The MoD structure also puts more emphasis on procedures, communication channels and 
grievance procedures. This has led to considerable frustration among members on the lower levels 
as employees fail to communicate important messages from the bottom to the top. Problems 
experienced by people on the lower levels remain unresolved for a long time as they do not reach 
relevant authorities on time because of the many levels of channels of communication and 
supervision. Above all, they are required to follow laid down procedures or chain of command each 
time they want to put across their grievances. This was confirmed by an MoD employee who 
claimed that many times, the arrangement has proved to be ineffective, leading members of the 
MoD/NDF to discuss their problems in the media (MoD Informant, May 20, 2006). This undermines 
professionalism, which is crucial in the democratic civil control of the military. 
 
There is also no personalised relationship, because those at the top are pre-occupied with giving 
orders and control and fail to come to grips with what is happening on the ground. This has led to 
some employees saying the institutions belong to ‘senior officers’ only. This could be justified 
because seniors are detached from the problems at the lower levels.   Moreover, it could also be 
argued that it is a result of the nature of the military institution which is basically authoritarian. 
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The other deficiency is the staffing of the organisation. Most people who occupy top positions in the 
MoD do not have formal management training or skills, apart from military training, necessary to 
run the institution (NDF Informant, April 11, 2006). This undermines efficiency in the Ministry. As in 
most African countries, especially in public institutions, appointments and promotions to senior 
levels are not done on merit and not based on competence. Most of these are based on political 
consideration, favouritism or patronage. The Executive Director of the National Society for Human 
Rights, Phil ya Nangolo, put it succinctly: 
 
All the top brass of the NDF are Oshiwambo speakers and former PLAN cadres. Although senior 
ex-SWATF soldiers were recruited into the defence force, they were given junior ranks that led to 
many of them resigning from the military. Promotions in the NDF especially to top positions such as 
colonel and brigadier are hardly done on merit, but purely on political considerations. Almost all 
senior civilian posts at the MoD, from the Minister, Deputy Minister, Permanent Secretary, and 
Deputy Permanent Secretary are all ex-PLAN and card-carrying members of SWAPO. Recruitment 
in senior civil service posts such as Permanent Secretary, Under Secretary, Director, and Deputy 
Director are also determined by one’s political affiliation. The defence force must be professional, 
fair in its promotion and must be seen to be just (Interview, March, 01, 2006). 
 
This has led to many public institutions in Africa failing to achieve their goals, because people who 
are supposed to steer the ship don’t have the necessary skills to do so. 
 
The other weakness is that pyramidal structures like that of the MoD do not adequately allow for 
personal growth and development of mature personalities. It has been observed by the researcher, 
as a former employee of the MoD, that most of the old military guard in the higher echelon of the 
Ministry fail to utilise the rising talent of young individuals skilled in policy analysis and 
administration that can contribute to effective running of the institution. Their job security is 
threatened, and thus they are not willing to accept any change in the organisation to improve on 
service delivery. For that reason, there seems to be a failure on the part of those in senior 
management positions in the MoD to clearly explain the responsibilities and tasks of every 
employee; they need to know the part they are to play in the total effort and how their roles relate to 
each other. This is important if the MoD is to achieve its set goals.  
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There is no doubt that almost all nations need Armed Forces. In addition, the military is expected to 
effectively perform their task of external security without infringing on the rights of the society. It 
should, however, be noted that members of the Armed Forces have undertaken to fight and die for 
the nation; therefore one could argue that the society should be prepared to accept this unique 
feature which comes from military duty. The society, for instance, should also accept 
inconveniences which may be caused by the Armed Forces such as the use of land for training 
purposes or of airspace for noisy aircraft. Above all, the society should accept that the Armed 
Forces are entitled to proper pay, accommodations, living conditions, and friendship within the 
communities they serve. The military should also be welcomed back into the civil economy after 
their service or when they retire from active duty.  
 
The Namibia Defence Force (NDF) 
 
Over the years, the strength of the NDF has varied from the envisaged 10,000 strong NDF. 
According to the most recent statistics of the Public Service Commission and budget documents 
cited in The Namibian newspaper, the defence force stands at 14,800 soldiers (Dentlinger, 
2006:1). The number of NDF soldiers has increased over the years. The opponents of the military 
argue that Namibia does not need a big army because it has friendly neighbours, even though 
there might be rivalry in economic, political and diplomatic arenas, but no one would want to send 
troops to destabilise the country.  Hannes Smith argued that it is too expensive to maintain such a 
Defence Force (Interview, July 24, 2006). Similarly, the Editor of the Namibian Newspaper, Gwen 
Lister (2005), wrote in her ‘Political Perspective column’ that the NDF is bloated, poorly trained, 
inadequately equipped, and probably unable to deal with a major emergency if it arose. It is also 
felt that the Defence Force is largely demoralised because it does not have much to do, and that 
the living conditions are not up to standard. Consequently, “What does it help Namibia to have a 
Defence Force at all?” she asks. She further opines that Namibia needs a small, properly equipped 
and well-trained force staffed by motivated, educated and civic-minded individuals who could be 
deployed in the case of a national crisis or emergency and not necessarily a military one.  
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The composition of the Defence Force was established by the Defence Act, 1957 (Act No. 44 of 
1957) and it consists of the Namibian Army; the Namibian Air Force; and the Namibian Navy 
(Government Gazette No. 2749, 2002:7). 
 
The Army 
 
The primary role of the Army as provided for in the Defence Amendment Act (Act 1 of 2002):5 (1-
5), as well as in the Defence Policy that incorporates policy guidelines for the development of the 
Ministry, approved by Parliament in March, 1992, is to ensure the maintenance of the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Namibia; on service in the prevention or suppression of terrorism; service 
in the preservation or suppression of internal disorder in Namibia; in the preservation of life, health 
and property; service in the maintenance of essential services; other services as may be 
determined by the President; and “while employed as contemplated in paragraph (a), be used in 
those police functions mentioned in section 13 of the Police Act, as may be prescribed”. 
Researchers such as Du Pisani (2003) are concerned with the widening of the functions of the 
NDF. According to him, the last provision of the roles of the NDF distorts the separation of 
responsibilities between the military and the civic authorities.  
 
The Policy for the Development of the Army envisages that the army should remain a disciplined 
and accountable professional force; continue to train along the lines of other Commonwealth 
armies; train with the police to rehearse plans for aid to the civil authorities, civil ministries and the 
civil community; and promote a good public image and contribute to the communities in which it is 
based (MoD, http:www.mod.gov.na/army_pol.htm). This is significant as it ensures the army’s 
responsibility and accountability to the citizens, through, among other things, involvement in 
community activities such as assisting in building roads in rural areas, renovating schools, assisting 
during natural disasters such as floods, and extinguishing bush fires, thus strengthening civil 
control of the armed forces in the country.   
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The Air Force  
 
The Namibian Air Force is another component of the NDF. The Air Force was commissioned in 
2005 at Grootfontein. The Air Force is small and consists of 4 Chinese Nanchang K-8 light attack 
aircraft; 12 Chengdu F-7NMs; 2 FT-7NGs – conversion trainers; 2 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 multi-
role fighters; 5 Cessna FTB.337G and O-2A – light utility aircraft; 2 Antonov An-12 transport 
aircrafts; 2 Harbin Y-12 transport Aircrafts; 1 Learjet 36 VIP Transport; 1 Dassault Falcon 900 VIP 
Transport; 2 Mil Mi-8 assault helicopters; and 2 Mi-24 Aeropatiale Alouette III light utility helicopters 
(ISS, http://www.iss.co.za/Af/profiles/Namibia/SecInfo.html). The role of the Air Force is to operate 
in support of the Namibian Army and the Namibian Navy. It is also responsible for conducting 
surveillance, transportation of personnel, supplies and equipment, training, as well as rendering 
support to civil authorities and community (Government of Namibia, 1990-2000, 2000:386). The Air 
Force also avails its assets to other ministries for non-defence tasks as well as to private and other 
national air assets where necessary (MoD, http:www.mod.gov.na/mar_pol.htm).   Accordingly, as 
part of the assistance to civil authorities, it played a major role in the campaign against malaria 
outbreak in the northern parts of the country in 2001. During the perennial floods in the Caprivi 
Region the Air Force has been deployed to relocate the affected communities to higher ground. 
Additionally, the Air Force flew in medicines from Zimbabwe and in the process saved many of the 
people who were affected by malaria and other water-borne diseases. 
 
The Navy  
 
The development of the Namibian Navy has been slow. The first ten officers from the army units 
were sent to Brazil in August, 1995 to study and set up the maritime wing of the NDF. A year later 
a group of six students was recruited from members of the public and sent to Brazil for training. In 
2002 the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources donated a patrol vessel, the NPV Oryx, to the 
MoD. In 2003 two Namacuras were donated to the MoD by the South African Navy. The navy was 
commissioned in 2004, and in the same year it acquired its first warship, Lt Gen Jerobeam Dimo 
Hamaambo, named after the late first Chief of the Defence Force. The warship was donated by the 
Brazilian government through a cooperation agreement between the two countries. The Namibian 
Navy is comprised of about 374 personnel (MoD, http://www.mod.gov.na/mar_pol.htm).  
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In 1994 the Namibian government entered into a cooperation agreement with Brazil to provide 
training to Namibian cadets. Additionally, the agreement included the provision that Brazil would 
assist Namibia in acquiring naval facilities such as patrol boats; and provide general consultation 
services on naval matters to Namibian cadets (Dzinesa and Rupiya, 2005: 215). Consequently, 
Brazil offered 80% of the required naval training, South Africa 10%: the remaining 10% was 
provided by India, the United States, Greece and Germany respectively (NDF Journal, 2002: 3). 
 
The Namibian Navy is responsible for defending the country’s rich maritime domain and coastline, 
which extends over 1,500 kilometres, against external attacks.  In addition, the role of the Namibian 
Navy includes assisting civil forces to combat illegal immigration, smuggling (arms, drugs etc.) and 
threats to the environment; conducting maritime surveillance, search and rescue; and assisting the 
Ministry of Fisheries with enforcing a fisheries protection regime. It is also envisioned that in the 
long term the Navy will be responsible for the protection of offshore oil, gas, diamonds and other 
installations (MoD, http:www.mod.gov.na/mar_pol.htm).    
 
The structure of the NDF is subjected to the powers of the Minister of Defence to ensure checks 
and balances. The Defence Force has headquarters, arms of service, formations, unit and 
personnel as determined by the Minister. The executive command of the NDF is vested in the 
Chief of Defence Force (CDF). The Minister directs the CDF in the execution of his duties during 
peacetime. Conversely, the CDF executes the defence policy; executes military commands over 
the armed forces and directs its activities in peace and war times; manages the operations of the 
military; and he/she is the principal advisor to the minister on all aspects of the military and to the 
government as a whole. The CDF is answerable to the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Force.  
 
From the above description of the organisational structure of the MoD, one finds a clear division of 
labour, not only among the directorates and divisions, but also between civilians and military 
personnel. This enhances professionalism because both civilians and the military have relative 
autonomy within their own specialised areas. One could therefore say the clearer the separation of 
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spheres of job responsibility between civilians and the military, the less the likelihood of 
intervention into one another’s areas of authority.    
 
Members of the military who are arrested for criminal activities outside the scope of their duty, or 
who perpetrate crimes on civilians, are subject to the jurisdiction of civilian courts. This is an 
important indicator in civil-military relations in Namibia, because it shows the extent to which 
civilian institutions have authority over potential excesses by the armed forces in the country. In 
Namibia members of the military who commit civil crimes outside the scope of their duties are liable 
to be arrested by the civil police and taken to civilian courts and prosecuted. As a general norm, 
and according to Article 10 and 12 read together with Article 78 of the Namibian Constitution, 
members of the Namibian Defence Force are liable and subject to Namibian courts for any civil act 
committed against legal interests of another individual or group in their personal capacity. 
According to an NDF informant this rule further applies and is not an exception to any commission 
or omission committed by the military while executing their duties and exceeding the limits of 
authority (Interview, April 11, 2006). Nevertheless, members of the NDF are not liable for acts 
committed while performing official duties although they are subject to Namibian courts for any act 
committed while executing duties or while furthering the interests of their employer.  In this 
instance, the employer, that is, the MoD, is held accountable by stepping in the shoes of the 
employees.  This is significant because it shows the authority of civil institutions over the military, 
which is a vital element of healthy civil-military relations. 
 
Furthermore, the criminal liability of members of the NDF cannot be protected under the pretext of 
performing ‘official duties’. On the contrary, an NDF Senior Legal Officer argued that official 
capacity is not a defence for any crime committed by a member of the military irrespective of 
whether such commission or omission is on or off-duty (Interview, May 4, 2006). This principle 
means that, like members of the civil society, members of the Namibian Defence Force are 
individually or collectively, but separately from their employer, liable for their own criminal misdeeds 
committed within the jurisdiction of Namibian courts. 
 
Correspondingly, the Defence Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) amending the South African 
Defence Act (44/1957), Chapter VII Article 41 (1) stipulates the Jurisdiction of civil courts in regard 
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to offences under the Military Discipline Code. The Act states that the High Court of Namibia or, 
subject to any other law prescribing its jurisdiction, a magistrate’s court may –  
 
(a) Try any person for an offence under the Code; and 
(b) Impose any punishment which may be imposed for that offence under the Code and which 
is within the jurisdiction of such court, including, in the case of a magistrate’s court, a 
sentence of detention. 
 
To illustrate the above, there has been a recent civil case that involved a senior member of the 
military who crashed a military vehicle on the walls of State House. The MoD distanced itself and 
the military officer was arrested and duly appeared before a civil court. There was also a case of 
Namibian soldiers who were alleged to have committed crimes against civilians in Liberia while 
doing duty for the UN in that country. An NDF Senior Legal Officer (who preferred anonymity) 
claimed that NDF suspects were withdrawn from Liberia and brought before an internal hearing 
and were found not guilty (Interview, May 4, 2006). However, William Lindeke also claimed that as 
a result of some incompetent courts in the country some cases take as long as seven years or 
more to be decided (Interview, April 21, 2006). Nonetheless, it is reassuring that soldiers who 
commit civil crimes are brought before a court of law, because they are, first and foremost, citizens 
like anybody else. It is therefore concluded that civil institutions indeed have authority over military 
excesses in Namibia, further strengthening civil control of the military.  
 
In an effort to prevent military involvement in politics, Namibia has a defence law that specifically 
forbids the military as an institution from playing a political role. In this regard, Section 14 of the 
Defence Force Amendment Act (Act 20 of 1990) prohibits a member of the NDF from nomination, 
election or appointment as a Member of Parliament or any prescribed public body.  Additionally, 
the Statement on Defence Policy (2003) describes the NDF as apolitical, organised and managed 
to serve the government of the day and the entire population of the Republic of Namibia. These 
provisions are significant in putting a stop to the kind of military participation in partisan politics, 
frequently portrayed by non-democratic governments. However, Giraldo (2001) warns us that the 
provision can be too narrowly interpreted, because it excludes military participation in partisan 
activities and contests, but permits more general comment on government policy or participation in 
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policy making. Interestingly enough, in the Namibian context, even though military personnel who 
are on active duty are prohibited from running for and holding legislative office, they are allowed to 
belong to political parties as provided by Article 21 (1) (3) of the Constitution. Political parties are 
banned from carrying out activities in military barracks, where there is a confined audience, 
because this might be interpreted as official endorsement of a partisan, political view. 
Nevertheless, soldiers are allowed to vote, because it has been recognised as one of the foremost 
basic political rights.  
 
The military institution itself is not democratic; therefore it is not always possible to exercise 
democratic principles within the Armed Forces because the institution of the military is autocratic by 
design. This was supported by Victor Simunja, Deputy Minister of Defence and Member of 
Parliament, who said: 
 
There was no democracy in the military because of the nature of the profession. The military 
cannot, for instance, lobby someone because they are not happy with something; neither can they 
bargain for something. It will be against the profession of the military to do so. Moreover, in the 
military sphere, decisions are implemented by giving orders and not by consensus. In addition, 
soldiers face many challenging tasks. Therefore if they were given choices when to perform a task, 
it would not be done. Some of the tasks cost life. Therefore from basic training soldiers are taught 
in autocratic ways of doing things (Interview, January 16, 2006).  
 
Then again, the military in Namibia understands and respects the way of doing things in the 
broader democratic government system. The military accepts its constitutional mandate. The duties 
and responsibilities of the Defence Force are clearly defined in the Constitution and they are bound 
by the supreme law of the country.  Nonetheless, there is need for a developed civil society that 
has a clear understanding of the democratic political culture, including the acceptance of the roles 
and missions of the military. 
 
Defence Budget 
 
Control of the Defence Budget is significant for civil control over the military. Namibia, like other 
democratising countries, moved rapidly to exert control over the Defence Budget to ensure civilian 
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control over the military. It is argued that “The power of the purse provides civilians with a key lever 
of control over the military” (Giraldo, 2001:6). The characteristic budget cycle has four separate 
stages, namely (1) budget preparation by the Executive, (2) budget approval where it is enacted 
into law by the Legislature, (3) spending or budget execution, and (4) audit and review for the 
efficiency and effectiveness with which the money was spent. 
 
In Namibia, roles and responsibilities for the preparation of the Defence Budget are very clear. 
Accordingly, civilians and the military participate in various ways at every phase of the Defence 
Budget which is prepared at the MoD. The preparation of the National Budget, including the 
Defence Budget, usually takes place within the Executive Branch of government. In addition, it 
involves the distribution and allocation of funds to all sectors such as defence, education, health 
etc. Junias Kandjeke, a former Director of Finance in MoD, claims that “The allocation of resources 
within a sector is the responsibility of the relevant line ministry, in this case the MoD in consultation 
with the Ministry of Finance” (Interview, July 12, 2004). Consequently, the preparation phase is an 
inclusive process as comments are sought from the National Planning Commission Secretariat, the 
Presidential Economic Advisory Council, the Bank of Namibia, and Regional Councils (Bank of 
Namibia, 2001:35).  Once comments are received, the draft budget is sent to Cabinet for approval. 
Once approved by Cabinet it is brought back to the National Planning Commission Secretariat who 
then distributes the Budget Circular and approval guideline amounts to line ministries, in this case, 
the MoD. The line ministries are expected to draw up their draft budget for funding of their 
programmes and projects. These proposals are to be accompanied by written motivation reports 
justifying their expenditures. The completed draft budgets are then sent to the National Planning 
Commission Secretariat for appraisal and scrutiny to determine whether they are within the set 
limits and address national objectives of accelerated economic growth and development, 
employment creation etc. (Ministry of Finance, 2003/04-2005/06).  The final figures are then 
compiled into a draft budget bill, which is then sent to the Parliament for approval. As Welch (1976) 
asserts, budgetary supervision is the most powerful weapon for civilian control over the military 
establishment. 
 
Democratically-elected officials have succeeded in asserting control over the spending level of the 
Defence Budget. Junias Kandjeke explains that “The Ministry of Finance has authority that is 
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considerably greater than that of spending ministries on budgetary matters. Ministries that have 
submitted additional budgets are normally invited for budget hearings. The purpose of the budget 
hearings is to give an audience to Accounting Officers of the line ministries to motivate their 
expenditure proposals. In a situation where excessive amounts are identified, the ministry 
concerned is advised to re-prioritise” (Interview, July12, 2004). From the above explanation one 
can obviously see that civilian officials provide a deliberate review of the Defence Budget and the 
military operational features. Moreover, elected civilian officials have a duty to rationalise spending 
because excesses in military spending could inflate the Defence Budget. Conversely, democracy 
comes with forceful demands for increased social spending, which are often answered at the 
expense of the defence sector. 
 
Giraldo (2001) argues civilian predominance is especially significant in budgetary issues because 
democratically elected leaders are better placed to ensure that the allocation of financial resources 
is rational and balanced. Nevertheless, argued Ben Ulenga, that there are weak internal evaluation 
mechanisms in the MoD to determine whether the money has been spent according to the 
stipulation of the Defence Budget (Interview, April 18, 2006). This is mainly as result of secrecy that 
surrounds certain activities of the military. To illustrate this point, when it comes to budget 
preparation at the MoD, there is a vote referred to as ‘special’. The activities that are financed in 
this vote are not made public, unlike other votes, for ‘security’ reasons. Therefore, it is difficult to 
account for proper utilisation of this money. Hence, this researcher is of the view "budgetary 
allocations to ‘special’ votes in the military budget are not publicly audited or accounted for”. This is 
an area that needs serious attention. 
 
It has been argued that the Namibian design of the MoD guarantees political control and 
management of the Defence Force. Practically, this arrangement may get in the way of civil 
supremacy as it could lead to unnecessary military influence in the affairs of the civilian-oriented 
MoD. This is so especially when it comes to responsibilities of the Permanent Secretary and the 
CDF. It is most likely the two offices in one ministry will always compete with each other when it 
comes to military supremacy. Therefore, some scholars suggest that for this arrangement to 
perform well, “It is important that the responsibilities of each military and civilian division should be 
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clearly distinguished from one another to avoid competing hierarchies, second-guessing, and 
competition” (Chuter, 2000: 60). 
 
To begin with, the creation of a civilian dominated MoD is essential but not a sufficient condition for 
civilian control of the military. Civilians within the MoD must play a vigorous role to develop a 
technical establishment and expertise required to control the military (Giraldo, 2001:12-13). Junias 
Kandjeke argues that although the MoD has the responsibility of formulating the Defence Budget 
and supervision of its execution, “There is no credible body with appropriate technical know-how to 
perform the tasks adequately” (Interview, July 12, 2004). This is a serious concern that could 
weaken civil-military relations.    
 
There are areas that are potential sources of conflict in the conduct of civil-military relations in the 
country. The challenge faced by Namibia is to develop professionalism in the NDF. Namibia has a 
young Defence Force, which is still in the process of consolidating itself as a professional force. A 
professional defence force would be evident by its moral principles and discipline; credibility and 
dignity; adherence to the democratic norms and principles, national and international laws and 
treaties; respect for cultural diversity; and acceptance of civilian control. Boene gives further details 
on the basic norms and characteristics of military professionalism:  
 
…exclusive expertise drawn from a lengthy education; a service ethic calling for personal sacrifices 
in the cause of society’s higher good in exchange for a degree of public recognition and social 
honour; delegation of public authority in the discharge of military roles, and the internal 
management of the profession, thereby fostering corporate feeling among professionals - chiefly 
officers (2000:12). 
 
The above comments are significant. Deputy Minister of Defence, Victor Simunja, claimed that, the 
NDF has met some of the principles mentioned above, “However, the main constraint is lack of 
human capacity to manage the Defence Force” (Interview, January 16, 2006). 
 
Negonga (2003) asserts that civil-military relations in Namibia are threatened by insufficient 
resources allocated to maintain the military because of the competing, national, socio-economic 
and political needs that need to be addressed as well. He further adds that the state should 
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increase the Defence Budget as this would improve professionalism in the NDF and therefore 
enhance healthy civil-military relations. While these observations are significant, it will be 
interesting to see whether an increased Defence Budget will enhance professionalism in the 
military at the expense of other considerations such as culture, historical and political factors that 
have influenced civil-military relations in the country. The other challenges include lack of 
understanding of the tasks and responsibilities of key actors, ineffective policy on the reintegration 
and resettlement of ex-combatants that remain to be adequately addressed by the government. 
 
Recruitment and Promotion 
 
According to the Statement on Defence Policy (2003) the NDF is expected to reflect the 
demographic composition of the society through its recruitment procedures. To this end, the policy 
envisions a military that has a broad representation of all Namibians at all ranks. Accordingly, when 
recruitment is done, it is explicitly stated in the advertisement that all young men and women 
between the ages of 18 to 25 years old are eligible for employment in the Defence Force. In the 
case of older recruits who have specialist or technical qualifications needed by the NDF, the age 
limit is 40 years. The other requirements are that candidates must possess a minimum educational 
qualification of Grade 10 and must pass an English language test; they must be medically fit; they 
must have no criminal record; and they must be Namibian citizens (MoD, 
http://www.mod.gov.na/n_item4.htm).  
 
For the past 15 years of independence, the MoD’s recruitment into the NDF was based on 
applications received from each of the thirteen political regions of Namibia. For example, each year 
the Ministry advertises for 1 500 applicants to join the military, and the number of those recruited is 
determined by the number of applicants from a particular region. However, according to the Senior 
Personnel Officer at the MoD, Lt Col T. Iyambo, this procedure was not found to be suitable. 
Therefore, “We now use the population census percentage of the region to determine the number 
to be recruited into the military” (Interview, May 7, 2007). Accordingly, if the population census 
percentage in a certain region is three percent and the MoD is recruiting 1000, three percent of 
1000 will be recruited from that region. Nevertheless, the MoD Senior Personnel Officer is of the 
view that this recruitment procedure is not perfect because people in regions such as Karas, 
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Hardap, and Omaheke etc. are reluctant to join the military. Lt Col T. Iyambo claims that, “The 
Ministry is forced to look at the individual names of those who applied and associate their origin to 
a region” (Interview, May 4, 2007). It is unfortunate to note that the Whites are not keen to join the 
military and those who do, prefer the Air Force, but again stay for a short period and then opt for 
the private sector. According to him the main reason given for lack of interest in the military, 
especially for the black population, is lack of recruitment information from the Defence Force. This 
is indeed worrisome and not good for healthy civil-military relations in the country. Recruitment and 
promotions should be done professionally to enhance the integrity and image of the military. 
 
There has been a public outcry on a clause in the recruitment policy of the NDF that compelled all 
new recruits to undergo a comprehensive medical examination including HIV and AIDS testing. 
Consequently, recruits who are found to be HIV and AIDS positive are disqualified and not allowed 
to join the NDF. It was felt by civil society that compelling anyone to undergo HIV and AIDS testing 
and disqualifying candidates from employment on the basis of their HIV and AIDS status was 
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. The Permanent Secretary of the MoD, Peter Shivute 
clarified that: 
 
The nature of the military profession requires that soldiers are fit in order to perform their duties. 
The NDF recruitment is clear and the MoD is not forcing anyone to join the defence force. The 
recruitment requirements, among others, stipulate that eligible candidates must be medically fit and 
must undergo voluntary testing for HIV and AIDS. In addition recruits must be between 18 to 25 
years old; without a criminal record; and satisfy certain educational requirements.  Recruits can 
only join the NDF if they are medically fit and meet the above mentioned requirements (Interview, 
March 19, 2006).  
 
The Executive Director of the National Society for Human Rights, Mr. Phil ya Nangolo, estimates 
that about 98% of the command structure of the NDF is composed of the dominant Oshiwambo- 
speaking ethnic group who are also former members of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN), SWAPO’s former military wing (Interview, March 1, 2006).  The top structure of the NDF is 
occupied by Oshiwambo-speaking Namibians and former PLAN cadres. To illustrate this point, the 
Chief of Defence Force, the NDF Chief of Staff, The Army Commander, Commanders of the Air 
Force and Navy are all Oshiwambo speakers. Additionally, all Brigadier Generals heading the six 
 156
MoD Directorates except for one are all Oshiwambo speaking Namibians. This falls far short of the 
democratic ideal that the armed forces should reflect the ethnic, racial or other social distribution of 
the Namibian society. Although new recruitment is done evenly across all groups, integration of 
PLAN resulted in a particular composition of the officer corps. The Namibian Constitution Article 
119 makes provision for a balanced structuring of the Defence Force, but this seems not to be the 
case. This raises serious questions as the Defence Force seems not to adhere to the provisions of 
the Constitution. Moreover, tensions could arise in civil-military relations as a result of such 
disparities. Parliament should ensure that the recruitment system for the Defence Force is open to 
all segments of society and selection based on merit and quality. All positions within the Defence 
Force must be open to all citizens, regardless of gender, political affiliation, class, race or religion. 
To maintain peace and stability, recruitment into the Defence Force must be fair, professional and 
reflect the demographics of the country.  
 
Of equal concern is the appointment of retired military officers to fill the key civilian positions of 
Minister or Deputy Minister, because it distorts the separation of responsibilities that is fundamental 
to civil-military relations; civilians recruited to head certain divisions such as legal affairs in the MoD 
were appointed as Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel respectively. An MoD informant clarified: 
 
When one is recruited from the streets, on the basis of his/her specialisation, into the NDF, he/she 
is required to have a military designation to fit in the structure (Interview, May 25, 2006). 
 
Similarly, this researcher has evidence that civilians who were recruited to head directorates such 
as Medical Service and Finance were also translated into military positions and promoted to the 
rank of Brigadier General. One could argue that this practice being done in the NDF/MoD 
undermines military professionalism. 
 
The MoD uses the Performance Appraisal Reports as a basis for staff promotion. However, a 
Report of the Third National Council Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security 
(2005) points out that the MoD does not adhere to this mechanism when considering the promotion 
of soldiers. Accordingly, certain personnel are promoted without the consent and knowledge of the 
responsible Commanding Officer. Equally disturbing is the revelation by an NDF informant that 
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there is no defined criterion for serving personnel to qualify for promotion or provision for an exit 
package for non-promotable members of the NDF (Interview, April 11, 2006). Serving members 
continue until they reach the retirement age of 65. 
 
Another sign of subjective control is the use of the media to solve organisational problems such as 
recruitment and promotions issues in the Defence Force. Over the years the leakage of information 
to the public through the media on issues internal to the Defence Force has become a pattern, and 
judging by the character of information it is mostly probably provided by senior officers in the 
Ministry. When the researcher was a MoD Public Relations Practitioner various internal cases such 
as promotions, soldiers’ wellbeing, disciplinary actions etc were often leaked to the media. This 
pattern contradicts major principles of military ethics, and acts against the unity of the officer corps 
and the corporateness of the military profession. These are serious concerns that political elites 
need to revisit to ensure effective civil control over the military in Namibia. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The creation of the NDF and the establishment of the MoD was determined by historical, political 
and security considerations. The skills of thousands of disarmed and demobilised ex-fighters were 
needed by Government as part of nation-building process. Additionally, the formation of a unified 
Defence Force, that reflects the demographic composition of the society and the reconciliation of 
former adversaries on both sides of the liberation war, has assisted to ensure peace and stability. 
We could further argue that the new political leaders were driven by a common goal of defending 
the sovereignty and independence on Namibia by creating a new Defence Force and MoD.  
 
The co-location of MoD and Defence Force Headquarters reduces duplication of tasks between 
civilians and the military. It also encourages an incorporated approach to operations and enhances 
the quality of military advice to politicians. Additionally, it has served as a confidence-building 
measure because there is transparency in the activities of both parties. To ensure professionalism 
there is a clear division of labour between civilians and the military.  
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The budget, which is a crucial tool for civil control of the military, is firmly under civilian control. 
Civilians are mainly responsible for budget formulation and the military for its implementation. 
Furthermore the budget is debated in Parliament annually to guarantee checks and balances by 
the legislature further strengthening civil-military relations in the MoD. A civilian-dominated MoD is 
critical to civil-military relations as civil control is particularly essential in budgetary issues. Civilians 
are better positioned to ensure that allocation of defence resources is coherent and reasonable. On 
the other hand, organisations will not survive without people to defend it against coercion from 
outside thus assuring their continuous survival. The participation of civil society in defence and 
security related issues can be a barometer of the country’s maturity for civil-military relations. The 
next chapter investigates the role of civil society in ensuring civil control of the military.  
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CHAPTER 9  
 
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
This chapter will examine and explore the role of civil society and political parties in stable civil-
military relations in Namibia. In the military area, the relationship between civil society 
organisations and the state has been that of apprehension. There is tension between the 
imperative of safeguarding secrecy on sensitive matters and the need for transparency. However, 
through global liberalisation of economics and politics, the military has been subjected increasing 
to the discipline of good governance.  Within this framework of good governance, the engagement 
of civil society organisations such as public policy research institutions, the media, academic 
institutions, and NGOs has become a crucial element of effecting transformation in the defence 
and security sector (Civil-Military Relations, http:www.gfn-ssr.org/good_pratice.cfm?id=74&p=22).  
 
The role of civil society and its expert institutions has become essential in implementing democratic 
civilian control of the military in established democracies. This has arisen from the need to increase 
democratisation of society and to deal with the rising complexity of defence and security. On the 
other hand, the public demands and expectations that their money, provided to the state, is spent 
in the most effective way is a basic reason for civil society organisations to have a say on the 
issues of defence and security. This view is supported by Pantev et al. who point out the need for 
vibrant civil societies to guarantee that defence and security issues of state are not monopolised by 
selected groups of people (2005:8). 
 
Therefore, civil society organisations frequently play a watchdog function and draw government 
attention to abuses of power or to policies that need to be corrected.  Civil society organisations 
that are interested in the activities of the armed forces include expert think-tanks, academic 
institutions, churches, peace groups, the media, human rights activists, environmental groups, 
public policy research institutes, academic departments, non-governmental organisations, and 
employer organisations. Their involvement in issues of defence and security has become 
necessary in promoting transparency and accountability in the military in a democratic society.  
Pantev et al. are of the understanding that civil society organisations can be producers of analytical 
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information on defence and security issues, educate the public on the military, inform the 
international community about the country’s defence policy, raise significant military issues for 
public and specialist debate, add to parliament’s capacity to perform its oversight function on 
defence and security issues, provide government with alternative views on the same defence and 
security issues and provide assessment on the implementation of the country’s defence policy 
(2005:58-9).  
 
However, scholars such as Forman are of the opinion that the extent to which civil society is 
permitted or wants to engage in military issues can be used as an indicator of the country’s 
maturity of civil-military relations (1998:38). Stepan (1988) argues that the task of civil society 
organisations is to commit themselves to the defence of democratic rights and processes and stop 
inviting the military to interfere in political conflicts. The civil society, he argues, should be capable 
of challenging the existing security doctrine. 
 
Definitions of civil society are diverse. Bratton has defined civil society as “a sphere of social 
interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community 
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication”. 
Additionally, he is of the view that civil society “is the realm of organized social life that is open, 
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-sufficient, and autonomous from the state, and 
bound by a legal order or set of shared rules”. Therefore, civil society largely operates outside the 
domain of the state machinery. It is further founded on the principle of voluntary association with 
different social interests (1994:11).  
 
Scholars such as Diescho are of the view that government sometimes co-opts the leadership of 
civil society such as unions, churches and other community organisations (1996:12). This makes 
these organisations less critical of government when it comes to challenging the political elites to 
deliver more service to the voters or looking into cases of corruption, self-indulgence or lack of 
rules and principles. 
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Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in pre-independence Namibia had little opportunity for 
involvement in the affairs of the state. A number of NGOs in the country such as the churches, 
trade unions, student movements, women’s organisations and human rights organisations were 
active in providing mainly social protection and support while being highly critical of the colonial 
regime. Other NGOs outside the liberation movement were tolerated and at times used as ‘fronts’ 
by the colonial administration with no, or very questionable, legitimacy (Geingob, 2006:244). 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the liberation struggle against apartheid and colonialism was, in 
itself, a movement of civil society, which proved to be highly effective and eventually contributed to 
the end of colonial occupation and the independence of Namibia. 
 
Civil society organisations in Namibia such as labour unions, student and teacher organisations as 
well as churches played a key role during the country’s liberation struggle. Before Namibia’s 
independence most civil society organisations served the interest of the minority white oppressors 
(Geingob, 2006:246-7). Black associations that emerged to counter the oppression had to struggle 
against the colonial state and the white civil society organisations. 
 
Namibian migrant workers formed the first informal civil society organisations of blacks, despite the 
fact that they were denied the right to legally organise themselves. In 1893 the workers staged the 
first strike at the Gross Otavi Copper Mine to protest against working conditions. In 1920 an African 
trade union was formed, but it was ruthlessly suppressed by the occupation regime. In 1957 
Namibian contract workers in South Africa formed the Owamboland People’s Congress led by 
Andimba H. Toivo ya Toivo with the aim of fighting against the hated migrant labour system. This 
organisation was later transformed into the Owambo People’s Organisation (OPO), the forerunner 
of SWAPO. In the 1970s the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) was established in exile 
by SWAPO. 
 
In post-independent Namibia labour unions continue to play an important role in influencing 
government policy. For example during the National Land Conference, the NUNW that represents 
the interest of Namibian workers presented its position paper on the land question, where it was 
“fundamentally opposed to any attempt that regards the market as a mechanism for redistribution 
land from the privileged propertied minority to the landless majority” (Geingob, 2006:5). Be that as 
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it may, one could question the effectiveness of the Namibian trade unions in performing their 
responsibilities. Since most trade union activists have been co-opted in government positions, this 
has increased the imbalance in power relations. It has been observed that they are reluctant to 
speak out on critical issues of public interest because of fear that they may be labelled as 
‘unpatriotic’ as they are dependent on the ruling SWAPO Party for their livelihood. It should be 
noted that the umbrella trade union, NUNW, that represents various trade unions such as the 
Namibian Public Workers Union (NAPWU), Namibian Food and Allied Workers Union (NAFAU) 
and NANTU, is affiliated with the SWAPO Party. 
 
Similarly, Namibian churches also played an important role in supporting the independence 
struggle. The churches gave SWAPO moral support and secured for it the backing of the 
international church organisations. The clergy such as Reverend Michael Scott, Pastor Marcos 
Kopper and Reverend Theophelus Hamutumbangela petitioned the United Nations against South 
Africa’s occupation of Namibia (Geingob, 2006:250). In post-independent Namibia the Church 
continues to play a vital role during drought periods by distributing food to the vulnerable, 
identifying most vulnerable individuals, families and groups, as well as providing education to 
citizens on HIV/AIDS. All the same, the churches’ involvement in military issues is limited. 
 
Students and teachers were also involved in the struggle for the independence of Namibia. The 
formation of the Namibia National Student Union (NANSO) in 1984 increased the protests of 
largely black people for equality in education. The teachers were organised under the banner of the 
Namibia National Teachers Union (NANTU) and the Teachers Union of Namibia (TUN) to fight for 
the elimination of inequalities in education and promote social equality. 
 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned unions and organisations, there were many others that were 
involved in the liberation struggle of the country and continue to contribute to nation-building. Such 
organisations and unions include the farmers’ union, the Legal Assistance Centre, the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Media Institute of Southern Africa, the Namibia Sports Council, and 
the Namibia Institute for Democracy, the National Youth Council of Namibia, the Namibia Housing 
Action Group and many others. All these organisations work under the umbrella of the Namibia 
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Non-Governmental Organisations Forum (NANGOF), although some analysts argue that NANGOF 
has been ‘captured’ by government (Hohn, 2007:6).    
 
NGOs play a significant role in healthy civil-military relations. Since NGOs are grass-roots based, 
they are an important mechanism available to assist Government to implement some of its 
programmes and to alert it on potential problems facing the society. They also serve as checks and 
balances on Government performance including military activities. Daphne de Klerk claimed that: 
 
The military in Namibia do not work closely with civil society organisations on issues of national 
interest. For instance, we heard that the MoD is drafting the Defence Policy. At what stage is the 
MoD going to involve civil society organisations in drafting this important national document? 
These are some of the issues that need to be reviewed for healthy civil-military relations in 
Namibia. (Interview, April 4, 2006).  
 
NGOs in Namibia play a minimal role in civil-military relations despite the fact that they are 
permitted to engage in security related issues. At independence in 1990, the first democratically 
elected government realised the importance of NGOs in the development and reconstruction of the 
country (Government of Namibia, 2005:4). The government has consequently recognised the 
important role that NGOs can play in development (Government of Namibia, 2005:8).To this end; it 
has made provision for the involvement of NGOs in policy development and implementation. 
Additionally, government has recognised that development has to be from the bottom up, and must 
include the active participation of citizens and their organisations, thus ‘democratising 
development’. Some of the reasons for the low level of involvement of civil society organisations in 
government policy and strategy implementation have been alluded to, according to the Civic 
Organisations Partnership Policy as the following: 
 
COs are insufficiently aware of policy components and miss the opportunity to actively 
participate both in the formulation of strategies and the implementation of such strategies. 
The Government has not been sufficiently forthcoming in creating awareness amongst 
COs about what participation (co-operation and collaboration) opportunities exist arguing 
that it is the role of COs to identify and propose strategies for collaboration. 
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COs fear that their roles may be instrumentalised in the sense that they may become part 
of the Government bureaucracy without being given the resources to carry out their 
assigned functions (Government of Namibia, 2005:7). 
 
In the light of the above, in 2005 Government approved the Civic Organisations Partnership Policy. 
The overall goal and objective of the policy is for civil society, its individuals, groups and 
organisations to cooperate with Government and its agencies at local, regional and national levels 
in order to consolidate democratic ideals and create synergy in development efforts so as to 
maximise the social and economic benefits for citizens. This, according to the policy, will be 
accomplished through the following four objectives:  
 
 To create a greater commitment for civic participation through the promotion and 
encouragement of active citizenship 
 To enhance the environment for civic participation and partnership 
 To bring the Government closer to the people and create partnership opportunities that 
benefit the Government, civic organisations and civil society 
 To enhance the capacity of partners (Government and civic organisations) to enter into 
partnerships and jointly respond to development challenges and opportunities in an 
efficient and sustainable manner (Government of Namibia, 2005:12).  
 
There is no provision for the closer working relationship between Government and civil society on 
the defence and security sector. It seems defence and security issues are left entirely in the hands 
of Government, which is a case for concern for democratic governance of the security sector.  
 
Civil society organisations are registered under Section 21 (a) of the Companies Act of 1973 “not 
for gain” (Kavei, 2005:8). These organisations are established, among others, for the purpose of: 
• Promoting religion, art, science, education, charity, recreation or any other cultural or 
social activity or communal group interests; 
•  Advocacy – facilitating the development of policy formulation with increased participation 
of civil society; 
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• Making people aware of their human rights and responsibilities and ensuring their role in a 
democracy. 
 
There has been a rapid growth of NGOs and other civic organisations in Namibia since 
independence in 1990. Initially, the civil society sector was fragmented and experienced extremely 
low levels of capacity. However, this changed as a result of the establishment of democratic 
principles and practices and freedom of association. Consequently, Namibia became a favoured 
country of international donor agencies, which were eager to support a fast growing civil society 
sector (Government of Namibia, 2005:4).  
 
Civil society organisations have been active in almost all the major development sectors such as 
education and training; agriculture and rural development; small and medium enterprises; gender 
issues; health; housing; relief, and human rights and democracy. A growing number of them have 
moved from operational service delivery to advocacy and capacity building (Government of 
Namibia, 2005:9). Nevertheless, the civil society in Namibia has not been actively involved in 
contributing to and debating defence and security issues. A National Coordinator of NANGOF, 
Daphne de Klerk, opines that the reason is that they are not fully accepted by the military as a 
partner in defence and security issues (Interview, April 4, 2006). Sharing the same understanding, 
the Executive Director of the National Society for Human Rights, Phil ya Nangolo, is of the opinion 
that there is widespread mutual suspicion between the military and the civil society actors in 
Namibia (Interview, March 1, 2006).  
 
There are also other organisations whose primary focus is on Namibia’s development. These 
organisations include Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Konrad Adenhauer Stiftung, and the Africa 
Group of Sweden, the Ford Foundation, the German Development Service and the International 
Cooperation for Development.   
 
The civil society, according to Namibia’s Civic Organisations Partnership Policy (2005), is deemed 
to encompass all public activity by individuals, their voluntary organisations, the private sector and 
their relationship with the Government. Civil society emerges as a result of freedom of association, 
which enables citizens to organise around interests or values. Civil society, therefore, is comprised 
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of groups, networks, movements and interests sympathetic to national development goals and 
objectives as well as those who may be hostile to these goals and objectives. 
 
In this study, civil society will refer to the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), Namibia Non-
Governmental Forum (NANGOF), and Legal Assistance Centre (LAC), and Institute of Public 
Policy Research (IPPR), academicians at the University of Namibia (UNAM), media practitioners 
and political parties. These groups and institutions are in one way or the other involved in 
education and advocacy for building a high political culture necessary for democratic participation 
in Namibia.  
 
Although the above organisations focus on different aspects of national development and the 
democratic process, they all have a common goal of enhancing democracy in Namibia. These 
organisations complement each other in their activities especially on governance issues, but they 
have failed to take a leading role in the democratisation of the Armed Forces in the country. 
 
There has also been a limited involvement of the civil society in defence and security issues. There 
are organisations that work in other areas but also somehow influence or interact or work on 
defence and security related issues, for instance organisations that are working on issues of 
human rights such as the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), the Legal Assistance Centre 
(LAC). Only the University of Namibia offers courses on defence and security to defence 
personnel, Members of Parliament, police and officers from other ministries. These courses are 
given under the auspices of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network 
(SADSEM), and include various topics such as civil military relations, public and strategic 
management, public policy management, and management of defence resources, comparative 
defence ministries, and human resources, defence budgeting and military professionalism.  
 
Most non-governmental organisations have no capacity or show little interest in defence and 
security matters. Nevertheless, the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) has been, to a 
limited extent, involved in the defence of democratic rights of citizens. Research oriented non-
governmental organisations such as the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR), Namibia 
Institute for Democracy (NID) and the Namibia Economic Research Unit (NEPRU) are expected to 
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take a lead in generating important, policy-directed research in defence matters. Nonetheless, 
these institutions are only involved in promoting democracy and governance in Namibia. The Legal 
Assistance Centre, according to Toni Hencok, is involved in HIV within the military as a workers’ 
rights issue (Interview, April 25, 2006). William Lindeke claimed that there are also other agencies 
and NGOs that deal with food and HIV/AIDS as security issues, ‘but there is not really a big NGO 
interface like in other countries such as South Africa’ (Interview, April 21, 2006). These institutions 
should actively engage in the study of defence and security issues. The 2001 SADC Protocol on 
small and light weapons provides for a partnership between the NGOs and defence and security 
establishment. But according to the National Coordinator of NANGOF, Daphne de Klerk, it has 
been very difficult to make the military accept civil society as partners in the whole process. She 
argues that the military viewed the NGOs not as partners but as perpetrators and agitators of 
imperialist agendas. Nonetheless, Daphne de Klerk is of the view that this stance of the military is 
slowly changing (Interview, April 4, 2006). 
 
Namibia has also a national focal point where the civil society meets with defence and security 
officials to deliberate on issues of mutual concern. However, this office is reported by Daphne de 
Klerk to be mainly run by the military and police causing some dissatisfaction on the part of the 
NGOs (Interview, April 4, 2006). While there is room for improvement in this field, Namibian civil 
society is permitted to engage in defence and security related issues, though to a limited extent. 
The National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC), as well as the 
print media often comment on and participate in certain security issues but to a certain extent.  
 
The Media 
 
The media played a significant role in the decolonisation of Namibia. The local media that were at 
the forefront of the liberation struggle for independence, such as The Namibian and the Windhoek 
Observer newspapers, widely exposed and reported on the destruction of life and property by 
Koevoet, a special South African police unit, in the former Owamboland at the height of the 
liberation war, that pitted PLAN forces against the apartheid, colonial South African Defence Force. 
In addition, the media promoted self-determination and independence and exposed the denial of 
fundamental rights of Namibians such as freedom of movement; they also reported on the 
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increasing militarisation, and the dusk-to dawn curfews in the northern parts of the country. Daniels 
is of the view that the media also survived the transition period from the colonial South African 
period to independence in 1990 (2005:20).   
 
The media play a crucial role in any democratic society. In the same vein the media ensure that the 
citizens are educated about the role of the military in society, which is vital for civil-military 
relations. The media play a vital role in civil control of the military as they often point out where the 
military needs attention. They also assist in efforts towards achievement of national development 
including security agenda. Additionally, the media help to shape public opinions on the governance 
of the country including that of the military. Therefore the media are a powerful tool that 
Government needs to foster democratic control of the military. Hannes Smith suggests that: 
 
The public can also use the media to influence Government policy through expressing their views 
on military programmes and other related activities. The NDF for example has to be accountable to 
Parliament and its budget and policy subjected to public scrutiny. This requirement can be realised 
if the public is informed through the media of their duties towards the military. The media is an 
effective way of transmitting such information to the public. Therefore the media ensure checks and 
balances to make the military more transparent and accountable and operate in accordance with 
the popular will of the people (Interview, July 24, 2006).  
 
Transparency and accountability are principles necessary for political control of the security sector. 
Namibia has been described as a democratic country that has a favourable environment for media 
freedom on the continent (Freedom House, 2006). In fact the Constitution of Namibia provides for 
freedom of the press as a fundamental human right. Chapter 3 of the Constitution makes provision 
for the entrenchment of certain fundamental human rights and freedoms. Accordingly, none of 
these rights and freedoms can be diminished under the current constitutional dispensation. 
Moreover, Article 21 (1) (a) of the Constitution stipulates that all persons shall have the right to 
freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media. This 
is a significant constitutional provision because it guarantees development of democracy. In this 
respect, one can also echo a Namibian legal practitioner who posits that freedom of speech and 
press is the foundation of any vibrant democracy and is significant for the promotion and respect of 
all other human rights (Daniels, 2005:41).    
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The media in Namibia are free and continue to perform the important role of informing the people, 
educating them about democracy as well as challenging government on issues that they consider 
to be essential for democratic governance of the country. Private radio stations and critical, 
independent newspapers such as The Namibian and the Windhoek Observer generally work 
without executive meddling. However Hannes Smith claims that reporters of state-run media, the 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) and the New Era newspaper have been subjected to 
indirect and direct pressure to keep away from reporting on controversial topics including defence 
and security issues (Interview, July 24, 2006). Whereas most journalists are adamant that the state-
run NBC enjoys absolute liberty to criticise the government, others consider it to be biased toward 
the ruling SWAPO Party. An opposition Member of Parliament, Arnold Tjihuiko, argue that both the 
New Era and the NBC give more coverage to SWAPO Party and Government activities than to 
other parties (Interview, April 20, 2006). Also Namibia has no government limitations on access to 
internet sites, and quite a few publications have popular websites.  
 
The media not only facilitate pluralistic debates on various public issues including defence and 
security, but also address issues of poverty, state repression, rights abuses and social injustices, to 
mention but a few. To illustrate this point, the local media reported widely on state repression 
against the Caprivi secessionists, where security forces were accused of torture, and on Namibia’s 
military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998 that ignored the vital 
role of parliament. Furthermore, the local print media, and to some extent the electronic media, 
continue to inform the public on the 128 suspects in the Caprivi high treason trial that has been 
going on since 1999. 
 
Additionally, the media regularly participate in security issues. For example, during the time of 
insecurity in the Kavango and Caprivi Regions, where UNITA rebels were terrorising the local 
people, the Republikein newspaper, together with the MoD, launched the Demining Awareness 
Programme and distributed pamphlets with information on the dangers of the landmines and other 
unexploded devices to the inhabits of the affected areas. Chris Jacobie explained: 
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We discuss various issues with the military both in public and private. However, it is not always 
possible to find a military officer who can give you information on certain things. Common sense 
also guides people where national interest is concerned especially when it comes to the security of 
our troops. I have given many suggestions to the military especially during the time of insecurity in 
the Kavango and Caprivi Regions where UNITA rebels were terrorising our people (Interview, April 
21, 2006).  
 
The media provide opportunity to inform the public on the country’s defence and security decision-
making process. The freedom of the press, as outlined in the Namibian Constitution, also provides 
for the security of journalists, including those who contribute on national defence and security 
issues. It is further argued by researchers such as Pantev et al that one of the main features of 
established and functioning democracies is strict legislation providing access to a range of types of 
information. According to these researchers, in democratic countries the law more often than not 
guarantees the access of citizens and organisations, including the media, to government 
information. Such laws create the fundamentals for the implementation of the constitutional rights 
of the citizen. Nonetheless, the Executive Branch of government may refuse to provide the 
requested information if an action may put at risk national security interests. Therefore, critically 
significant for the democratic control of the military is how the classification of information and the 
access to classified information are regulated.  A particular piece of security information and not 
broad categories of information can be classified according to law. Moreover, such laws or 
regulations need to be public, and the Executive should not be allowed to use good judgment in 
their implementation.  In addition, the law should oblige the Executive Branch of government to 
respond to requests for information related to defence and security. Pantev et al also suggested 
that documents could be classified for a limited period of time, and thereafter, the document or part 
thereof is made public (2005:61).  
 
Namibia has no information law that allows ordinary citizens to access information in possession of 
the state or the private sector. However, the country is a signatory to SADC Protocol on Culture, 
Information and Sport that provides for access to information or freedom of information laws. As 
the Deputy Director in the Ministry of Information, Wilma Deetlefs, cited by Clemencia Jacobs in 
the Namibian (2007) clarified: 
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“…Cabinet instructed the Office of the Prime Minister to draft the legislation and to make 
the necessary arrangement to amend the Constitution in order to have access to 
information under the fundamental freedoms, at its fourth ordinary meeting on 2 March 
1999…to date the drafting process has not even begun” (Jacobs, 2007:5). 
 
At present Namibia has only an information policy which does not legally bind government to give 
information.  
 
However, the media also have a decisive role of contributing to the democratic process in society 
and the state. Since the media play a critical role in informing the public on matters such as the 
Defence Budget etc., media practitioners should have competence in defence and security issues. 
It is vital that news provided by the media must also meet certain criteria such as truth, accuracy 
and fairness. These criteria are, of course, professional ethics that guide journalists in the 
performance of their duties.  
 
There have also been interactions between the media and the military in the country, though with 
difficulties. For example, following the involvement of Namibian soldiers in the civil war in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, and after the public outcry on the welfare of the 
troops in that country, the MoD organised an all-expenses paid flight for the local media 
practitioners to and from the DRC to cover military operations of the NDF. The researcher, who 
was at the time head of Liaison and Public Relations in the MoD, was instrumental in organising 
the trip. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) also had the opportunity to give input during 
the public hearing of the Defence Bill of 2002 on the article that restricted media reporting on 
certain security issues. Equally, the Legal Assistance Centre gave a submission that called for an 
amendment of a clause in the Bill on the recruitment in the NDF that would have excluded those 
living with HIV and AIDS.  
 
Notwithstanding government’s tolerance of the free media in the country, controversial issues 
reported have not escaped the wrath of the authorities.  When the media have reported on public 
issues such as corruption, nepotism, involvement of the military in regional conflicts, rule of law and 
other social and economic related matters, government officials have not hesitated to attack the 
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media. However, despite this the media have continued to perform their responsibilities and have 
taken government officials and politicians to account for their actions. Namibia has an independent 
media as well as government owned and controlled media. By and large, the independent media 
are free to report on defence and security related issues with or without government endorsement. 
This is vital to ensure oversight over the military. 
 
Society needs to partner with the Armed Forces in the above-mentioned issues to maintain a 
common understanding of and respect for each other. After all, they are both part of the democratic 
process. In addition, civil society represents the interests of excluded groups and the wider society 
in defence and security policy debates; influences decisions and policies with regards to military 
issues; disseminates independent analysis and information on the military to Parliament and the 
public; provides government with an alternative source of expertise on military issues; and provides 
feedback on military policy decisions and implementation. Moreover, the involvement of civil 
society organisations in defence and security matters reduces secrecy, because they monitor 
security activities for transparency and public accountability. 
 
Political Parties 
 
It has been said that the most important ingredient of a democracy is the existence of political 
parties (Boer 2004:6). Democracy can only be a reality if there are strong and functional political 
parties. Political parties play an important role in the democratic politics that drive the country. 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) point out that the principal democratic role of political parties is to 
give voice to the people’s grievances and serve as a conduit for political demands to parliament. 
Additionally, they argue that political parties legitimise the system’s political process, and that they 
ensure accountability on the part of those who are ruling the country. Political parties also serve as 
an alternative to the citizens of the country. It is further argued that “The stability and long term 
institutionalization of democratic politics largely depends on the ability of political parties to meet 
the above responsibilities” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:251). It can, therefore, be argued that 
without political parties and the willingness of government to accept them, it would be difficult for a 
democracy to exist.  
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In Namibia, as in most African countries, the institutionalisation of a viable, multiparty political 
system is proving to be a difficult task. During the independence elections in 1989 there were over 
forty active political parties. Many of these were tribally-based and had been involved with various 
South African-sponsored attempts to create an internal settlement in Namibia to the exclusion of 
the liberation movement, SWAPO. Other political parties were particularly established to take part 
in the 1989 UN-supervised elections. Due to the fragmentation that was encouraged by South 
Africa’s Bantustan or Homeland Policy of promoting group rights, occasionally it seemed as if 
almost every traditional community had a party representing it. 
 
Since independence, political parties have faced various constraints, among others the economic 
realities of participating in elections, and the very small size of some parties’ support bases have 
seen some of them either fall by the wayside or get swallowed up by larger or more sustainable 
alliances. 
 
In 2004 there were eleven political parties that were registered with the Electoral Commission for 
national elections, although at least two appeared to be either dormant or barely performing their 
tasks. SWAPO, which is the largest political party, is presently at the helm of political life in the 
country as a result of the absence of an effective political opposition party. In the 1989 elections to 
the Constituent Assembly, SWAPO won 57.3% and the remaining votes went to the other parties. 
In the 1994 parliamentary elections, SWAPO maintained its commanding majority by winning 
73.9%, thus obtaining 53 seats in the National Assembly. On the other hand, the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) got 15 seats, the United Democratic Front (UDF) had 2 seats, the 
Democratic Coalition of Namibia (DCN) and the Monitor Action Group (MAG) each had 1 seat. 
Again in the 1998 elections for the National Council, SWAPO won 21 seats, DTA 4 seats, and UDF 
1 seat. In the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections SWAPO continued its history of 
political dominance by taking 55 of the 78 National Assembly seats, the opposition CoD and DTA 
each got 7 seats, UDF 2 seats, and MAG 1 seat (Parliament Journal, 2005:21).  As a result, we 
could argue that SWAPO governs Namibia the way it sees fit, because it has an overwhelming 
electoral support and dominates the political landscape.  
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Political parties play an essential role in ensuring stable civil-military relations. However, this crucial 
role seems to be threatened by the weakness in the legislative process where one party 
dominates. This view was expressed by Ben Ulenga who argued that “There should be a strong 
combination of opposition forces in Parliament to be able to vote against the Executive on certain 
issues including the military. If this is done, the ruling party will be careful to meet the expectations 
of all citizens” (Interview, August 14, 2006). The dominance of one party is regrettable because the 
country needs strong opposition political views to ensure vibrant democratic governance. 
Moreover, SWAPO’s dominance of the political scene might lead the ruling party, if not already 
doing so, to make clientelist use of state resources to dominate electoral politics, thus weakening 
the consolidation of democracy in Namibia.  
 
Consequently, one could characterise Namibia as a single party dominated democratic state. 
SWAPO Party has a two-thirds majority in parliament and this has many implications for the quality 
of debate. Phanuel Kaapama argues that, “There is lack of inner-party democracy in most of 
Namibia’s political parties including the SWAPO, to the extent that when parliamentarians debate, 
they do not say things that they would like to say because they want to appease their party or they 
want to be seen to be loyal to their party” (Interview, April 5, 2006). Part of that problem is that 
Members of Parliament in the National Assembly, which is the principal law-making body, are not 
directly elected by the electorate to represent their constituencies. He also claimed that: 
 
We have one big constituency which is Namibia and as a result political parties take advantage of 
this. They ensure that a seat in Parliament belongs to the party. The moment that a political party is 
not comfortable with a Member of Parliament, he/she is withdrawn. If a Member of Parliament of 
the National Assembly were directly elected by the electorate or constituency, he/she could only be 
removed from Parliament by the electorate (Interview, April 5, 2006). 
 
This view is supported by Nahas Angula who asserted that: 
 
The party requires you to support its programmes whether legislative or political. Normally parties 
work on collective responsibility. So a party might take a decision which is in conflict to the way you 
look at things and you might be put in a situation where you have to make a decision whether to 
answer to your conscience or follow the party line, but that situation is a rare occurrence. It does 
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not happen all the time. It happens with issues like the death sentence or abortion, prostitution, 
gambling and other moral issues. What I know is that there is always a leeway for one to answer to 
his/her conscience by abstaining, if it comes to a vote, or if you have serious reservations that you 
do not want to offend your party, you absent yourself (Interview, October 4, 2007). 
 
Conflicting views among Members of Parliament of the same party may arise on a certain issue, 
but there are practical ways of dealing with them. Under normal circumstances before a Member of 
Parliament introduces a bill there is a caucus of the party where one can express his/her strong 
views on it. During the caucus a Member of Parliament sponsoring the bill may be forced to go 
back and amend it if there are serious reservations, before it is tabled in Parliament. 
 
Nevertheless, Namibia is credited as a multi-party democratic country because it allows different 
voices and ideas to be heard. In addition, the Namibian government, unlike that in most other 
African countries, provides financial assistance to opposition political parties in the country. 
Namibia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Libertina Amathila, reminds us that if political parties are not 
funded by government for them to function effectively, they may be attempted to seek funding from 
outside the country, which often comes with conditions that may undermine the sovereignty of the 
country  (International IDEA, 2006:3). While this may be true, it is also important for government to 
finance political parties, because without it, it would be difficult for parties to survive. All parties 
represented in Parliament each month get a certain amount of money according to the number of 
seats. Lottie Bock, Chief Accountant at Parliament: National Council, is of the view that 
“Government pays money to parties in Parliament to assist them with their daily administration 
such as running their offices” (Interview, September 03, 2007). Arguing on similar lines, Boer 
(2004) is of the view that without funding, the number of political parties would be reduced, giving 
voters less choice during elections. He further opines that this may also weaken their effectiveness 
in providing policy options to move the country forward. Political parties need funds to strengthen 
their institutions through activities such as recruitment of members, paying salaries, office space 
and other services needed for their everyday political and organisational undertakings.   
 
Even though political parties receive funding from government, some observers such as Ben 
Ulenga point out that SWAPO, which continues to win the most votes in every election, gets a 
larger amount of funding than the others. Moreover, it is felt that SWAPO has access to 
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government resources for its activities, thus elevating its status among the electorate (Interview, 
August 14, 2006). The same view was echoed by Henk Mudge who claimed that: 
 
…SWAPO has state machinery and infrastructure that they shrewdly use for party political 
activities. Political parties are also financed according to the number of seats in Parliament. The 
Republican Party gets N$180 000 annually, whereas SWAPO gets N$11 million per year. How on 
earth can we compete with SWAPO when they have that amount of money to spend in addition to 
state machinery? So it is very difficult for opposition parties to perform effectively (Interview, 
October 16, 2007). 
 
While this may be true, government is funding political parties represented in Parliament according 
to the share of votes each party received in the last election. Despite these criticisms, the fact that 
the Namibian government is funding all political parties in Parliament helps to ensure the survival of 
a multi-party democracy in the country. 
 
Nonetheless, highly organised political parties are likely to assert control over military issues in the 
Legislature. Political parties in democratic countries such as Namibia are committed to the 
collective goal of democratic stability; therefore it would not be difficult for them to support healthy 
civil-military relations. The willingness and ability of political parties to debate the activities of the 
military, particularly their relation to the budget, is significant to civil control of the armed forces. 
However, political parties in Namibia do not have people with specialised knowledge on military 
issues, weakening their position in making a meaningful contribution in this sector. Ben Ulenga 
points out that: 
 
Political parties can offer meaningful contributions on defence and security issues debated in 
Parliament once we have Members of Parliament with a military background or who have a clear 
understanding of the military. A few years ago there was a debate on the Defence Budget. The 
Defence Budget was found to be the fastest growing compared to other allocations since 
independence. Some MPs were questioning the justification for spending so much on the military. 
However, the issue was not thoroughly debated because I believe most of the members had no 
knowledge of the needs of the military. Therefore at the moment it is very difficult to perform 
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effective checks and balance on the military, although we are doing our best (Interview, August 14, 
2006). 
 
Equally significant, the willingness by political parties to work together in the national interest 
despite differences has considerably contributed to democracy and the uninterrupted political 
stability the country has continued to enjoy for the past 15 years since independence. 
 
From the above illustrations, it is clear that political parties are somewhat permitted to engage in 
discussions on defence and security related issues. Political parties could add a different view to 
the national debate on defence and security as well as monitoring government spending, but they 
are presently weakened by capacity limitations. Conditions are there for political party actors 
interested in increasing civilian control over the military and in improving the quality of the NDF. For 
example the media in Namibia are free and have space created by the Constitution to debate 
defence and security issues or report on the activities of the military, thus playing a constructive 
role in nation-building and preservation of peace and security.     
 
Conclusion  
 
The chapter analysed the role of civil society and political parties in ensuring stable civil-military 
relations. It dealt with civil society first and then the media and political parties. It is clear that civil 
society and political parties play a crucial role in ensuring effective civil control of the military. The 
engagement of civil society organisations in military activities in the country is limited. This is not 
good because it weakens transparency and accountability in the military. Nevertheless, civil society 
organisations have to some extent succeeded in influencing changes in policy decisions in the 
military. However, although civil society contested the NDF recruitment requirement for applicants 
to undergo a comprehensive medical examination, including HIV testing, calling it discriminatory, 
the requirement is still applicable to all potential recruits.    
 
Of equally concern is the lack of capacity of civil society orgnisations to eloquently engage in 
security issues. This has effectively denied the country significant contribution from civil society to 
the transformation process of the security sector. The media plays a vital role in guaranteeing 
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transparency in the activities of the military, which is essential in civil control of the armed forces. 
The general animosity from authorities to media reports on military issues does not only undermine 
media freedom, but also weakens the watchdog role of the media which is necessary for effective 
civil control of the military. There should be a partnership between the media and the military to 
ensure good governance of the security sector. Furthermore, political parties which are necessary 
to ensure checks and balances on military activities have performed a modest role. This is because 
of the dominant, one-party democracy that characterises Namibia. Therefore, the playing field is 
not level for political parties to play a meaningful role ensuring effective oversight of the security 
sector. The next chapter focuses on analysis of the research findings of Namibia’s civil-military 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
ANALYSIS  
 
The preceding six chapters have outlined in detail Namibia’s experience in democratic civil control 
of the military. The purpose of the research was to investigate the nature of Namibia’s civil-military 
relations and this was accomplished. This chapter presents an analysis of the main findings in 
Namibia’s case study, as they relate to the research questions.   The chapter shall deal first with 
the political transition to independence, the nature of civil-military relations and their influence on 
the political control of the military. It also analyses, among other things, the country’s DDR 
processes and the implications, if any, for future civil-military relations in Namibia.   
 
Transitional process to independence 
 
The country’s political transition to independence was internationally supported, because Namibia 
was an international territory before independence. Additionally, as illustrated earlier, the 
international community created conditions that would help to bring lasting peace in the country. 
For example, Namibian exiles were given a comprehensive reprieve to return home, and all 
perpetrators of apartheid atrocities in Namibia were given a general pardon.  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the armed conflict in Namibia triggered international and internal 
population movements. Namibian refugees crossed international boundaries into countries such as 
Angola, Zambia, the former Zaire, Tanzania, the former German Democratic Republic, while in 
Angola and Zambia refugees were under the protection of SWAPO. For security reasons the 
majority of the refugees did not register with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and were not accommodated in refugee camps, but in SWAPO administered camps. 
This afforded SWAPO political leadership with an opportunity to manage both civilian and military 
affairs of the organisation. Obviously SWAPO while in exile engaged in governmental activities 
geared towards administering thousands of both civilians and military members under its care. For 
instance, the liberation movement was responsible for streamlining the Namibian exile population 
in its camps into loyal cadres through military training, political and other educational activities.  It is 
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also worth noting that SWAPO, as a former liberation movement, assumed political power and 
transformed itself into a post-conflict government. SWAPO started work on shaping the 
government of independent Namibia already in its camps while in exile. These structures served as 
an embryo of the new government. Therefore we could argue that exile practices and mentality 
continue in independent Namibia and form a major foundation of government and people’s ways of 
relating to the ruling party.  
 
The role of the UN 
 
The UN played a ‘midwife’ role and saw through the independence and the transition of Namibia. 
There was simplicity about the mandate, goals, strategies and the extent of the project as they 
were clearly defined from the beginning of the process. Consequently, the UN set up a robust and 
elaborate institutional framework through UNTAG. UNTAG had both the operational and logistic 
capacity. It was also neutral, and this heightened confidence in its security-building measures and 
activities. This made UNTAG’s mission both credible and workable, and contributed significantly to 
the success of Namibia’s transitional period to independence. As the first President of Namibia, 
Sam Nujoma, affirmed:  
 
The hard-worn Independence of Namibia has strengthened and solidified the faith in the United 
Nations of the then-oppressed black majority of the Namibian people. We fought a long struggle 
against a powerful occupationist force. Those were difficult times – trying indeed to the human 
mind. But through the African Group of States, and the Non-Aligned Movement in particular, the 
United Nations kept the legitimate aspirations of Namibia hot on its agenda, culminating in the 
long-awaited arrival of the women and men of (the United Nations Transition Assistance Group)… 
The child of the United Nations was born and the international community was watching and 
sharing in this highly collective, rewarding achievement. Without the United Nations, today’s reality 
in Namibia would have remained a remote possibility (The Republic of Namibia and the United 
Nations System in Namibia, 2004:8).   
 
The operational and logistic capacity of UNTAG enabled it to be prominent all over the country. 
Similarly, its ability to provide the neutral, international, institutional presence necessary for the 
effective implementation of DDR aspects of its mandate contributed to its success in Namibia. 
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Moreover, UNTAG was directed by the basic UN values of consent and neutrality (United Nations, 
1996:209-210). This finely tuned the concerned parties’ confidence in its security building 
measures and activities. 
 
The UNHCR provided a comprehensive, international, institutional structure as well as supportive 
dealings with various associated UN agencies, NGOs and the CCN, which was a supporter of 
SWAPO (National Archives of Namibia, UN Pages, File A. 624). In addition, provision was made 
for large numbers of ex-combatants to return to Namibia under UNHCR operations as peaceful 
returnees. This presented vital prospects and a possibility to produce a combined reintegration of 
ex-combatants with that of returnees under an incorporated support scheme. Accordingly, the 
returning ex-combatants received comparable reintegration assistance packages as civilian 
returnees. Typical support packages were comprised of food rations, clothing, health care, 
agricultural implements and seeds (Report on Namibia 14 March 1990 SACC/NCCR File AC 623 
12.8). The latter was meant to facilitate the integration of agricultural-oriented returnees. Moreover, 
there was no further all-embracing government support for the wider returnee population. The 
returnees, while recipients of partly-targeted assistance, were settled together with the wider 
society under nation-building strategies like the Land Reform Programme. This was a bad 
approach since returnees had distinct and different needs from the wider society. The government 
adopted a policy of not making a distinction between returnees and the ordinary citizens. For that 
reason returnees’ successful reintegration was not fully realised.  
 
Comprehensive support was undermined by various factors such as incompetent personnel; 
inadequately orientated former combatants; unfavourable economic, social and political 
frameworks, a lack of monitoring and revision mechanisms, as well as unrealised expectations of 
private investment and job creation that impeded the effective reintegration of the majority of the 
combatants in the country. 
 
The UNHCR effectively discharged its statutory responsibility for assisting in the repatriation of 
refugees and ex-combatants. The agency played its usual and customary humanitarian role to help 
provide a safe and dignified return for refugees and returnees to Namibia. The UNHCR initiated the 
repatriation programme and invited the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) to be its main 
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implementing partner. In addition, other UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 
assisted in the transitional process (Colletta, 1995:6). 
 
A comprehensible agenda and comparatively practical targets were prepared for the 
implementation of these activities. Every single one of the above mentioned factors jointly 
stimulated the UN’s efficiency in implementing its mandate.    
 
The drafting of Namibia’s Constitution by the Constituent Assembly 
 
Since the United Nations had played a major role in the process of Namibia’s nationhood, 
considerable influence was also wielded by some of the members of the international community 
on the outcome of the Constitution. Different parties with various interests were involved in finding 
a solution to the Namibian problem. These parties included South Africa, the Western Contact 
Group (the United Kingdom, France and the United States of America), indigenous ethnic political 
parties, and the SWAPO liberation movement. The Namibian state was founded on the 
compromising of interests or vision of various groups, individuals and parties that were participating 
in the process of drafting the country’s Constitution. This ensured that the Constitution was seen as 
a ‘public good’, and essential for stability. Most importantly, the Preamble of the Constitution 
captures the shared aspirations of all Namibian people. The Preamble states that:  
• whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace; 
• whereas the said rights include the right of the individual to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, regardless of race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion, creed or social or 
economic status; 
• whereas the said rights are most effective maintained and protected in a democratic 
society, where the government is responsible to freely elected representatives of the 
people, operating under a sovereign constitution and a free and independent judiciary; 
• whereas these rights have for so long been denied to the people of Namibia by 
colonialism, racism and apartheid; 
• whereas we the people of Namibia –  
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have finally emerged victorious in our struggle against colonialism, racism and 
apartheid; 
 
are determined to adopt a Constitution which expresses for ourselves and our 
children our resolve to cherish and to protect the gains of our long struggle; 
 
desire to promote amongst all of us the dignity of individual and the unity and 
integrity of the Namibian nation among and in association with the nations of the 
world; 
 
will strive to achieve national reconciliation and to foster peace, unity and a 
common loyalty to a single state; 
 
committed to these principles, have resolved to constitute the Republic of Namibia 
as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State securing to all our citizens 
justice, liberty, equality and fraternity (The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 
p. 1). 
 
This provided a solid foundation for the Namibian state. Namibia, which was later followed by 
South Africa, according to Geingob was “the only country in Africa at the time that drafted its own 
independence constitution through a Constituent Assembly” (2006:120). The people of Namibia 
elected their own representatives who served in the Constituent Assembly to draft and adopt a 
constitution in a spirit of give and take to launch the country and its people into nationhood. 
Geingob also contends that many African constitutions were drafted in Europe. This makes 
Namibia’s success story on the African continent admirable and worthy of being emulated by other 
African countries. Moreover, the Namibian Constitution, acknowledged by many as one of the most 
liberal ever adopted in Africa, was drafted and accepted in record time by a popularly elected 
Constituent Assembly comprised of representatives of all parties who were given seats under the 
closed-list, proportional representation, electoral system. 
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Namibia’s political transition included the independence election, after which a new, fully sovereign 
and legitimately elected SWAPO government was put in power.  
 
Post-independence and DDR experience 
 
In the post-conflict period, Namibia’s independent government’s demobilisation and reintegration 
was influenced by security concerns. The end of the war, the successful conduct of the transitional 
elections and the formation of the new defence force ushered in a democratic dispensation in 
Namibia. The country’s DDR was facilitated by the multilateral New York Accords that provided for 
the implementation of the settlement plan. The plan provided a clear policy and UN institutional 
framework for Namibia’s transition to independence and by implication DDR. UNTAG provided the 
military, political and technical support for the disarmament and demobilisation process. This 
assisted in reducing the possibilities of former adversaries going back to war, as in Zimbabwe 
when the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) clashed when DDR started. The UNHCR led the repatriation process 
according to the plan. The principal objective of DDR was to create the appropriate, stable, security 
framework for the conduct of Namibia’s transitional elections. The UN’s intervention in the 
Namibian situation was guided by specific mandates and short timeframes. On the other hand, the 
post-conflict and long term reintegration of the former PLAN combatants and SWATF fighters, as 
well as of returnees, was left in the hands of the new SWAPO government. Dzinesa (2006) is of 
the view that there were no plans to ensure continuity through UNTAG’s post-withdrawal 
interaction with relevant local bodies. This created a gap between the DDR processes mostly as 
the new government failed to put in place a broad reintegration plan. This view is shared by 
Colletta et al (1996) and Preston (1997) who opine that there was no reintegration policy 
immediately after independence. It is argued that the government assumed that the people 
returning from exile would go back to their homes and resume their lives back in their local 
communities.  
 
The former PLAN Chief of Staff and now Minister of Defence, Major-General (Retired) Charles 
Ndaxu Namoloh, who was the head of the PLAN integration team in the negotiation between 
UNTAG and South Africa, commented that “SWAPO had a strategy for DDR of former PLAN 
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combatants”. He argued that “Both ex-PLAN and ex-SWATF fighters were reintegrated into the 
new Defence Force according to their numbers”. Unfortunately, “The new authorities had structures 
in place but could not reintegrate all ex-combatants because of lack of resources” (Interview, 
March 15, 2006).  
 
DDR shortcomings 
 
Nevertheless, various factors such as shortage of skilled manpower, lack of comprehensive DDR 
policy, and competent, dedicated, institutional frameworks undermined the effectiveness of 
initiatives such as technical training and cooperative business ventures for ex-combatants. Ex-
combatants’ need for housing, land access and long-term health insurance were not met by the 
reintegration policies. The vital shortcomings of the reintegration plans were all exposed by the 
financial payout which exposed the initiative’s short-sightedness. The short-term financial 
assistance failed to guarantee the long-term sustainability of ex-combatants, threatening national 
stability. This was of course mirrored in ex-combatant protests within a decade or so after the 
implementation of DDR.   
 
Moreover, the government did not raise the awareness of the community about what it could do to 
help the reintegration of women ex-combatants. Notwithstanding national encouragement of the 
wider population to accommodate returnees including ex-combatants, patriarchal gender relations 
were reflected in gender insensitive reintegration strategies (Dzinesa, 2006:252-3). Also when 
planning the Development Brigade and Peace Project, it appears few efforts were made to 
conscienticise the broader community or to incorporate its input. The ex-combatants did not have 
access to land, housing, long term health insurance or sufficient trainers who were to cater for 
twenty thousand people. As a result the project failed to achieve its purpose. More significantly, the 
relationship and centrality of DDR mechanisms to the broader goals of the changeover to 
independence through peaceful and credible elections, was demonstrated. 
 
It has also been reported that ex-PLAN fighters feel unfairly treated and discriminated against 
despite their contribution to the liberation and independence of Namibia. They feel they were not 
adequately rewarded compared to their counterparts in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The Report of 
 186
the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (2005) further indicates that the 
Ex-Combatant’s Fund, which was established to benefit former fighters equally and fairly, has 
failed to fulfil this task. Moreover, an ex-fighter has to reach the age of 60 years for him/her to 
benefit from the Fund. The report further states that ex-combatants fail to enrol in the Personnel 
Administration Matters (PAM), an institution which was intended to empower them to advance their 
studies in the short term. Obviously, the majority of ex-combatants were inhibited by educational 
qualifications as they spent most of their time on the battle ground. 
 
Government’s Skills initiated Projects for Ex-combatants: deficiencies  
 
The government strategy of providing ex-combatants with vocational training (through the 
Development Brigade), as well as imparting agricultural skills for self-sufficient civilian life, did not 
achieve the desired results. The strategy largely failed because of various conceptual, institutional 
and operational environmental factors as discussed elsewhere in this study. The project was not 
financially viable. It did not manage to incorporate nearly the intended number of ex-combatants, 
and its success in helping the trainees to become competitive in the job market was highly 
questionable. In addition, according to the report of the Technical Committee on Ex-combatants, it 
turned out during the latest ex-combatant registration that some of the beneficiaries of earlier 
assistance, including ‘a large number of former DBC employees’, were not ex-combatants or 
former freedom fighters at all (Technical Committee on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 11). These 
shortcomings led the Committee to conclude that DBC was not a sustainable entity and therefore 
there was a serious need to review its mandate (Technical Committee on Ex-Combatants, 1998: 
12). This is exactly what the Committee did.  However, the DB and DBC projects succeeded to 
some extent in defusing the ex-combatants’ predicaments. They also provided ex-fighters who 
were incorporated into these projects with a level of comfort similar to that in exile. Although the DB 
was initially meant for ex-fighters from both sides of the war, in practice its membership was almost 
exclusively drawn from the ranks of ex-PLAN combatants. This created some apprehensions 
among the former SWATF fighters who felt discriminated against. 
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Amnesty and reconciliation  
 
The policy of national reconciliation played a central role in the prevailing peace and stability in 
Namibia. The country’s independence was attained against the background of a highly divisive and 
oppressive political context. The policy of national reconciliation helped to unite the people of 
Namibia.  
 
The underlying strength of reconciliation, as against other conflict handling mechanisms such as 
force or mediation, is that it is a voluntary initiative of the conflicting parties to acknowledge their 
responsibility.  Since Namibia was an international territory before independence, the international 
community was keen to create conditions that would bring about lasting peace.  Consequently, the 
United Nations, the Western Contact Group (five Western members of the UN Security Council that 
included Canada, France, West Germany, United Kingdom and United States of America that 
negotiated for an internationally accepted transition to independence of Namibia) and SWAPO 
negotiated for a blanket amnesty for all exiles before they returned home. Geingob asserts that the 
proposal of the Western Contact Group included: 
 
• the release of Namibian political prisoners or detainees held by South Africa prior to the 
beginning of the electoral campaign so that they can participate fully and freely in the 
process without the risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment, 
• all Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside of the territory of 
Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the 
electoral process without the risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment 
(Geingob, 2006:75). 
 
All the parties accepted the comprehensive amnesty as a practical approach towards reconciling 
the Namibian society. This has helped reduce the hatred of the past thus laying the foundation for 
peace and harmony in the country. Therefore, Namibia’s post-independence relations were made 
possible by the effectiveness of the national policy of reconciliation. The former adversaries 
integrated with ease into the new defence force (NDF), strengthening the process of national 
reconciliation (Dzinesa, 2006:240). We could argue the policy successfully served as a ‘vehicle and 
 188
mechanism’ to reduce the danger of frustrated integrated ex-fighters from using military means to 
dislocate the post-conflict nation-building efforts. These political relations, assisted by the absence 
of a splintered armed liberation movement, generally made it easy for the integration, despite some 
destabilisation attempts by fifth-column elements (political groups and individuals who supported 
the colonial South African government and opposed the independence of Namibia).  This created 
the prevailing peace and stability in Namibia that has enabled the country to implement national 
development plans and programmes for the purpose of eradicating poverty, ignorance and 
disease.  
 
By and large, Namibians, irrespective of colour, race or creed are united and work together for the 
common good and mutual benefit of all citizens. With no doubt, the reconciliation policy has helped 
Namibians to embrace each other and move forward as one people instead of seeking revenge for 
the past injustices committed.  However, the policy is a ticking time bomb if not nurtured by all 
stakeholders. Reconciliation is being threatened by skewed income distribution, land ownership, 
and high rate of unemployment. Therefore, government and other stakeholders should give serious 
attention to these issues. 
 
The NDF/MoD 
 
The Defence Force has headquarters, arms of service, formations, units and personnel as 
determined by the Minister. As illustrated, the NDF was one of the first agencies of the state to be 
established by government. The reasons for establishing the Defence Force were mainly political. 
The new government wanted the military to play a role in nation-building as well as to create 
political stability and consolidate state power. It is also argued that the Defence Force was formed 
because the new SWAPO government was faced with, among other things, “a severely weak state 
that was potentially threatened by ‘fifth column’ activities of SWATF and SADF counter- 
revolutionary elements that could easily derail the gains of independence” (Dzinesa and Rupiya, 
2005: 207).  
 
The organisational structure of the MoD, as has been illustrated in Chapter 8, which co-locates the 
defence headquarters, serves as a confidence-building mechanism between civilians and the 
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military in Namibia. The co-location is significant because it allows the military and civilians to work 
together, thus solving common problems as a team.  The working relationship between the military 
and civilians is good. This was confirmed by the Minister of Defence Major-General (Retired) 
Charles Ndaxu Namoloh, who claimed that:  
 
In this arrangement nothing is done without the knowledge or involvement of either civilian official 
or the military. Soldiers and civilians sit together in planning the welfare of the soldiers (Interview, 
March 15, 2006).  
 
Therefore we could say this understanding could have contributed to the reduction of suspicion and 
created confidence in the operations of the military in Namibia. The transitional period was 
characterised by historical, mutual mistrust and animosity.  However, earlier conflict dynamics 
influenced the establishment and reintegration of former adversaries into a new and legitimate 
national Defence Force (NDF) that was central to post-conflict peace and nation-building.  
 
The NDF respects and accepts accountability. The Defence Force does not enjoy any form of 
impunity. The NDF is accountable and held responsible for its actions. Nevertheless, taking into 
consideration the nature of the security sector, some information on their activities cannot be 
disclosed to the public for reasons of national security (Born, H., Fluri, P., and Johnsson, A. B., 
2003:92). Under the cover of national security, the military might end up committing certain things 
which, if they were to be known, would lead to prosecution by a court of law. This view is shared by 
Philemon ya Nangolo who argues that the military is not open enough. “It seems this scenario 
largely has to do with the integrity of senior military officers. For instance if an officer has 
unquestionable integrity, there will be no reason to hide the misdeeds committed by the military” 
(Interview, March 1, 2006). Some observers are of the view that the unnecessary secrecy in the 
activities of the NDF might be a result of the liberation struggle experience where everything was 
classified. It is further argued that SWAPO has retained its liberation modus operandi in which 
secrecy, discipline, internal unity and collective leadership are the guiding principles. 
 
The internal reforms that took place in the NDF, especially training and modernisation, have had 
significant influence on how the Armed Forces interact with civilian authorities and the public. The 
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cooperation at the highest political administrative level and the military high command has ensured 
the consolidation of peace and democratic civil-military relations in Namibia. It is equally important 
to note that a lack of civilian and military partnership in the reform agenda can lead to inappropriate 
military interference in the political governance of the country.  
 
Moreover, some observers, such as Lieutenant Colonel K. Carel Ndjoba, are of the view that there 
has been no military interference in the political process in Namibia because “The NDF is 
professional in the sense that it is apolitical and therefore not enthusiastic to get involved in politics. 
As soon as politics is allowed in the military, it is a recipe for trouble in the long run that could 
cause instability in the country” (Interview, June 28, 2006). Soldiers should be made aware of their 
responsibilities and prepared to serve the government of the day.   
 
Researchers such as Finer (1962) and Stepan (1974), as noted in Chapter 3 of this study, 
commented that professionalism may augment the likelihood of coups, because the military 
institution is politicised and easily manipulated by politicians. On the other hand, Huntington (1957) 
argues that professionalising the military makes them ‘politically sterile and neutral’. Arguing on 
similar lines, Lamb (1999) is of the view that professionalising the armed forces enhances the 
military’s specialisation and skills in performing their primary task. He further adds that it increases 
the educational opportunities available to the officer corps as well as enhances the institution’s 
corporateness.  
 
While the above arguments are helpful in understanding professionalism in the military as a crucial 
element for democratic civil control of the armed forces, it was felt by most interviewees that there 
has been no military interference in the political governance of the country, not because the NDF is 
apolitical and professional, but because of the entrenched party control system in the military.  
 
Political leadership of the country 
 
The quality and maturity of the civilian political leadership provided by the ruling SWAPO 
government has also contributed to stable, civil control of the military, as it seems to have 
succeeded in subordinating the NDF to the political authority through a host of strategies such as 
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appointing retired military officers to serve on boards of parastatals, or to serve in the country’s 
foreign missions. For that reason, one could characterise the SWAPO political leadership as 
having good judgment. As William Lindeke pointed out: 
 
The SWAPO government has so far performed remarkably well, and this has to do with good 
military-related policies put in place, such as the Reconciliation Policy as well as the legitimating 
historical factors behind the ruling SWAPO Party. Citizens largely view SWAPO as the party that 
brought about the political independence of Namibia. As a result, the political leadership is popular 
among citizens, and the SWAPO Party is dominating the political scene in the country (Interview, 
April 21, 2006).  
 
We could also argue that the strengths in the governance of civil-military relations in Namibia were 
derived from the political leadership that had experience in handling the affairs of the military. 
Despite the ‘teething’ problems at independence associated with establishing a national defence 
force and putting it under firm civil control, the willingness of the military to serve the government of 
the day was instructive. It is further argued that political control of the military had been 
consolidated and maintained in the country because of an effective counter-intelligence system in 
place. The Chief Editor of the Windhoek Observer newspaper, Hannes Smith, noted that: 
 
The SWAPO government has put an inflated security system on the ground that monitors the 
military and what goes on in the country as a whole. The security apparatus is wide and effective; 
there is also a strict tap on the activities of the defence and security forces by the national 
intelligence agency. Any disturbance or plot by the military against government can be detected 
within minutes before it happens (Interview, July 24, 2006). 
 
The above claim is interesting as it shows the ascendancy of the communist party control system 
of civil-military relations in Namibia. This practice is reminiscent of the liberation struggle period 
experience, where there were fears of secret agents who allegedly had infiltrated SWAPO. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the military in Namibia is infiltrated by enemy agents 
to justify monitoring the activities of the armed forces. Nonetheless, this case is a typical example 
of the paranoia of the security operatives of perceived enemies to the state. The secret monitoring 
of the activities of the military undermines good governance in the security sector. The prevailing 
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political environment that is conducive to democratic governance of the military may contribute to 
effective civil control of the Armed Forces.  
 
The nature of civil-military relations 
 
The dynamics of the preceding liberation struggle period impacted on the nature of civil-military 
relations in independent Namibia. The People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s 
former military wing, was subordinated to the political control of the party, further strengthening civil 
control of the military. At independence, after SWAPO won elections and came to power, the same 
tradition of subordinating the military to civil authorities continued to be practiced, thus strongly 
influencing the nature of civil-military relations in independent Namibia. Additionally, BMATT, that 
helped in providing standardisation training to the integrated ex-PLAN and ex-SWATF fighters as 
well as the setting up of the structure of the MoD by the British, laid the foundation for the British 
system of civil-military relations in Namibia. In the final analysis, this researcher argues that both 
the socialist and Western models of civil-military relations are applicable in Namibia. 
 
BMATT was an important institutional actor during the integration process of former PLAN 
combatants and SWATF fighters. This view was confirmed by the Permanent Secretary of Defence 
as illustrated in Chapter 4. These were former adversaries with different political ideologies. 
Therefore it was a matter of necessity that standardisation training had to be provided to build 
confidence among the ex-fighters.  
 
Transparency in the Defence Budget  
 
Ideally, civil control of the Armed Forces should be evident in the military budgeting process.  It is 
generally believed that Namibia’s budgets, including defence, are transparent and subject to 
national debate in Parliament. Phanuel Kaapama agreed with this point when he said: 
 
Every year the Minister of Finance goes to Parliament to present and defend the National Budget 
that includes the Vote on the MoD. In this way, the Defence Budget is subjected to national debate 
(Interview, April 5, 2006).  
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However, some observers are of the view that the Defence Budget is not transparent. The National 
Coordinator of Namibia Non-Governmental Forum (NAGOF), Daphne de Klerk, claimed that: 
 
The defence budget is not transparent enough as no-one, for instance, knows how the salaries of 
the military are determined or how much is being spent on purchasing weapons for the military 
(Interview, April 4, 2006).   
 
It is felt such issues should be open and debated by the public. This view is shared by Foster who 
argues that “The structure of the budget has remarkable implications for controlling the military”. He 
adds that “A more comprehensive budget that spells out specific spending authoritisations is better 
to control than one that presents wide spending categories and substantial, discretionary leeway 
for actual expenditure by the military” ( Foster, 2005:2).   
 
Of course, whether the Namibian budget is transparent or not, the allocations are explicitly 
indicated and within the allocations there are what is called ‘discretionary’ allocations and 
expenditure. This is money allocated for special projects in the Defence Budget. But what the 
special projects, are and how one monitors the use of funds to ensure that money for special 
projects is not abused, are some of the things that need to be assessed.  
 
Defence budgeting and expenditure should be a public process because it involves the best 
possible allocation of national resources. Spending on defence must be seen within the context of 
the broader economy of the country. Ordinary citizens and NGOs should be informed or involved in 
the defence spending process. Only then can they be in a better position to know what type of 
Defence Budget is needed by the military. As Foster adds, “The openness of the budget to public 
view, is inextricably linked to control: the more open, the more controllable and controlling” (Foster, 
2005:2). However, it should also be noted that politics has a major impact on this issue in the 
sense that the ruling SWAPO Party has two-thirds majority in Parliament and that not only affects 
the defence and security sector, but the discussion and programmes in general. Phanuel Kaapama 
noted that, “For instance, when there are questions on certain issues including defence and 
security, some people just vote in favour without any discussion taking place” (Interview, April 5, 
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2006). Unfortunately, this is the general political architecture of the country and has an impact on 
transparency and the extent of debate in the national Parliament. Moreover, it has also been 
argued that the level of military expenditure is a political decision which reflects the preferences of 
the government of the day. Therefore the budget needs the ordinary citizens’ support for it to work 
effectively in accordance with other national needs. The budget is not simply a lawfully consistent, 
fundamental, civic fiscal instrument, but also a way of guaranteeing responsibility. Therefore the 
military budgeting process needs to be transparent, efficient and effective.  
 
Nonetheless, not all aspects of the military budget are transparent to the society at large. Pantev  
argues that transparency in the budgeting process allows parliament to execute competently its 
oversight function and helps society to have confidence in the defence and security area. 
Nevertheless, the execution of the values of transparency and accountability has to balance 
carefully with the right for public information and the protection of sensitive information for security 
purposes (2005:94). However, it is significant that parliament should not allow blanket classification 
of information related to defence and security. The executive, through the Minister of MoD, should 
be obliged to justify and explain the reasons for classification of documents.  
 
Budgeting process and implications 
 
The budgeting process in Namibia seems to be confined to the Executive Branch of government 
and the Legislature. It is, however, encouraging to note that all participants in the budgeting 
process, that is, civilian and military planners at the MoD, Ministry of Finance, government 
agencies and the Legislature, play their roles in all aspects of the military budgeting process and 
adhere to the principles of democratic governance. The President of the Republicn Party and 
Member of Parliament, Henk Mudge, remarked that, “The military budget and related information is 
often made public once the national budget is tabled in Parliament” (Interview, October 16, 2007). 
However, much needs to be done in terms of providing major defence and security policy 
documents, defence programmes, implementation and budget audit reports to the public. It is also 
vital for democratic control of the military for civil society such as NGOs, the media and lobbying 
groups to interact in all stages of the budgeting process. 
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Namibia’s Defence Budget has rapidly increased since independence in 1990. Defence 
expenditure in terms of the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has also risen 
considerably since 1994 according to economist Robin Sherbourne (2001). He attributed the rise in 
defence expenditure to the following: 
 
• The implementation of the 1993 Defence White Paper and its provision for the creation of 
the new air and maritime wings, in addition to upgrading existing military bases; 
• The Cabinet directive of 1998 leading to the employment of, 2 000 ex-PLAN fighters into 
the NDF; and 
• The need to finance the deployment of NDF troops in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (2001:8). 
 
Taking the average percentage of military expenditure over 12 years, the country’s investment in 
defence stands at approximately 2.358% of GDP a year. Sherbourne (2001) argues that from all 
accounts, Namibia has been able to afford its military expenditure. Obviously, the money that has 
been invested in defence has benefited the country as it is evident in the current prevailing peace 
and stability. 
  
The interface between the Executive and the Legislature 
 
It is also instructive to comprehend the crossing point between the Executive and the Legislature in 
their relationship to the military. The Executive, through the MoD, formulates military policy, 
procures military equipment and makes plans for future development. The role of the Legislature is 
also defined. Parliament approves the military budget and other policies proposed by the 
executive. Through budget allocations, the Legislature has the most powerful control mechanism 
over the way in which the Executive conducts the affairs of the NDF.  
 
Such oversight function makes the military more accountable and transparent. The separate yet 
harmonizing roles that the Executive and Legislature play in their control of the military serve as an 
important oversight function, to ensure not only its political neutrality but also its subordination to 
civilian control. 
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Parliament has committees that are charged with certain responsibilities, but none of these 
committees has done much at this stage. This view was confirmed by Ben Ulenga, who claimed 
that members of the existing committees do not have the necessary knowledge on defence and 
security matters and, “as such they are not better placed to effectively implement their mandate of 
oversight function over the security forces” (Interview, April 18, 2006). There is need to empower 
committee members to ensure checks and balances.  
 
Parliament is intended to serve as an institution through which elected representatives of the 
people act as watchdogs over the performance and behaviour of government to make certain the 
interests of the people are best served. The watchdog task is normally performed by various 
parliamentary committees. Nonetheless, when it comes to overseeing of certain activities of the 
military, such as monitoring the defence budget, there remains an overwhelming task for the 
Legislature. Pantev argues that the most important role for the Legislature for civilian control on the 
military is the budgetary control (2005:31). This function gives the Legislature the capability to pass 
the budget and to decide on suitable funds for the personnel and material necessities of the 
military. This responsibility is reinforced by the prerogative of parliamentary oversight in all areas of 
defence to carry out particular functions in monitoring the implementation of the defence and 
security policy by government. Nevertheless, the democratically elected civilians are less capable 
of controlling how the money is spent. This problem is further worsened by the existence of ‘secret 
funds’ that are often hidden in other votes of the Defence Budget and therefore are essentially free 
from legislative oversight.  This can undermine state policy and democratisation. 
 
Namibia’s bicameralism has been criticised. However, the merits and demerits of this system are 
not the focus of this study. Having said that, the National Council, unlike the National Assembly, 
has no formal law-making function while its powers of review are limited and can be overruled by 
the National Assembly. Although it can offer its opinion, the National Council has no veto on 
legislation. Therefore, this weakens the effectiveness of the National Council to scrutinise defence 
bills that are passed by the National Assembly. In one way or the other, this also weakens the 
oversight function of the Legislature over the military, which is not good for healthy civil-military 
relations. The other weakness preventing an effective system of checks and balances is that the 
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composition of the National Council reflects the same pattern of the dominant SWAPO Party 
politics that operate in the National Assembly. SWAPO Members of Parliament dominate in both 
Houses of Parliament as a result of lack of significant opposition political parties in Namibia. Since 
the Executive Branch of state dominates the two Houses of Parliament, the Namibian Parliament 
lacks the political inspiration to challenge the policies, programmes and Defence Budget 
submissions of the incumbent government. Henk Mudge noted that when it comes to voting, the 
voting rules of a ‘winner-takes-all’ system often result in an unbalanced ruling majority denying the 
minority opposition the chance to scrutinise military and other related issues. This is not good as it 
does not only undermine the oversight role but also stifles the voice of opposition parties in 
Parliament, which is essential in a democratic setting (Interview, October 16, 2007).  Moreover, 
Parliament, as well as appointees in the MoD, lacks sufficient expertise to deal with the growing 
difficulty of the defence and security programmes.  This is where NGOs and research 
organisations are needed to contribute to the democratic civil control of the defence and security 
sector. In this regard, these organisations may assist by providing training, educating the public, or 
giving alternative expert opinion to government on defence policies, budgets, procurement options 
etc. This in turn may contribute to a broader public understanding of the military, thus strengthening 
civil-military relations in the country.  
 
Consolidated state and democracy 
 
The data presented in the literature review and subsequent chapters of this study suggest that 
Namibia has a relatively strong state with an established democracy. This understanding is shared 
by D. Kellner, Project Manager at the Namibia Institute for Democracy, who suggests that there is 
moderate political and social division, restrained ethnic conflict, economic stability and prosperity 
and effective governmental structures. Moreover, elections are generally regarded as free and fair, 
and where problems are identified, these are regarded as minor (Interview, April 24, 2006). Most 
respondents also accept that democracy has brought an improvement in both economic and 
political rights. In addition, people are generally satisfied with current economic conditions and 
remain confident about the future. As William Lindeke added, there were no incentives and pushes 
from society to say “Rescue us from this dire situation” (Interview, April 21, 2006). This makes it 
less likely for Namibia to experience military intervention in domestic politics. 
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To a large extent Namibia seems to have met most of the requirements needed to consolidate 
democracy as a vital aspect in stable civil-military relations, as was illustrated in Chapter 3. For 
example, since independence in 1990 Namibians have ensured that political institutions and 
processes are set up and strengthened to sustain effective participation of all citizens in the affairs 
of the country. In the past 15 years of independence there have been sustained attempts by 
government, opposition political parties and civil society actors to consolidate the fledgling 
democratic structures, processes and culture in the country. For instance, citizens are free to vote 
and elect their representatives or to be elected. They have an opportunity to express their views 
freely, and have freedom of association. Also Namibian citizens perceive the state and government 
as legitimate. This is significant as it ensures stability, because it enables the government to make 
and enforce decisions without having to resort to violence or coercion to obtain compliance from 
citizens.  
 
A “case study” of testing civil-military relations 
 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, following secessionist attempts by the Caprivi Liberation 
Movement (CLM) to dismember the region from the rest of Namibia, NDF soldiers and other 
security forces were deployed in the region and fought street battles with the rebels. The resulting 
violence caused approximately 2,400 refugees from the region to flee to nearby Botswana. Several 
people were arrested and detained. During and after the attack the military and the police were 
accused of heavy-handedness and were implicated in human rights abuses, including intimidation, 
assault, murder and torture, but no one has so far appeared before a court of law. Consequently, 
there was general concern over these allegations of excessive force perpetrated by security forces 
on the residents of Caprivi, and a cry for justice to be done. Caprivi, a strip of land extending 
eastward out of northern Namibia along its borders with Angola and Botswana, differs 
geographically, politically, and in its ethnic makeup from the rest of Namibia. Before independence, 
the region was heavily used by the colonial South African Defence Force to launch operations 
against SWAPO freedom fighters in Zambia and Angola. The Namibian government accused an 
Angolan rebel movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of 
supporting the Caprivi rebels.  
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Nevertheless, Namibia has signed treaties against torture. Article 2 (1) of the Convention against 
Torture provides that no circumstances, whether a state of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency, may justify torture. It binds each state to ensure that all acts of torture are 
offences under its criminal law.  Namibia is on record that it is against torture, but government was 
reluctant to take public action to investigate whether these allegations of torture were true or not.   
 
Clarifying the role of the military 
 
It is vital for the elected civilian authorities to determine whether the military’s role should be limited 
to defending the country from external threats, as clearly outlined in the Statement on Defence 
Policy (1993), or expanded to include safeguarding internal security, as in the Caprivi incident, and 
performing other civic duties. In deciding on the role of the military, civilian authorities should put in 
place a clear, legal framework regulating the activities of the military in specific missions that arise 
from such roles. The military should not be the first line of defence in internal security or civic 
action. It is the responsibility of the police force to maintain order in the civil society. It has been 
argued that deploying the military in police operations may weaken the professional standards of 
the military (Cilliers, 1995:45). The military is not trained or equipped to deal with police operations. 
Additionally their involvement in such operations opens up the possibility that they can use 
excessive force which undermines their image and credibility. To illustrate this point, it was 
reported that most of the more than 300 people who were arrested following a crackdown by 
Namibian security forces were tortured, and that at least ten died in captivity, some under 
suspicious circumstances (OneWorld.net, 2007). Some members of the NDF were also implicated 
in human rights abuses, including intimidation, assault and torture. Moreover, of concern at least 
with regard to fundamental human rights, such as the right to a fair trial as contained in Namibia’s 
Constitution, is the lengthy trial of more than 120 Caprivians accused of high treason. The trial 
began in November, 2003, and is still continuing. At the same time, a second trial of separatists is 
in progress. 
 
As the literature review suggests, the habit of using the military to perform internal assignments like 
maintaining law and order should be carefully balanced with the military’s primary role of external 
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defence, because using the military for internal security is open to unprepared and unregulated use 
of the Armed Forces, thus evading civilian control. For that reason, it is suggested by scholars that 
legislation must be passed that (1) guarantees civilian control over the military’s internal missions; 
(2) reduces the degree of military encroachment on the roles of other civilian institutions; and (3) 
minimises the risks of human rights violations (Giraldo, 2001:21). Incidentally, civilians are the ones 
who should decide when and how the military will be utilised, indicating what can be done or not, 
the time frame to start and stop the operation, and the sharing of tasks among civilians and officers 
in control of the assignment. The military’s responsibility should be restricted to a support function. 
They ought to be called in only following the failure of police, and they should not be given police 
authority to investigate, arrest or imprison. Moreover, military operations should be subject to 
review by the legislature and civil courts. The latter seems not to have been done during the 
deployment of the NDF in the Caprivi Region to quell a secessionist rebellion. 
 
Despite the negative implications of an internal role for the military, the NDF have been involved in 
support of the police to deal with escalating rates of crime especially during the festive season. The 
military routinely provide law enforcement support to the Namibian Police by jointly setting up 
roadblocks and patrols to minimise criminal activities during holiday seasons. Consequently, there 
has been a great deal of support and general satisfaction from the wider public on the use of the 
military in a policing role during these periods. This is also supported by Giraldo (2001) who 
asserts that under certain circumstances, the military also prefers such responsibilities in order to 
gain resources and salvage public confidence in the defence force. The legal framework must be 
clear and understood by civilians and the military alike to have any impact. Moreover, the military 
should be limited to a support role and called only after the police have failed to perform their 
mandated responsibilities.    
 
The NDF is aware of its shared responsibility to the civilian authorities. The Constitution and the 
Defence Act are clear on what is expected from the Defence Force. The military has undertaken 
peacetime activities in support of civil authorities. However, the Defence Force should take more 
initiative undertaking national projects that are beneficial to the country. The military could, for 
instance, in areas where they have deployed units, assist in activities such as painting schools, 
building roads to link inaccessible areas etc. 
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It is also felt by some of those interviewed that the size of the NDF is too big and expensive 
compared to the military threat facing the country. The appropriate size and strength of the military 
is however, debatable. But what size or capacity of the military does the country need to have a 
robust defence and security? Obviously, Namibia needs a military that is highly trained, 
professional and responsive because it has, among other things, certain international 
responsibilities to fulfil, such as contributing troops to multinational peace keeping forces under the 
United Nations (UN), Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the African Union (AU) 
supervision to bring peace in the world. Moreover, Namibia needs the military capacity to 
effectively defend the territorial integrity of the country by guarding and protecting the marine 
resources against fishing piracy, preventing violation of the national airspace and assisting civil 
authorities and communities.   
 
The military has significantly contributed to peace in the country. As has been illustrated in Chapter 
5, the deployment of the NDF in 1999 along the Kavango and Caprivi borders, to root out UNITA 
bandit activities in the two areas as well as to fulfil the country’s commitment to regional security by 
supporting the Angolan government to fight UNITA rebels, brought peace and stability on 
Namibia’s northern borders. 
 
Internally defence expenditure has been targeted not only at establishing a credible conventional 
force, but as we have seen, demobilisation had to be revisited in late 1999 when thousands of 
unemployed ex-combatants threatened violence.  Consequently Cabinet approved the employment 
of about 2 000 unemployed ex-combatants. To this end, the action taken by government was 
timely and prevented a potential explosive situation. 
 
Likewise, the Namibian government considers multilateral and bilateral contacts as a useful means 
to improve stability and establish confidence and trust. Consequently, the country’s defence 
expenditure has also been used to finance four Joint Permanent Committees on Defence and 
Security between Namibia, Angola, Botswana, Zambia and South Africa, which supports the 
preventive diplomacy and security policy of the country. (This information was obtained through the 
researcher’s personal participation in the preparation and organisation of such joint meetings.) 
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These committees meet annually to address any security concerns along the common borders and 
inside the respective countries. This has effectively resulted in better border security with minimal 
deployment of NDF forces along the international borders, bringing benefits.  
 
Deficiencies in the oversight mechanisms 
 
There is also a Cabinet Committee on Defence and Security (CCDS), as discussed in Chapter 5, 
but many of its operations are not transparent. For instance, most respondents agree that the 
deployment of Namibian soldiers in the DRC was undertaken in heavy secrecy. The public, and 
perhaps Parliament, only found out from foreign media reports weeks later that Namibian soldiers 
were involved in the DRC fighting. The Executive, through the President, deployed the NDF in the 
DRC conflict without the involvement of the Legislature. The role that was played by CCDS in the 
deployment of NDF soldiers is not known. This was followed by a public outcry that the President 
should have consulted Parliament before the decision to intervene. These are the times we 
legitimately urge for transparency from the Executive to ensure checks and balances in a fragile 
democracy such as Namibia. 
 
A link between representative democracy and civil control of the military 
 
Civilian political control finds its roots in the concept of representative democracy. Elections could 
be used as a measure for representative democracy. The principle is that elected civilian 
authorities define and guide national policies concerning defence and security and maintain 
decision-making power over the military. Although Namibia has established a strong and 
sustainable electoral democracy, there are some concerns about the system of proportional 
representation where political parties impose unknown candidates on voters. In the proportional 
representation system political leaders are elected by virtue of their affiliation to the party and not 
because their followers put them there. This leads to lack of accountability on the part of elected 
officials as they tend to serve the party. This may affect civil-military relations because the basic 
principle is that elected civilian authorities define and guide national policies concerning defence 
and maintain decision-making power over the military.  Therefore, lack of accountability on the part 
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of political authorities, may result in the military’s interfering in the political governance of the 
country.  
 
The National Assembly is composed of members who have no direct constituencies. In the words 
of Diescho, they “therefore feel no sense of accountability to those who elected them. If anything, 
their sense of accountability is solely to the party’s head who has the power to promote and/or 
remove them” (Diescho, 1996:8).  This is a concern in democracy because the political leaders are 
not accountable to the electorate, but to their parties. The proportional representation system 
works according to the party-list system, which depends on the party hierarchy, and the party-list 
reflects this hierarchy. The order on the list does not necessarily mean that the best candidate or 
most popular candidate is on top. The more popular candidate with the electorate might in fact be 
put nearer the bottom. This situation could result in depriving the electorate of having their favoured 
candidates representing them in the National Assembly. According to Geingob, “It could also 
undermine the quality of debates in Parliament since the candidates on the top list are not 
necessarily the best” (Interview, October 4, 2007). This is a concern for a fragile democracy like 
that of Namibia. Moreover, in one way or the other it could also negatively affect healthy civil-
military relations, because people who are sent to Parliament may not be able to effectively 
perform their oversight functions over the military, thus causing uneasiness among the armed 
forces. Also they may be viewed by citizens, including the military, as not representing their 
interests but that of their parties. This may create unnecessary tension, thus undermining peace 
and stability in the country. 
 
A democratic culture also appears to be rooted in Namibia. In the 1999 regional government 
elections, SWAPO and the DTA tied by winning three seats each in one constituency. As a result it 
was difficult to elect the Governor of the Hardap Region. Nevertheless, the two political parties 
settled the impasse by sharing the position of Governor. The DTA Governor was allowed to occupy 
the office for six months and the remaining half of the year was held by the SWAPO Governor. This 
proves the existence of accommodation, a strong culture of tolerance, and a culture of inclusivity 
that exists in Namibia.  Similarly, during the announcement of the last presidential and 
parliamentary election results, leaders of different opposition political parties accepted the people‘s 
will and conceded victory to the winner. This is indeed a refreshing change in Africa, where the 
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losing candidate often refuses to accept the results of the election and violence follows. This is an 
area where most African countries continue to fail.  
 
In Namibia, according to Geingob (2006:234), the electoral commission is strong and is seen and 
accepted by citizens as transparent, thus making it easier for losing parties to accept the results of 
the elections.  Indeed, electoral systems have an important role to play in democratic countries as 
well as in civil control of the military because they affect political processes and outcomes. 
Therefore, the electoral system needs to be seen to be fair, transparent and accountable in its 
operations. This in turn creates the system’s legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, thus avoiding 
unnecessary military interference in the political processes in the country. 
 
Namibia’s members of the National Council are elected directly by the constituencies in their 
regions. Therefore it gives them more political legitimacy than to members of the National 
Assembly. The National Council derives its political legitimacy first and foremost from the 
constituencies and the 13 political regions of the country whose members represent in Parliament. 
For that reason, the National Council has the potential to be more accountable to the electorates. 
 
Even though Namibia has successfully held free and fair elections, the government continues to 
seek ways to strengthen electoral democracy in the country. For example, as discussed in Chapter 
9, all the political parties in the Parliament are being funded by the state proportional to their 
representation in Parliament. In addition, some people feel the ruling SWAPO Party has an 
advantage over opposition parties because it has state machinery at its disposal. To change this 
situation it is up to political parties to work hard to create a tremendous mount of support from the 
grassroots level. By creating such support they may get more Members of Parliament after the next 
election. This would increase the financial amount that opposition parties get from Government. 
People will support the party that they think can do something for them or for the country. 
 
The proportional representation system being practiced in Namibia is significant because it 
increases the representation of smaller parties in the Parliament. These parties are likely to be left 
out in a winner-takes-all system. Therefore the proportional representation system ensures that 
there will always be an opposition political party in parliament. For example in the 1989 elections 
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ten parties contested and seven gained representation in Parliament. In 1999 only four parties 
were represented in the National Assembly.  
  
Inadequacies in democratic governance 
 
The weakening of the opposition political parties in Namibia since the 1989 independence election 
could be characterised as one of the significant inadequacies in the country’s democratic 
governance. This is also a concern to democratic civil-military relations, because it weakens the 
system of checks and balances. It might also lead to disgruntlement in the military bearing in mind 
the country’s pre-independence history that was typified by fear and mistrust. The ruling SWAPO 
Party has weakened the opposition by co-opting most opposition personalities into senior 
government positions where they become functionaries of the ruling party. A notable example of 
co-option was that of Mr. Vekui Rukoro, who was appointed as Attorney General. Mr. Rukoro was 
a leader in the South West Africa National Union (SWANU). Additionally, opposition political parties 
lack history, legitimacy, integrity, membership and influence to provide a strong opposition to the 
ruling SWAPO Party (Diescho, 1996: 19). As a result, there is total absence of an effective political 
opposition party in Namibia to ensure checks and balance on the ruling SWAPO Party. This has a 
wide implication for governance as well as on the civil-military relations in the country.  The 
existence of different political parties in Parliament is necessary as they make it possible to have 
oversight function on the Executive and the military as an institution of state. 
 
Namibia has a dominant party system which can be attributed mainly to the fact that the ruling 
SWAPO Party is principally viewed as the party that brought about the country’s political 
independence. There is no effective political opposition in Namibia. Henk Mudge claimed that, “The 
opposition in Namibia has failed completely. We do not really have checks and balances on 
Government. They ruling SWAPO Party do not listen to the opposition (Interview, October 16, 
2007)  
 
Among the reasons for weak opposition political parties are that they are fragmented because of 
the previous colonial regime’s strategy of divide and rule, as well as the tag they continue to carry 
of being associated to the colonial South African Regime (Diescho, 1996: 11). Therefore, the 
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opposition political parties cannot put up a strong opposition against the ruling SWAPO Party. 
Consequently, political parties, especially those in opposition in Parliament, play less of an 
advocacy role in bringing military and other related issues to the fore, because they are often over-
ruled by the ruling party, which is in the majority.  
 
It is interesting to note that the ordinary citizen is also not well informed about the importance of 
opposition political parties in a democracy and their role in democratic control of the military. This 
scenario has resulted in the majority of citizens viewing opposition parties as ‘sell-outs’ or agents of 
imperialism. In addition, the President of the Official Opposition, the Congress of Democrats (CoD) 
and Member of Parliament, Ben Ulenga, argued that Namibian citizens do not necessarily 
understand the role of the military in a democracy, and they are not well grounded in the principles 
of democracy and therefore fail to hold their parties accountable. As a result, the ordinary people 
do not drive the agendas of political parties in Namibia (Interview, April 18, 2006). This is a serious 
concern and challenge to the sustenance of the country’s democratic system as well as to the 
opposition’s role of checks and balances over the military.  Healthy civil-military relations need 
vibrant opposition parties to ensure checks and balances, especially when debating in Parliament 
issues related to the military. 
 
Furthermore, different political parties ensure accountability in the military as a form of political 
control. The role of the opposition is useful in Parliament to sensitise the public to the role of the 
NDF and also to drive home the point that the military is accountable to Parliament. The Executive 
seems to be unmindful of this fact. It seems to regard the need for public account especially when 
it has to do with the military as unpatriotic. Ben Ulenga recounted: 
 
We do not perform our duties as expected. For example the people who are in charge of the 
military do not feel obliged enough to be accountable to Parliament. There is too much secrecy in 
the operations of the military. It is often felt by the Executive that ordinary politicians in the country 
should not know or question certain things such as the purchase of military helicopters or why the 
country is spending too much on the military. Those who question government actions on the 
military and other political programmes are often labelled as unpatriotic (Interview, August 14, 
2006). 
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Lack of public transparency and awareness of certain activities undertaken by government or 
Parliament are issues of serious concern. Professor William Lindeke explained that public treasury 
money was used to send soldiers to the DRC. He elaborated: 
 
It was also reported that a reward of a diamond mine concession was given to Namibia for 
participating in the war in the DRC, but the money accrued from this deal did not come back to the 
country’s treasury. The activities of the mine were undertaken by August 26 Holding Company, 
which is mainly run by the Ministry of Defence. However, the financial credit books of this company 
are audited privately and secretly (Interview, April 21, 2006). 
 
The lack of transparency on activities of the August 26 Holding Company raises some serious 
questions. 
 
However, it is vital to note that political parties and civil society are permitted to engage in defence 
and security issues affecting the country although the level of permission might not be to their 
satisfaction. The participation of civil society serves as a barometer of the country’s maturity for 
civil-military relations. The political parties and civil society actors are also committed to the 
democratic constitutional system, both its formal acceptance and in the observation of rules.  
 
Namibia has good policies in place, but one of the weaknesses is the implementation thereof 
because of human capacity. This argument is in line with what the UN Namibia Common Country 
Assessment (2004) reported, that the country has a very positive policy environment and strong 
legislation, but the weakness is the country’s lack of personnel with the knowledge and skill 
necessary to implement, monitor and evaluate government supported programmes (United Nations 
Namibia Common Country Assessment 2004, www.undp.un.na/2004%20CCA%20%20print.pdf).   
This view is further supported by Du Pisani who argued that one of the deficiencies of security 
sector governance in discharging their duties in a professional manner is limited human resource 
capacity (Du Pisani, 2003:31). Additionally, William Lindeke claimed that Namibia was also among 
the top five countries in Africa in terms of policies on human rights, economic, trade and micro-
economic organisation, stability, transparency and accountability, according to an Afrobarometer 
survey (Interview, April 21, 2006). Afro barometer is an independent, non-partisan research project 
that measures the social, economic, political and other aspects of development in selected African 
 208
countries. It is further argued by William Lindeke that international agencies such as the Economic 
Commission for Africa, World Economic Forum, World Bank, UNDP and African Development 
Bank have recognised the country’s performance. Insofar as policy development is concerned, 
Namibia is at the top with countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Tunisia etc. 
(Interview, April 21, 2006). Perhaps we could say the deficiency as a result of limited human 
resources is the legacy of the political and historical factors that characterised pre-independent 
Namibia. The country perhaps could have had such strengths in human resources capacity if it has 
been independent for many years, but there is a lot of room for improvement in these areas. 
 
 The responsibility of civil society in civil control of the military 
 
NGOs and other civil society actors play a significant role in ensuring effective civil control of the 
military. Nevertheless it is vital for a country to have vibrant NGOs with interest in the activities of 
the military for them to successfully perform that function. It is held that civil society performs less 
well in the early stages of democratic consolidation than they do during transition.  The reason for 
this, as agued by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), is that when a pro-democracy movement wins 
an election, as happened in Namibia, civic leaders are co-opted in government and party hierarchy, 
thereby weakening them. As a result, they fail to perform their responsibilities of holding the 
executive accountable because of the rule of collective responsibility and the economic enticement 
of the office they hold. For civil society to carry out its role of checks and balances over the military 
more effectively, it is vital that its institutions have autonomy from the state in their functions and 
operations.  
 
Namibia does not have a big interface of societal institutions, besides state institutions to promote 
transparency and accountability within the NDF. This is a concern to all stakeholders in the 
defence and security sector in the country. The societal dimension of civil-military relations rather 
than institutional state control is significant in modern democratic civil-military relations. This view is 
supported by Morris Janowitz (1960) who argues that the civil society actors, through the media 
and think-tank institutions such as university, research institutes and non-governmental 
organisations, should be involved on a regular basis to provide independent analysis and 
alternative military agendas. They may also promote the implementation of defence and security 
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programmes. The media, for instance, could play a crucial role on issues of fraud, mismanagement 
and corruption when these are identified in the military. It is unfortunate that most research-
oriented, non-governmental organisations such as the Institute of Public Policy (IPPR) and the 
Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) have limited capacity to play an active role in defence and 
security issues. Think-tank institutions could check particular areas of concern such as force 
modernisation programmes, defence policy, recruitment policy etc. Reports compiled by these 
institutions could have a major impact on decision makers and societal attitudes towards the 
military, thus contributing to the usefulness of the democratic civil control of the Armed Forces.  
 
The ability of Namibian civil society to raise funds locally is restricted because the majority of the 
people are poor.  For that reason, they turn to government for support or to foreign donors, a move 
that often compromises their plans. As such, most of the initiatives of civil society will continue to 
be funded by foreign donors, who in many instances have strings attached to their funding. This 
type of assistance is often viewed with suspicion by the authorities. Disappointingly, in recent years 
there has been a severe cutback in donor funding to NGOs in Namibia. The explanation given for 
the reduction in donor funding for Namibian NGOs is that “Donors generally view the country to 
have successfully mastered the political transition and is stable” (Hohn, 2007:1). But what the 
donors fail to understand is that the country still needs support in the form of funding to sustain 
what has been achieved so far (although one would not advocate for a donor-dependency 
syndrome). Lack of funding for NGOs, especially those involved in military issues, means they can 
not play the vital role of providing both Government and the public the necessary analysis of 
military issues. 
 
Namibians need to be aware of their constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of the media 
and use them to contribute to nation-building. At the same time, there is a need to respect and 
tolerate the rights of others to exercise their freedom of speech and expression. As such the civil 
society and other stakeholders should be conversant with security doctrine of the country and be 
able to speak out on defence and security issues of public importance. As argued by Forman and 
Welch (1998) democratisation can only by achieved by educating civil society about the roles of the 
military. It is also argued that when democracy fails to take root, it can lead to military intervention 
as happened in Nigeria, Ghana etc. (Cawthra and Luckham 2003:10).  
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The media serve as the primary connection linking state institutions and civil society as well as the 
wide variety of organisations and institutions dealing with defence and security issues. It plays a 
vital role of checks and balances. C. Daniels argued that the media was largely seen as a ‘fourth 
state’ (Daniels, 2005:42). This is because of its considerable influence over public opinion, which in 
turn affects the outcome of elections. The media is also sometimes referred to as the ‘Fourth 
Estate’, a term of historical French origin, which is not related to the modern three-branch system 
of government. Even though within the framework of good governance the media is a necessary 
constituent effecting transformation, it has not been easy for the local media to perform its 
oversight functions on defence and security in Namibia. Government seems to be oversensitive 
when it comes to issues of defence and security. As discussed in Chapter 8 of this study, freedom 
of expression is protected in Namibia’s Constitution and the country has a convincing standing 
within Africa with regard to press freedom. However, there are infrequent lapses, particularly in 
regard to the nervous relationship that exists between the government and the English language 
daily newspaper, The Namibian, known for its independent, critical standpoint. This deficiency 
could be attributed to lack of access of information law in the country that would oblige Government 
to be more transparent insofar as dissemination of information on the military is concerned. This 
argument is supported by the principles of democratic civil-military relations as advanced by the 
USIS, that democracy fosters an inexhaustible struggle between two rights, that is, the 
government’s responsibility to defend national security, and the people’s right to know, based on 
journalists’ capacity to access information. Government sometimes needs to restrict access to 
information considered too sensitive for general distribution. Nevertheless journalists in 
democracies are fully justified in pursuing such information (USIS, Principles of Democracy Civil 
Military Relation, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/principles/civil.htm). 
 
The media helps the public and their representatives to come to grips with military issues and also 
to ensure accountability in the operations of the Defence Force. In many instances, the media are 
described as ‘irresponsible’ in their reporting especially when it comes to military issues. However, 
the media play a significant role in democratic control of the military. Obviously the relationship 
between the military and the media is not that good, but the two need each other. It is worrying that 
the media are expected to practice self-censorship when reporting on military matters. There 
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should be a harmonising relationship between the media and the military. The military relies on the 
media to keep a finger on the pulse of public opinion. Equally, the media needs the military to 
provide a sanctuary to thrive.  
 
Restructuring of the society 
 
Considering the degree to which the country was ethically, racially, culturally and linguistically 
divided at the time of independence in 1990, the SWAPO government has generally succeeded in 
restructuring the Namibian society. The ruling party was able to depoliticise ethnicity and promote a 
non-ethnic national identity. It is therefore important to note that, in spite of almost a century of 
colonialism that separated and isolated people according to ethnic origins, fifteen years after 
independence people identify themselves as Namibians rather than by their ethnic origins. 
Moreover, since independence Namibia has had democratic rule based upon a progressive 
Constitution, free and fair elections and the rule of law. For that reason, argues Arnold Tjihuiko, 
civil and political rights are fulfilled for most Namibians (Interview, April 20, 2006). This is indeed an 
achievement that is unique on the African continent, which is mostly characterised by ethnic and 
civil strife.  As a result, the achievement of civil and political rights has also contributed to 
successful democratic civil control of the military.   
 
Perceptions on the level of protection against external threat 
 
Most significant is the assessment of perceptions regarding the security needs of ordinary citizens, 
whether they feel protected from external threats or not. This assessment gave some ideas on the 
relative importance of external versus internal threats. In this regard, most people who were 
interviewed generally felt safe and protected from both internal and external threats. There is a 
sense of satisfaction with the role being performed by the Defence Force in the country. It is 
generally felt that there is peace and tranquillity in Namibia. This could be credited to the founding 
fathers of the nation who created the reconciliation process. There is no tension any more 
compared to the pre-independence period. Nonetheless, as earlier discussed in Chapter 5, there 
was a short-lived disturbance in the Caprivi Region in 1998 which lasted for a few hours, as well as 
the UNITA banditry activities that terrorised the local population in the Kavango and Caprivi regions 
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in 1998/9.  According to William Lindeke, “This was not an internal Namibian issue but an external 
one. Beyond that, the country had been very peaceful, at least in terms of external forces induced 
disturbances. By and large the majority of Namibian citizens feel safe and protected from external 
threats” (Interview, April 21, 2006).  
 
Namibia continues to live peacefully with its neighbours, although the country was involved in 
several minor international disputes that included  a border dispute with Botswana along the 
Caprivi Strip over the Kasikili Island and the Situngu Marshland along the Linyanti River, for which 
a bilateral border commission was set up to seek a peaceful resolution (Government of Namibia, 
Namibia’s Foreign Policy Initiatives, http://www.mfa.gov.na/foreign_policy_initiatives.htm  ). There 
was also some shooting between the Botswana border guards and the NDF in 1998. William 
Lindeke commented, “This was localised and not felt by the Namibian population at large” 
(Interview, April 21, 2006). The others were protests from Botswana residents against Namibia’s 
planned construction of the Kavango Hydroelectric Dam at the Popa Falls in Namibia; a managed 
dispute with South Africa over the location of the boundary in the Orange River; a dormant dispute 
over where the boundaries of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe converge; and Angolan 
rebels and refugees who still reside in Namibia (Government of Namibia, Namibia’s Foreign Policy 
Initiatives, http://www.mfa.gov.na/foreign_policy_initiatives.htm). These were clear, tangible threats 
that were faced by the country at that time. Currently, there are no immediate and clear external 
threats, except for transitional crimes.  
 
Of course the threat of international terrorism is there, but this is an international threat. To an 
extent the proliferation of terrorist organisations is very minimal. Therefore there are very few 
external threats to Namibia. Phanuel Kaapama claimed that there are countries that are living 
under greater threats such as Iraq, Afghanistan, European countries and USA. “A country like 
Namibia advocates for non-alignment and there is very limited Western military interest in the 
country” (Interview, April 5, 2006). 
 
However, there are some concerns about the level of protection against internal threat. There is 
primarily domestic violence and street crimes, although not collective violence. There are also 
incidences of house breaking and car theft, but not car hijackings. Most people in Namibia live in 
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fear of crimes such as murder, rape and house breaking. It is common in Windhoek to see fortified 
and electric fences around houses. All these are signs of insecurity. There are a number of factors 
that are responsible for internal insecurity. These include the level of poverty, which is often seen 
as responsible for incidences of crime. Crime, on the other hand, leads to lack of confidence in the 
security forces and presumed inefficiencies of institutions such as the police, who are entrusted 
with the responsibilities of internal security. William Lindeke claimed that “Every now and then 
there are media reports that ‘The police have insufficient infrastructure’, and ‘There is no fuel for 
police vehicles because they have depleted their budget. As a result they could not go to a crime 
scene and do investigations’ etc. Undoubtedly, this contributes to insecurity” (Interview, April 21, 
2006). Lack of transport cripples police operations as it contributes to delays in the handling of 
police investigations. Coupled with this is the inability of the investigating officers to complete 
dockets ranging from armed robbery and house breaking to assault. This is indeed unfortunate, as 
it undermines professionalism of the force and the justice system of the country as well. 
Correspondingly, Phanuel Kaapama argues that “Those who are well-off see many unemployed 
people on the corner of major streets waiting for jobs, and this also leads to imaginary perceptions 
of internal threats” (Interview, April 5, 2006). All these perceptions are being generated by a 
number of the above mentioned factors.  
 
There is also concern about incidences of theft of protected resources, fraud and drug trafficking. 
However, since law and order are essential for ensuring peace, democracy, economic 
development and good governance, Government has put necessary measures in place to 
strengthen law and order institutions.  To this end, there is a Criminal Procedure Act, although not 
yet put into effect to apply as law, that provides for life imprisonment for serious crimes such as 
treason, murder, armed robbery and rape. It also provides for stiffer minimum sentences and 
stringent conditions before bail is granted. Besides, a number of laws have been passed by 
Parliament aimed at addressing the crime situation in Namibia. Significant among them are: the 
Anti-Corruption Act (Act N0 8 of 2003), the Combating of Rape Act (Act No 8 of 2000); and the 
Combating of Domestic Violence Act (Act No 4 of 2003) (Parliament of Namibia, Acts of 
Parliament, www.parliament.gov.na). Although there has been a significant decrease in crime 
incidences over the years, according to Arnold Tjihuiko, Government should consolidate this 
achievement by adequately equipping the Namibian Police and ensuring professionalism and 
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discipline in the force, in order for it to effectively fight crime in the country. Additionally, the Police 
should combine pro-active crime prevention and reactive methods of policing, with special 
emphasis on the involvement of the community. In this regard, government, together with the local 
authorities, should enhance community policing programmes to further ensure law and order for 
security in Namibia (Interview, April 20, 2006).   
 
Nevertheless, Namibia is an oasis of peace and stability on a turbulent continent. The country is 
ranked number 64 on the Global Peace Index. In Africa, Namibia ranks in eighth place (Maletsky, 
2007:3). The Index, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, ranks 121 countries from Algeria 
to Zimbabwe according to their peacefulness. According to the report, Namibia received a top 
ranking as a result of the low number of deaths from organised internal conflict. The main 
determinants of internal peace were identified as income, extent of schooling and the level of 
regional integration. On the other hand, there was no single common factor which made countries 
score poorly on external peace. All the same, it is believed that there is a link between the 
peacefulness and the wealth of nations, and therefore business is seen to play a major role in 
peace. In this regard, the prevailing peace in Namibia has attracted large business interests from 
local and multinational companies. Business growth in turn should support the country’s socio-
economic wealth as well as improve living conditions of citizens, thus enhancing civil-military 
relations.   
 
There have been recurring droughts and floods in the country, and government is expected to have 
mechanisms for dealing with some of these issues. William Lindeke explained that “It is, however, 
reassuring that many of the internal problems have been well managed. Namibia has laws, 
personnel, structures and institutions to manage these problems reasonably well” (Interview, April 
21, 2006). 
 
Strengths of civil-military relations in Namibia  
 
Most citizens interviewed by this researcher during this exploration study believe, among other 
things, that what has worked well in civil-military relations in Namibia is the fact that the country 
came from a situation that was characterised by mistrust and brutal armed forces during the 
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colonial period. It took a long time for people to accept the military as part of them. Arnold Tjihuiko, 
an opposition politician and Member of Parliament, claimed that after independence there were 
incidences where the new Defence Force proved to be brutal. “They for instance, harassed people, 
but now the situation has completely changed to the better. People have confidence in the military 
and regard them as their protectors. For this reason, the relationship between civilians and the 
military is healthy” (Interview, April 20, 2006). Furthermore, Tjihuiko claimed that what has mainly 
contributed to this positive image of the Defence Force in an independent Namibia is the better 
training received by the military now compared to the training in the past. “The NDF is friendly to 
the citizens and communication is somehow good” (interview, April 20, 2006). 
 
However, it is felt by some local observers such as Ben Ulenga that the military is not open 
enough. It is argued that soldiers are mostly not open in their activities. As such, sometimes 
civilians are not comfortable with the way the military do certain things. It is suggested that civilians 
may get more satisfaction if they know what is exactly taking place within the boundaries of the 
military establishment (Interview, April 18, 2006).  
 
What has been crucial to the success of the model of civil-military relations in Namibia is the 
military acceptance of being under civil control. The Permanent Secretary of the MoD, P. Shivute, 
revealed that the military has found it necessary to be under civil control in Namibia because they 
have seen numerous incidences of coup d’états in Africa where the military was not under effective 
civil control. When soldiers are not accountable to civil authorities, many things are likely to go 
wrong. “It is felt that, for that reason, it is important that soldiers should not be involved in politics. 
Inasmuch as soldiers uphold the Constitution and have the right to join political parties of their 
choice, they should not actively get involved in political activities” (Interview, March 19, 2006).   
 
Namibia is able to have successful civil control of the military because of its liberal Constitution, 
which has various oversight mechanisms. This view is also expressed by Du Pisani who suggests 
that Namibia meets the criteria broadly associated with democratic security sector governance. 
Among these are: 
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A robust legal and policy framework for the different security sector actors; political oversight of the 
security sector, particularly at the executive level of government; relatively clear systems and 
processes for political direction, policy setting, planning and budgeting; security sector 
organizations are accountable to elected civil authorities, however, accountability is stronger 
towards the executive than the legislature; there are other established oversight agencies such as 
the Office of the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and the Judiciary; security organizations 
operate in accordance with international law and domestic constitutional law; by and large there is 
a clear division of roles and responsibilities between the defence and security forces and defence 
and security force personnel are regularly trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner 
(Du Pisani, 2003:31-32). 
 
It is felt by some observers such as Chris Jacobie that since Namibia came from three decades of 
war, the consequences of war are still fresh in people’s minds. It is also argued that the 
independence election results of 1989, when the losers accepted the results, were crucial for the 
prevailing peace and stability in Namibia. SWAPO, the ruling party, won 57%, while the opposition 
political parties won 43%. “The margin was not too wide and therefore the losers easily accepted 
the results thus avoiding conflict” (Interview, April 21, 2006). Equally important is the fact that the 
ruling SWAPO Party and those in opposition continue to work together in the interest of the nation 
despite their political differences. Additionally, the majority of voters in the 1989 elections were 
those who sought the independence of the country. Basically, they are also the writers and 
custodians of the Namibian Constitution.  
 
Namibians, including the military, have so far respected the Constitution of the country. A 
researcher from IPPR, Professor W. Lindeke, argues that “Some of the constitutions that were 
created way back in 1990/92, by countries that were in democratic transition, changed by 50-
100%” (Interview, April 21, 2006), whereas Namibia has great respect and has treated its 
Constitution like a sacred document. The Namibian Constitution was constructed to last a long time 
and take the country through the risks and uncertainties that have characterised its neighbours in 
the region. For example, in Angola there was civil war and in South Africa there was uncertainty as 
the country was in transition to majority rule. In the meantime the Namibian Constitution has laid a 
strong foundation for the country to move forward. As Kaapama confirmed, “the Constitution makes 
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the future continue to look bright for all citizens, and therefore for the military to continue to accept 
the status quo because of the prevailing political stability” (Interview, April 5, 2006). 
 
The strengths of Namibia’s security governance could also be attributed to the ‘special’ manner in 
which Namibia attained independence. Resolution 435, which laid the foundation for security sector 
reforms, and the UN supervised elections, were all ‘special’, and the country continues to receive 
special attention from the international community sixteen years after independence. This situation 
is also evidenced by the presence of a significant number of foreign embassies in the country, 
assisting the transition phase towards strengthening democracy.  
 
Notwithstanding the above argument, inadequacies may be found when it comes to the 
appointment of senior military officers. There is no constitutional provision for the appointment of 
senior military officers such as Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively. These 
are critical posts that require proper scrutiny by both the Executive and Legislature to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the military. 
 
As expounded in the literature review on civil-military relations in this study, civil control of the 
military is a characteristic that illustrates a country’s freedom from military intervention. In this 
regard, Namibia has many such characteristics that facilitate civil control of the military. The 
country is supported by effective institutions such as Constitutional constraints, party controls, and 
defined spheres of military responsibility etc. which have obviously assisted to facilitate civil control 
of the military. The Constitution provides for the structures and principles necessary for stable, civil-
military relations. It clearly outlines the separation of responsibilities between civilians and the 
military in the country. Sharing this view, Simon Lunn, cited by Pantev (2005), said that such legal 
and constitutional systems, that present separation of responsibilities between civilians and the 
military and simplify the bond between the head of state, the government, parliament, and the 
military in terms of the separation of authority, command, and subordination in both peacetime and 
the transition to war, are some of the prerequisites necessary for effective democratic control over 
the military. But this alone does not guarantee healthy civil-military relations in the country. Stable 
civil-military relations depend, mostly, on the extent to which military professionalism is being 
enhanced. It is desirable that political, ethical and organisational features concerning military 
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professionalism are strictly observed. Some of these include: the Armed Forces act consistent with 
democracy and adherence to the country’s Constitution, national legislation and international law 
agreements; respect by the military of civilian rule; respect for the democratic political process and 
the country’s cultural diversity; non-partisanship in relation to party politics; availability of resources 
enabling the military to effectively discharge its functions; and the operation of the Defence Force 
according to established policies, procedures and rules in times of war and peace (South African 
White Paper on Defence,1996:9-10).  
 
Deficiencies in civil control of the military 
 
While recognising the democratic achievements of post-independent Namibia in the defence and 
security sector, there are further deficiencies in civil control of the military in Namibia identified in 
an analysis of security sector governance in the country. These include: 
 
Weaker legislative oversight compared to that of the executive; considerable presidential 
patronage in the  appointment of key personnel; information about security sector planning and 
budgeting is often not widely available, this makes it difficult for civil society and Parliament to 
determine whether a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management of security 
sector resources has been followed in every case; a relatively limited capacity of civil society actors 
to effectively monitor the security forces and to provide constructive input into the political and 
policy process; a somewhat limited human resource capacity in some security sector 
organizations, especially in the domains of planning and budgeting and political control that is pre-
eminently exercised from the centre (Du Pisani, 2003: 32). 
 
Nevertheless, mindful of these challenges and the importance of strengthening civil-military 
relations in Namibia, the Government, through the MoD, has embarked on education and training 
programmes for members of the military and civilians working in the ministry. Additionally, the NDF 
has prioritised training in the following areas: respect for human rights; the rule of law; international 
law on armed conflicts; non-partisanship; civil supremacy over the armed forces; key elements of 
the political process in democracy; the significance of the Constitution as supreme law and 
principles of democratic civil-military relations. One could say that the above scenario is indicative 
of the culture of stable civil-military relations in Namibia.  
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Strengthening civil control of the security sector 
 
It is evident that since independence in 1990 the SWAPO government has been continuing to 
consolidate its grip over its core political support base as well as the state security apparatus. This 
has been done by directly employing ex-combatants, mainly with ex-PLAN background, in the 
public service, largely in the uniformed services. As a result, this has not only ensured civil control 
over the defence and security forces, but also strengthened the status quo. However, this raises a 
serious concern as militarism seems to be seeping into the institutional life of the society with 
dangerous, short term and long term implications. Militarism is a danger to national security. This 
development may lead to militarisation of the state which invariably also leads to the strengthening 
of authoritarian rule and the erosion of democratic practices. The leader of the opposition in 
Parliament, Ben Ulenga claims that: 
 
Also it has an effect on the entire society because they could become permeated by violence 
imagery, as is clearly evident in the language used by some politicians against opponents, such 
‘traitors’, ‘sell-outs’, ‘imperialists’; as well as the idea that it is inconceivable to solve any conflict 
without resorting to the force of arms. Institutions of society becoming saturated with violence and 
ideas of battle, heroes, traitors etc. become a part of everyday life, even in civilian matters 
(Interview, April 18, 2006).  
 
Unfortunately, these signs are slowly creeping into the society. Yet there has been little outcry from 
the public or media, and this relative silence encourages those controlling the levers of power to 
continue this development of militarising the society. This is an area that needs serious public 
debate. 
 
The above observation has been supported by scholars such as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) 
cited in Chapter 3 who argued that the ability of civilian institutions to keep the armed forces under 
control also determines whether the military will interfere in the political governance of a democratic 
country. It has also been argued by researchers, such as Decalo (1991) as cited in Chapter 3, that 
successful subordinating of the military to political authority may be influenced by various factors, 
among them the force of personality of the founding father of the nation.  
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Deficiencies in management of military facilities  
 
Notwithstanding all the various international agreements signed by Namibia as outlined in the 
earlier chapter, there are no guarantees of sustaining the current civil-military relations. The Report 
of the National Council’s Standing Committee revealed serious deficiencies in the management of 
military facilities. Poor conditions of work and other, related issues are very serious, as they may 
eventually lead to disgruntlement within the military and cause some problems in the future for 
civilian authorities. An ill-equipped, poorly trained and unmotivated military will not guarantee public 
defence and security. 
 
Equally important is a military that is well equipped to execute its mandate of guaranteeing 
territorial integrity and guarding against external attacks. Unfortunately, according to the report of 
the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security (2005) the 
equipment and weaponry of the NDF are very old. The equipment is more than 16 years old and 
inherited from PLAN. There is a need therefore to buy new weapons and adequately equip the 
military for it to meet its constitutional obligations.   
 
It is important to challenge the theoretical argument advanced by some researchers such as 
Pantev (2005) and others who hold that the presence of democratic institutions in the country 
ensures democratic civil control of the military. This view has not been empirically confirmed 
because it is premised on institutional determinism. The presence of democratic institutions is not 
the only determining factor that ensures democratic, civil control of the military, but there are 
various other factors such as the age and robustness of the democracy, the nature of the transition 
to democracy, a vibrant political culture, existence of deliberative citizens who are able to raise, 
articulate and engage in important public issues, and political tolerance of diverse views. The level 
of civic education in Namibia leaves much to be desired. Most Namibians are not educated on 
issues of civil-military relations. In order for a civil military relations framework to work, it needs an 
informed citizenry. When the citizens are informed, politicians have to be careful in whatever they 
do, but when citizens are not informed, politicians might get away with doing certain things. This is 
one area where Namibia needs to concentrate on educating members of the public on the role of 
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the military; how the military is different from, say the police; what the military officer can or cannot 
do. These are essential issues that need the attention of the political elites.  
 
In the final analysis, we argue that the existence of a healthy, democratic, civil-military in the 
country is part of the broader political system that includes the following characteristics: (1) a 
government based on the separation of powers and principle of checks and balances – are a 
strong mechanism for guarding against abuse of power; (2) a politically unbiased civilian-
dominated MoD; (3) an apolitical defence force; (4) a strong and independent civil society and 
mass media; and (5) relatively strong and vibrant opposition political parties. Additionally, the party-
control system in the armed forces is practiced to ensure stable civil-military relations in Namibia. 
There is also a tradition of legislative apparatus in Namibia as well as a strong executive culture 
that relies broadly on the authority of civil servants, Ministry of Finance and presidential control to 
ensure the subordination of the military to democratic civil control. Other than that, the above 
issues hold the key to civil-military relations in democratic transitions. Moreover, transition literature 
as discussed in Chapter 3 has often underlined that the military plays a central part in the process 
of democratisation, as they can either obstruct or reverse political changes in a country.  
 
The preceding chapter has analysed the findings of the main research question, what is the nature 
of civil-military relations in Namibia. Since the process of civil-military relations takes place in a 
unique setting, the following chapter gives some conclusion to the nature of Namibia’s civil-military 
relations and practices for improving the implementation of civil-military relations in Namibia.   
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION  
 
Conclusion  
 
The thesis has examined the nature of civil-military relations in Namibia and how civil control of the 
armed forces has contributed to peace and stability since the country’s independence in 1990. The 
study was a response to the following research problem: in a continent that has experienced 
military coups, attempted coups or military interference in politics, Namibia has been stable and 
peaceful. The contributing factors to this stability in terms of the civil-military relations are strong 
control mechanisms such as the Constitution and democratic institutional arrangement relating to 
civil control of the military. The significance of this research is that it has provided background 
information to improve the understanding of the nature of the civil-military relations in Namibia that 
have ensured civil control of the military and contributed to prevailing peace and stability. The study 
presents the argument that historical factors such as colonialism, the armed liberation conflict, 
conflict termination accords and subsequent, conceptual, institutional, political and socio-economic 
frameworks determined the nature of civil-military relations in Namibia. The subordination of the 
military to civilian authorities and how the subordination of the Armed Forces contributed to security 
and stability, featured strongly in this research. 
 
In the light of the theoretical framework and the specific research findings, a number of exploratory 
conclusions may be drawn regarding the nature of civil-military relations in Namibia.  External 
international factors had a significant impact on the model of civil-military relations in Namibia. 
Similarly, civil-military relations in the country evolved over a long time and were largely shaped by 
Western military influence and the liberation struggle experience, which was characterised by a 
system of political, party-control. Civil-military relations started from the Imperial German colonial 
time, through apartheid South Africa’s occupation of the country, and into the liberation struggle 
periods. SWAPO, like other liberation movements such as the ANC, ZANU, ZAPU, FRELIMO and 
PAC, benefited from countries where they operated. Most of the SWAPO exiles were trained in 
countries like China, Soviet Union and other former East European countries which have a strong 
tradition of civilian control of the armed forces through the political, party system.  Also the military 
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in these countries were powerful political actors. These countries had clear and continuing 
subordination of the military to civilian tradition.  
 
The tradition also continued through PLAN during the liberation struggle that was led by SWAPO. 
Consequently when SWAPO won the independence elections, it formed a government in 1990, 
along with the military values, traditions and cultures that ensure civil control over the military and 
that have continued after independence. International trends also created opportunities for 
democratic civilian control of the military and their disengagement from politics as an international 
model. The contribution of this research is the finding that the nature of civil-military relations in 
Namibia is a hybrid of both Western and Socialist systems.  
 
Finally, Namibia’s civil-military relations have the following elements: the existence of proper 
constitutional and legislative structures with clearly defined responsibilities for the Executive and 
Legislature and a parliamentary system of checks and balances; a civilian dominated MoD and a 
military which is ultimately accountable to the democratically elected authorities. However, 
although Namibia is formally a western model, in reality political party controls remain strong to 
guarantee civil control of the military. 
 
This thesis is by no means an exhaustive exploration of the nature of civil-military relations in 
Namibia. Nevertheless, the contributions of this research to empirical understanding and the best 
application of civil-military relations in Namibia include the following suggested general principles 
and practices: 
 
• Tracking and detailing historical factors that influence civil-militaryrelations. This helped to 
explain the pattern of civil-military relations in Namibia, that is, a hybrid of both the western 
and Socialist system that had ensured civil control of the military.  
 
• Transparency in the defence budget should be emphasised to guarantee effective civil 
control of the armed forces. There should be transparency in the defence budget-making 
process, especially in the pre-budget phase. The public, civil society and other 
stakeholders should be given the opportunity to make proposals before the final Defence 
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Budget is tabled in Parliament. The Defence Budget could be more transparent, especially 
if people could for instance know how much the country is to spend on rearmament and 
what type of weapons are to be purchased. The Legislature should have the capacity to 
review and amend Defence Budgets rather than serving as a ‘rubber-stamp’ institution. 
Public hearings on the budget and other mechanisms of economic and social policy-
making and programming should give adequate transparency to compel government to 
make accountability a noticeable certainty.  
 
• Professionalism of the NDF needs to be re-emphasised. In this regard, joint military 
exercises with other military forces in the Southern Africa Region should be stepped-up. 
This view is shared by Pantev who contends that to promote a professional culture within 
the military there is a need to create systems within the armed forces that raise 
understanding of and respect for democratic values and institutions as well as human 
rights ethics (2005:109). These systems are essential to harmonise parliamentary, 
government and civil control over the military.  The same view is also supported by Du 
Pisani (2003) who asserts that security forces and other related agencies should be 
adequately trained and resourced to carry out their activities professionally and in a 
manner consistent with democratic norms and human rights.  
 
• The legislature plays a pivotal role with respect to civil-military relations when issues of 
democratic control are considered. Therefore, legislative oversight is entrenched in the 
provision that the Legislature is the principal forum for deliberating, debating, and passing 
laws (including defence legislation); reviewing defence policy; approving annual defence 
plans, programmes and budget, and expenditure. Nonetheless, there are no mechanisms 
in place to monitor the implementation of the above activities. It is therefore strongly 
recommended that such measures are put in place to strengthen the oversight and the 
implementation process of the above responsibilities. Moreover, the dominance of the 
SWAPO Party in both Houses of Parliament has stifled opposition voices, thus making 
them feeble. This undermines the effective oversight functions of the Legislature on 
defence and security in Namibia. National interest is served when cross-party consensus 
is achieved on defence and security issues. 
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 • There is also a need for a more robust committee system in Parliament for checks and 
balances. This will ensure that parliamentary committee members become proactive and 
don’t wait for bills on defence and security to be tabled. It is not enough for the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security to go around 
the country looking at military infrastructures, whilst there are more important things to be 
investigated. There are many complaints from the public and the military that are not 
investigated, such as the issue of recruitment, promotions etc.   
 
Details of defence issues require much specialised knowledge; therefore, parliamentary 
committee members who perform such a complex task as overseeing the defence and 
security sector should possess certain military skills to perform their mandate effectively. 
There is a need for a substantive parliamentary oversight involving Members of Parliament 
trained with the skills and responsibilities of holding the military authority accountable. 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security should perform the following 
additional functions: examine and report on any major policy initiative announced by the 
MoD; keep under scrutiny the MoD’s compliance with freedom of information legislation, 
and the quality of its provision of information to parliament; examine petitions and 
complaints from military personnel and civilians with regard to the military; examine and 
report on the main estimates and annual expenditure of the MoD; report periodically on the 
impact of efficiency savings on the running costs of the MoD; consider, and where 
necessary gather evidence and report on, each major appointment of military commanders 
or top civil servants in the MoD made by the Executive. Additionally, Committees on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security should be empowered to publish their reports, as 
this could contribute to the development of a culture of accountability and transparency. 
 
It is also essential that Parliament wield oversight of the military by applying effective 
control of the Defence Budget. In addition, the roles of the Legislature in deploying the 
military during emergency and war must be clearly spelt out. There should be a clear 
separation of responsibilities between the military, politicians and citizens. There is a need 
to enhance the existing legislative structure with clearly defined responsibilities for the 
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Executive and Legislative Branches. This will in turn improve the system of checks and 
balances. 
 
• There should be a pool of staff with considerable knowledge in the field of defence and 
security in Parliament to keep the members fully informed on key military issues and 
related information. Improving civilian control of the military civilian training programme on 
military related issues should be pursued. This is supported by researchers such as 
Stepan (1988) who argues for the strengthening of civil-military expertise and strong 
parliamentary committees with oversight responsibilities and sufficient staff to execute 
them. Therefore, there should be opportunities for staff training and development to 
enhance the capacity of legislative staff and members to draft legislation and 
independently analyse issues related to defence and security in Namibia. 
 
The level of expertise available to a committee is significant to determine whether it can 
perform its mandate effectively. In this regard, the number, capacity level and stability of 
the staff servicing these committees (for example the research capacity and its nature –
whether it is specialised or general, separate or part of the broader parliamentary research 
unit, and has access to data and relevant support documentation with the capacity to 
obtain and copy it, has the capacity to call on experts and the capacity to hold hearings 
and to carry out inquiries) should be enhanced and sustained. 
 
The theoretical framework and research findings suggest a number of potential research agendas. 
There are several themes that emerged from this study and that could be considered for further 
research. Those themes include: 
 
¾ Civil-military relations and parliamentary oversight over the military. This is a 
complex subject and requires the understanding of various realities that 
characterise the country. 
¾ The political economy of Namibia and how it establishes the boundaries within 
which civil-military relations take place and how to manage it. 
 227
¾ The manipulation of ethnic and political influence in the NDF being used in the 
appointment and promotion of senior officers, to ensure effective civil control of the 
military. 
¾ Managing the military budget process and the institutional procedures that permit 
or impede them from carrying out their watchdog role. 
 
The above themes could provide policy makers with further understanding of different factors that 
influence democratic civil-military relations in the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 228
Appendix 1: Political Control of the NDF 
Political Control of Defence 
 
President 
 
 
 
 
 
National Assembly 
 
 
 
 
Cabinet 
 
 
 
 
Minister of Defence 
 
 
Chief of Defence Force                   Permanent Secretary 
 
 
MoD Directorate  
 
 
 
Namibia Defence Force 
 
 
  
Army    Air Force   Navy 
  
 
Source: Statement on Defence Policy, 1993. 
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Appendix 2: Structure of the Ministry of Defence 
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Key: 
CDF    Chief of Defence Force 
PS    Permanent Secretary 
DPS    Deputy Permanent Secretary 
NDF COS   Namibian Defence Force Chief of Staff  
D/PERSONNEL   Directorate of Personnel 
D/OPERATIONS  Directorate of Operations 
D/LOGISTICS   Directorate of Logistics 
D/MEDICAL SERVICES  Directorate of Medical Services 
D/FINANCE   Directorate of Finance 
DEF PROCUREMENT  Defence Procurement 
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D/MI    Directorate of Military Intelligence 
ITD    Information Technology Division     
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Appendix 3: SWAPO-PLAN Military Structure 
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Source: G. Dzinesa and M. Rupiya, Promoting national reconciliation and regional integration: The Namibian Defence 
Force from 1990-2005  
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide  
 
 
 
Civil-Military Relations in Namibia: 1990 - 2005 
 
 
Interview Guide (face-to-face) Questions to Senior Government 
Officials/Parliamentarians 
 
 
Legislature: (Parliament provides a critical check on the dictates, authority, and roles of military 
establishments and structures.) 
 
1. Are there specific legislative committees that address defence matters, with 
appropriate staffing to support their functions? 
 
2. Is the legislative environment conducive to public hearings on defence issues, 
including budget, training and procurement matters? 
 
Executive: (The nature of the relationship between the Executive Branch and the military can 
help determine the prospects for the role of the military not impinging upon the transition towards 
democracy). 
 
3. Does a civilian leader exist with commander-in-chief authority over the Armed 
Forces, rather than a parallel authority? 
 
4. To what extent are state functions for civilians managed by executive agencies 
rather than the defence sector (e.g. health programmes in rural areas handled by 
health ministry, road-building performed by Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication etc.)? 
 
Oversight process: (The question of oversight of Defence budgets is one of the most 
revealing about the nature of civil-military relations). 
 
5. Are Defence Budgets transparent and subject to national debate by civilian 
institutions such as the Legislature? 
 
Constitutional and legal provisions: (Civil-military relations assessments should gauge 
the extent to which civilian institutions have authority over potential excesses by the Armed 
Forces). 
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6. Are members of the military who are arrested for criminal activities outside the 
scope of their duty, or who perpetrate crimes on civilians, subject to the jurisdiction of 
civilian courts? 
 
7. Are the police functions separate from the armed forces? 
 
8. How are civil-military relations institutionalised in Namibia?  
 
9. What are the key political institutions in Namibia necessary for the obedience and 
compliance of the military to civil authorities? 
 
10. What are the functions of each of the political institutions identified? 
 
11. How do these political institutions facilitate the implementation of civil control 
over the military? 
 
12. In which way do the identified political institutions each or collectively facilitate 
and or impede the realisation of civil control over the military? 
 
13. Are there any differences between the Defence Policy as formulated and what 
gets eventually implemented? If so, what are these? 
 
14. What are the strengths in the governance of civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
15. What are the weaknesses, if any? 
 
16. What are the things that have worked well in civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
17. What are the things that did not work so well, and why? 
 
18. What is the role of the Ministry of Defence? 
 
19. What is the role of the Permanent Secretary?  
 
20. What is the role of the Chief of Defence Force? 
 
 
21. Who controls the spending level of the NDF? 
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22. Is the Minister of Defence supported by civilian employees with education and 
expertise on defence matters? (Establish the role of civilians in security issues) 
 
23. What can be done to improve civil-military relations? 
 
24. How can civilians exercise better control over the military? 
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Civil-Military Relations in Namibia: 1990 - 2005 
 
 
Interview Guide (face-to-face) Questions to senior NDF officers 
 
Questions regarding the defence establishment and procedures would focus on the role of civilians 
in security issues. 
 
1. Is the operative authority structure a civilian defence minister reporting to a civilian 
cabinet? 
 
2. Is the Minister of Defence supported by civilian employees with education and 
expertise on defence matters? 
 
3. How do you define civil-military relations?  
 
4. Why was it necessary to introduce the British model of civil-military relations in 
Namibia? 
 
5. Is the concept of democracy cherished by the Armed Forces? 
 
6. Is it necessary for the military to be under civil control? 
 
7. How do Senior NDF Officers feel in this transformation in terms of losing 
privileges? 
 
8. Are the Armed Forces aware of their shared obligations to the civil authorities? 
 
9. Does the NDF’s doctrine reflect the convincing vision of the role of the Armed 
Forces within the state?  
 
10. Are there any differences between the Defence Policy as formulated and what 
gets eventually implemented? If so, what are these? 
 
11. Who controls the spending level of the NDF? 
 
12. Does the NDF respect and accept accountability? 
 
13. Who is accountable for the funds allocated to the Armed Forces? 
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14. What can be done to improve civil-military relations? 
 
15. How can civilians exercise better control over the military? 
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Civil-Military Relations in Namibia: 1990 - 2005 
 
 
Interview Guide (face-to-face) Questions to the civil society actors 
 
To establish the extent to which civil society is permitted or wants to engage in defence or security-
related issues. This can be a barometer of the country’s maturity in civil-military relations. 
 
1. Are there non-governmental organisations run by civilians that address defence 
and security issues? 
 
2. Are security studies a subject of inquiry at University of Namibia (UNAM)? 
 
3. Are you permitted to engage in defence and security related issues? 
 
4. How conversant are you with defence and security matters? 
 
5. Are defence budgets transparent and subject to national debate in Parliament? 
 
6. Do you feel safe and protected from external threats? (Assess perceptions regarding 
security needs/shed light on the relative importance of external versus internal threats) 
 
7. Are members of the military, who are arrested for criminal activities outside the 
scope of their duty, or who perpetrate crimes on civilians, subject to the jurisdiction of 
civilian courts? 
 
8. Do you have confidence in the level of protection against internal threat? 
 
9. How do political institutions facilitate the implementation of civil control over the 
military? 
 
10. What are the strengths in the governance of civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
 
11. What are the weaknesses, if any? 
 
12. What are the things that have worked well in civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
13. What are the things that did not work so well, and why? 
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14. What can be done to improve civil-military relations? 
 
15. How can civilians exercise better control over the military? 
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Civil-Military Relations in Namibia: 1990 - 2005 
 
 
Interview Guide (face-to-face) Questions to SWAPO Party Officials 
  
1. Were civil military relations practiced in the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN)? If yes, what mechanisms were in place to ensure obedience of PLAN to 
civil control? 
 
2. What does the PLAN military code say? 
 
3. Who was responsible for the military policy of PLAN? 
 
4. How was PLAN organised and controlled? 
 
5. Did SWAPO have a strategy for the disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration of former PLAN combatants? 
 
6. What are the strengths in the governance of civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
7. What are the weaknesses, if any? 
 
9. What are the things that have worked well in civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
10. What are the things that did not work so well, and why? 
 
11. What can be done to improve civil-military relations? 
 
12. How can civilians exercise better control over the military? 
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Civil-Military Relations in Namibia: 1990 - 2005 
 
 
Interview Guide (face-to-face) Questions to officials of other political parties 
 
1. Are defence budgets transparent and subject to national debate in Parliament? 
 
2. Are there specific legislative committees that address defence matters, with 
appropriate staffing to support their functions? 
 
3. Is the legislative environment conducive to public hearings on defence issues, 
including budget, training and procurement matters? 
 
4. Are members of the military arrested for criminal activities outside the scope of 
their duties, or who perpetrate crimes on civilians, subject to the jurisdiction of civilian 
courts? (To assess the extent to which civilian institutions have authority over potential excesses 
by the Armed Forces) 
 
5. Does a civilian leader exist with commander-in-chief authority over the NDF, rather 
than a parallel authority? 
 
6. To what extent are state functions for civilians managed by executive agencies 
rather than the defence sector (e.g. health programmes in rural areas handled by 
health ministry, road-building performed by Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication etc.)? 
 
7. Are members of the military who are arrested for criminal activities outside the 
scope of their duty, or who perpetrate crimes on civilians, subject to the jurisdiction of 
civilian courts? 
 
8. Are the police functions separate from the function of the Armed Forces? 
 
9. What are the strengths in the governance of civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
10. What are the weaknesses, if any? 
 
11. What are the things that have worked well in civil-military relations in Namibia? 
 
12. What are the things that did not work so well, and why? 
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13. What can be done to improve civil-military relations? 
 
14. How can civilians exercise better control over the military? 
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Appendix 5: Interviews list  
 
Angula, N. (Rt. Honourable Prime Minister of Namibia), Member of Parliament, October 4, 
2007, Windhoek.  
 
Bock, L. Chief Accountant, Parliament: National Council, September 03, 2007, Windhoek. 
 
Chaka, B. Principal Legal Counsel, Parliament: National Council, February 19, 2007, Windhoek. 
 
De Klerk, D. National Coordinator of Namibia Non-Governmental Forum, April 4, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Geingob, H. Honourable Dr. (Member of Parliament), Chief Whip of SWAPO: National  
 Assembly and First Prime Minister of Namibia, October 4, 2007, Windhoek.  
 
Ex-PLAN Informant, April 18, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Hauanga, E., Senior Civil Training Officer in the Ministry of Defence, March 3, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Hencok, T. Legal Assistance Centre, April 25, 2006, Windhoek.  
 
Iyambo, T., (Lieutenant Colonel), Senior Personnel Officer, Ministry of Defence, May 07, 2007, 
 Windhoek. 
 
Jacobie, C. Executive Editor: Republikein, Allgemeine Zeitung Newspapers and Democratic Media  
 Holdings (PTY) Ltd, April 21, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Kaapama, P. Lecturer of Political Science, University of Namibia, April 5, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Kandjeke, J. Director of Finance, Ministry of Defence, July12, 2004, Windhoek. 
 
Kapere, A. Honourable (Member of Parliament) Chairman of National Council, October 3, 2007,  
 Windhoek. 
 
Kellner, D. Project Manager: Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID), April 24, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Lindeke, W. A. (Professor) Senior Research Associate: Democracy and Governance, IPPR, April  
 21, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
MoD Informant, May 20, 2006. 
 
Motinga, D. Director: Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), April, 24, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Mudge, H. Honourable (Member of Parliament), President of the Republican Party (RP), October  
 16, 2007, Windhoek. 
 
NDF Informant, April 11, 2006, Windhoek.  
 
 243
NDF Senior Legal Officer, May 4, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Namoloh, C.N. Honourable Major General (Retired), (Member of Parliament), Minister of Defence 
 and former PLAN Chief of Staff, March 15, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Niikondo, A. (Dr.), Head of Public Management, Polytechnic of Namibia and an ex-PLAN  
 combatant, April 6, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Ndjoba, K. C. (Colonel), Senior Staff Officer Training, Ministry of Defence, June 28, 2006,  
 Windhoek. 
 
Siluzungila, F. (Colonel), Senior Officer: Policy and Operations, Ministry of Defence, November 19, 
2007, Windhoek. 
 
Smith, H. Chief Editor: Windhoek Observer, July 24, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Simunja, V. Honourable (Member of Parliament), Deputy Minister of Defence and former PLAN  
 Combatant, January 16, 2006. 
 
Shivute, P. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, March 
 19, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Tjihuiko, A. Honourable (Member of Parliament), Chief Whip and Secretary of Economic Affairs,  
 National Democratic Organisation (NUDO), April 20, 2006, Windhoek. 
 
Ulenga, B. Honourable (Member of Parliament), President of the Congress of Democrats (COD),  
 April 18, 2006. 
 
ya Nangolo, P. Executive Director of the National Society for Human Rights, March 1, 2006,  
 Windhoek. 
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